A New Dawn for the Second Sex by Vintges, Karen
A New Dawn  







n for the Second Sex





































A New Dawn for the Second Sex

A New Dawn for the Second Sex
Women’s Freedom Practices in World Perspective
Karen Vintges
Amsterdam University Press
Cover illustration: Hydra Constellation Map; courtesy of Torsten Bronger
Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden
Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout
Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by 
the University of Chicago Press.
isbn 978 90 8964 602 6
e-isbn 978 90 4852 227 9 (pdf)
doi 10.5117/9789089646026
nur 740
© Karen Vintges / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2017
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of 
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, 
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) 
without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations 
reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is 
advised to contact the publisher.
To Vera
‘I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine 
which is the main danger’ – Michel Foucault
‘The Gods have their twilight, the heroes are forgotten; but though mythology has 
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 Introduction
In her study The Second Sex, published in French in 1949, Simone de Beauvoir 
brings to light the second-class status of women in history. According to her, 
women were always ruled by men and exclusively def ined in their relation 
to them. She concludes, however, that things for women will turn out for 
the better thanks to their access to contraception, work, and education. 
‘The free woman is just being born,’ she announces, thus picturing women 
as subjects on the move (Beauvoir 2010: 767).
Today, women all over the world are climbing the social, educational, and 
economic ladder. They are entering influential positions on all continents, 
as presidents and political leaders, managers, scholars, and teachers, and 
undertake risky ocean voyages and mountain expeditions. It has become 
obvious: women can do anything. A new dawn seems to have broken for 
them. As mainstream opinion holds, it is only a matter of time for women’s 
liberation to be completed.
However, over the last couple of years, some of my female students at the 
University of Amsterdam started to counter this view, telling me that the 
situation for women ‘is far worse than you think it is.’ And, by way of another 
example from my own experience as a Western, white, university teacher 
(and here I follow one of philosophy’s methods of starting from the bottom 
up, from one’s own experience): why are there only six women among the 
40 students enrolled on the Research Master’s program, while 50 per cent 
of the students in my – predominantly white – department are women? Of 
the – again, mainly white – full professors in the Netherlands, only 17 per 
cent are women. In the areas of economics and politics, inequality between 
men and women in positions of power is standard, as is the case in other 
countries in the West, a part of the world that is commonly believed to 
have achieved the goals of feminism. Could it be that, after all, women’s 
brains are less f it to participate in the upper ranks of these areas, as some 
scientists claim today? Or are women still discriminated against, albeit in 
subtler and less obvious ways? Or could it be that women are unwilling to 
step out of their ‘comfort zone’? And yet another possibility: are women 
perhaps resisting the prevailing models of successful personhood?
Male dominance in the domains and ranks of society where crucial 
decisions and big money are at stake endures the world over. Power asym-
metries between men and women still manifest themselves in many other 
ways. The number of women living in poverty is disproportionate to the 
number of men, and women earn less than men at all levels. Sexual violence 
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against women and children continues everywhere, and has taken on new, 
extreme forms such as a global traff icking in women from poor to wealthier 
countries, ‘jihadists’ forcing captured women into sex slavery and ‘lover 
boys’ luring and blackmailing underage girls into prostitution through 
social media.
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir aims to grasp the hidden currents of her 
time, discussing and integrating social developments and scientif ic results 
in a synthesizing view – as is the task of social philosophy. She concludes 
that ‘patriarchy’ (literally, the rule of the father) will not come to an end 
by legal or economic changes alone, but that ‘institutions, customs, public 
opinion and the whole social context,’ have to change for men and women to 
become equal. Until these new economic, moral, social, cultural, and other 
consequences take place, ‘the new woman cannot appear’ (777). Summing 
up all of these consequences, Beauvoir implies that ‘patriarchy’ has many 
dimensions. From her argument, we can distill the image of patriarchy 
as a many-headed monster, with a legal ‘head’, next to a moral, economic, 
institutional, and social one, each representing practices that should be 
replaced by other social practices. Only then will women’s positions def i-
nitely change; only then will women no longer be ‘torn between the past 
and the present’ (777). The image of patriarchy as a many-headed monster 
not only captures the multi-faceted character of patriarchal patterns, it 
conveys, too, that different ‘heads’ of the monster can dominate in different 
settings, requiring different strategies of attack.1 Women’s experiences with 
patriarchy’s – often ugly – faces differ through time and place, demanding 
a variety of strategies.
The image also allows us to question the standard view in the West that 
feminism is no longer necessary, except as an export product to rescue 
women from ‘other cultures’. Contra this standard view, is ‘patriarchy’ 
1 Yvonne Benschop and Marieke van den Brink (2012) use the metaphor of a seven-headed 
dragon to characterize the multifaceted gender inequality practices that exist in Dutch aca-
demia. In their analysis of women’s discrimination in several disciplines, they conclude that 
different gender inequality practices are salient in each context, requiring a variety of gender 
equality measures. No one-size-f its-all- approach will do: ‘there are simply too many heads 
on the dragon, and each requires a specif ic attack’ (89). Informal scouting practices in the 
medical sciences for professorships need to be countered by a more open way of recruitment. 
In the humanities, ‘the exclusionary effect of masculine information and support systems 
affects women candidates in all phases of the appointment process,’ tendencies that should 
be countered by strategic alliances between women candidates and men in decision-making 
positions (Benschop and Van den Brink 2012: 87). In the natural sciences, selection processes 
ultimately question and measure women’s qualities against a masculine standard. An effective 
measure here is the inclusion of female members of appointment committees (88). 
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perhaps like a waterbed, when pushed down in one place, rising in another? 
Or returning to our image of the monster, does patriarchy rear new ‘heads’ 
when one is cut off? When its legal head is slayed, does it perhaps grow 
others, in different domains? In this sense, are we dealing with a hydra?
As Greek mythology tells us, the divine hero Heracles had to perform 
twelve labours in order to save himself, the second labour being the killing 
of the so-called Lernaean hydra. This serpent-like monster had many heads, 
one of them immortal. Heracles f irst smashed off all other heads, with 
the help of his nephew Iolaus, who burnt the wounds with a torch thus 
preventing the growth of new heads. Heracles then lifted the monster in 
the air, bashed off the last immortal head and buried it. After its defeat, 
the goddess Hera placed the hydra amongst the stars, turning it into a 
constellation (cf. the book cover). From the myth of the hydra we may ask 
ourselves whether patriarchy, too, has an ‘immortal’ head. Could it be that 
it yet has to be slayed and that, until then, it will continue to grow new 
heads? The story of the hydra suggests that defeating the monster is only 
possible in a joining of forces. Can ‘feminism’ be re-articulated again as 
such a joint project?
Currently, ‘feminism’ is an essentially contested concept. Women from 
the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, have developed strong 
movements for women’s empowerment and rights. To many, however, ‘femi-
nism’ is an integral part of the (formal and informal) imperialist strategies 
of the West and, in that sense, is synonymous with Western colonialism. 
African-American women, in a similar vein, have criticized ‘feminism’ 
for representing the prism of privileged white women, who are part of 
the problem instead of the solution. For these reasons, many postcolonial 
thinkers keep their distance from the political language of feminism.
However, the Moroccan women I have met in recent years taught 
me this political language again. From our cooperation in a research 
project, I learned that postcolonial thinkers are sometimes too critical 
in throwing away the categories and ideas that feminism is based on. 
Many Muslim women use the phrases ‘women’s issues’ or ‘gender justice’, 
instead of ‘feminism’; but ‘patriarchy’, ‘women’s oppression’, and ‘women’s 
rights’ are concepts that women from all backgrounds in Morocco use, 
including women from Islamist organizations. Rather than doing away 
with feminism, I take from their – multiple – voices the necessity of ‘de-
colonizing feminism’, i.e. of its critical reformulation in world  perspective 
(cf. Connell 2009; Rhouni 2010).
In yet another sense, such a reformulation seems necessary. The standard 
view of feminism in the West holds that everything is already settled, but 
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for some minor issues. One of these issues is that girls and women do not 
equally participate in the labour market, allegedly due to some remaining 
obstacles and to women and girls not being angry and eager enough to 
compete for jobs, let alone for long-hours careers. State and market organiza-
tions try to remove these obstacles and stimulate women to seek full-time 
employment. Without questioning the current division of paid labour and 
care work, women are supposed to enter the job market on male terms 
under the banner of the values of feminism.
My worries about this type of state- and market-feminism only increased 
when, some time ago, I was invited by a group of Dutch female professionals 
to join a brainstorm meeting on how to raise a new ‘feminist movement’ 
in the Netherlands. Among them were a few parliamentarians, a high-
ranking police off icer, and a trade union leader, all of whom sympatheti-
cally exchanged their experiences of being ‘lonely at the top’. I remember 
a conversation on the road to Rotterdam with one of these professionals, 
who, by that time, was an employee of a prestigious management consulting 
f irm. Why had I not understood a word she said? And why did I leave 
the meeting without any of the enthusiasm I had originally felt? I did 
write an introduction to the f irst magazine of the new movement, on how 
feminism today was more practical than ideological, but the title of the 
new movement made it clear to me why I had felt uncomfortable: it was 
called ‘Women Inc.’
What had puzzled me was was the idea of a new feminist movement 
being an enterprise.2 Women Inc.’s activities and aims are mainly about 
enhancing women’s ‘employability’ in the labour market. Women from 
all cultural backgrounds (Inc. meaning not only incorporated, but also 
inclusive) are mobilized through, among other things, festivals with a 
range of events, such as lingerie shows, workshops for kick boxing or pole 
dancing, and panels on topics such as health and money. Partly subsidized 
by the state, Women Inc. is an organization that exemplif ies the rise of 
state- and market-feminisms that use the channels and mechanisms offered 
by the market to promote gender equality (cf. Kantola and Squires 2012). 
How should we evaluate these current feminisms? Has ‘feminism’ been 
confiscated as a political term to the extent that its meanings range from 
2 Women Inc. today has over 16 employees who function as program makers, project leaders 
and coordinators. It is f inanced by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, local govern-
ments, organizations and foundations. It has worked for the Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Science, The Ministry of Internal Affairs, Delta Lloyd, ABN AMRO bank, Hurkmans Consultancy, 
Microsoft, and several other companies, as well as several local governmental institutions. 
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‘the invasion of other countries’ to ‘shopping, pole-dancing, even eating 
chocolate’ (Power 2009: 12, 27)?
Maybe it is no coincidence that, in recent years, interest in the work 
of Beauvoir has grown.3 Her 800-page study The Second Sex generally 
counts as the founding text – or ‘exemplar’ – of contemporary feminism 
(cf. Vintges 1998). Are people perhaps interested once more in the ideas and 
ideals of ‘original’ feminism? Should we return to its initial meanings and 
reclaim the notion versus its current confiscations? But what does it stand 
for, and how do we distinguish it from its current mainstream versions? 
The present study aims to answer these questions as well as to articulate 
some inspiring guideposts for change (cf. Taylor 2004).
In order to push the critical perspective offered by Beauvoir’s theoretical 
work, some concepts from the work of Michel Foucault will be introduced 
in this study. His mid- and f inal works provide important clues to update 
Beauvoir’s stances on who women are today –an issue that Foucault himself 
did not address, but which is the main theme of the present study. Especially 
his f inal work offers some concepts that enable us to revitalize Beauvoir’s 
notions of politics and ethics, allowing for a critical reformulation of femi-
nism in world perspective.
Outline
Building on the theories of Foucault and Beauvoir, the present study is an-
chored in current academic debates as well as in the original vocabulary of 
contemporary feminism (cf. Vintges 1998). The f irst chapter discusses both 
Beauvoir’s and Foucault’s critiques on current ‘neoliberal’ models of self and 
society, and distills from their work a theoretical toolset that f its a cultur-
ally plural, global feminist perspective. The chapter argues that Foucault’s 
f inal work on ethics exhibits some striking similarities with Beauvoir’s 
perspectives as developed in her essay The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), which 
allow us to synthesize (the best elements of) their approaches in a concept 
of ‘freedom practices’. The latter concept will be def ined in terms of f ive 
core characteristics in order to specify it as an analytical tool. From this 
approach women’s ‘freedom practices’ i.e. their critically creative ethical 
life projects, become visible, several of which will be sketched at the end 
of the chapter.
3 This observation is based on my own experience.
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Chapter 2 discusses the culturally plural character of the concept of 
freedom practices as distilled from the works of Foucault and Beauvoir. It 
argues that the concept comprises a culturally plural notion of an embed-
ded ethical self that surpasses notions of moral autonomy. The concept, 
moreover, is culturally plural in yet another sense, in that it comprises 
cultural repertoires in addition to verbal ones. Building on the concepts of 
Susanne Langer (1960), women’s freedom practices are articulated as com-
prising several ‘keys’, especially the ‘presentational forms’ of rite, art, and 
myth, alongside verbal language. From its culturally plural character, the 
concept of freedom practices in principle allows for a critical reformulation 
of feminism in world perspective. Against dominant readings of Beauvoir’s 
exemplary text, The Second Sex, I will argue that this work supports a critical 
reformulation of today’s mainstream feminism. Re-reading The Second Sex 
through the lens of Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity, the work’s culturally 
plural perspective comes to the fore. Moreover, many of The Second Sex’s 
analytical concepts turn out to be still relevant in the light of new theo-
retical, scientif ic f indings and current social and political developments. 
The work also gives us a clue to specify what is the ‘immortal’ head of the 
patriarchal hydra today. The chapter ends by sketching some examples of 
women’s freedom practices in world perspective.
Chapters 3 and 4 elaborate concrete examples of women’s freedom 
practices that oppose the different faces of the hydra’s ‘immortal’ head, in 
various ‘keys’. Chapter 3 discusses examples of Muslim women’s agencies 
and freedom practices, both past and present, in the domain of religion, in 
a synthesis of the research project ‘Women and Islam: New Perspectives’.4 
The chapter draws on the work of its participants, especially on the dis-
sertation of Aziza Ouguir that examines the legendary stories on the lives 
of Muslim women saints in Morocco’s past (Ouguir 2013); on Fatima Sadiqi’s 
and Moha Ennaji’s work on Moroccan feminism; and on Marjo Buitelaar’s 
research on Dutch Moroccan women’s life stories. It also presents the 
work of Muslim women scholars who have uncovered the Qur’an’s gender 
egalitarian message. Finally, the chapter discusses some of the conditions of 
Muslim women’s lives in the West as well as a few examples of cross-cultural 
feminist media strategies.
Chapter 4 presents several freedom practices of women and girls that 
oppose patriarchy’s ‘immortal’ head in the West. As a social philosopher, 
trained to elucidate social patterns in ‘the multiplicity of forms’, it took me 
some time to specify patriarchy’s dominant faces in this context. Moroccan 
4 Cf. Acknowledgements.
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colleague Fatima Sadiqi handed me an important clue telling me that 
‘while we as women in the Arab world are oppressed via space, you Western 
women are oppressed through the image’ (Sadiqi 2013). Another part of the 
answer was handed to me by Beauvoir’s chapter on myths in The Second 
Sex, the studies of British feminists Angela McRobbie (2004) and Rosalind 
Gill (2008) and by Camille Paglia’s study Sexual Personae (1990). I will 
specify the contours of patriarchy’s immortal head in the West in a discus-
sion of current Hollywood f ilms, especially The Twilight Saga, four books 
and f ive f ilms that in recent years created a ‘global hype’ (Bucciferro 2013).
A concluding chapter evaluates the extent to which we are witnessing a 
new dawn for women and the extent to which Beauvoir’s study The Second 
Sex is still relevant to our times and deserves a new dawn as well. Contra 
mainstream feminism in its colonial, state, and market versions, a ‘feminism 
in a new key’ will be articulated, consisting of women’s culturally plural 
freedom practices, each hunting the hydra in their own contexts and ‘keys’ 
– with mutual support.
The reader who is primarily interested in the thematic content of this 
study should skip the following section on its methodological backgrounds.
Method
Postcolonial authors rightly argue that Western philosophy should revise its 
concepts and perspectives in the context of our globalized world. Foucault 
hinted at this as well, when he said: ‘European thought f inds itself at a 
turning point. This turning point, on an historical scale, is nothing other 
than the end of imperialism. The crisis of Western thought is identical 
to the end of imperialism’ (Foucault 1999: 113). He added that there is not 
yet a philosopher ‘who marks out this period. For it is the end of the era 
of Western philosophy. Thus, if philosophy of the future exists, it must be 
born outside of Europe, or equally born in consequence of meetings and 
impacts between Europe and non-Europe’ (113).
In my view, Foucault can be counted as a philosopher who developed 
some critical notions for a philosophy of the future. Using ancient Greek 
ethics, i.e. a pre-modern era, as a stepping stone, he came up with a new con-
cept of freedom in contrast with the dominant Western ones of individual 
autonomy and authenticity. I take his concept of ‘practices of freedom’ as 
a serious contribution to the postcolonial project of developing concepts 
that account for diversity and different cultural settings. As a consequence, 
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new political and normative perspectives emerge, with some remarkable 
similarities to Beauvoir’s ideas, updating her views in a timely manner.
But what about Beauvoir’s ‘grand theory’ of patriarchy from a Foucauldian 
approach? Foucault was opposed to ‘total’ theories of society. To him, history 
and society are too complex to be covered by one ‘totalizing approach’ 
(Foucault 2003: 6). Societies consist of various and dynamic patterns of 
power one Logic cannot account for. All-encompassing theories, moreover, 
have inhibiting effects, putting brakes on discontinuous, particular, and 
local critiques.
Rather than covering the development of societies via one central con-
cept, as grand theories do, Foucault argues for a variety of analytical tools 
to capture concrete patterns of power in history. At the background of his 
methodological concern is what William Walters (2012) calls Foucault’s 
‘patchwork’ conception of society (Walters 2012: 78). Foucault’s analyses of 
dominant power practices (for instance, current ‘neoliberal governmen-
tal’ ones – see Chapter 1) should never be taken as a new grand theory of 
society and socio-cultural change, as Huub van Baar (2011) and Stephen 
Collier (2009) argue. Walters (2012) interestingly introduces the concept of 
‘polytemporality’ in this respect. We should ‘grasp the contemporary as a 
rather polytemporal state of affairs […], a time combining multiple political 
techniques and styles of government, not all of which cohere or answer to 
a single logic of development’ (Walters 2012: 10, cf. 40).
Dominant patterns of power thus exist in combination with others from 
different times and from different descent, contradicting or overlapping 
each other, or converging into new assemblages. ‘Genealogical’ research 
should track and trace these power patterns by ‘studying upwards’ and 
f inding out what their nodal points are – decisive for who we are today. 
However, I would like to draw attention to the fact that, according to 
Foucault, grand theories do make sense. After discussing ‘the inhibiting 
effect specif ic to totalitarian theories,’ he adds: ‘(n)ot that all-encompassing 
and global theories haven’t, in fairly constant fashion, provided – and don’t 
continue to provide – tools that can be used at the local level; Marxism and 
psychoanalysis are living proof that they can’ (Foucault 2003: 6). In the 
words of Foucault, analytical work ‘cannot proceed without an ongoing 
conceptualization,’ but this conceptualization ‘implies critical thought – a 
constant checking’ (Foucault 2000: 327, quoted in Walters 2012: 42).
A ‘genealogical’ approach can take in grand theories, since strong patterns 
need strong theories, but it discloses these patterns in their entanglement 
with other power practices. Total theories have ‘provided tools that can be 
used at the local level only when, and this is the real point, the theoretical 
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unity of their discourse is so to speak, suspended, or at least cut up, ripped 
up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured, dramatized, 
theatricalized, and so on’ (Foucault 2003: 6). Beauvoir’s grand theory of 
patriarchy, which involves a single logic of development of human history, 
should equally be torn and cut up, and be re-articulated as a set of analytical 
tools that allow us to study patterns of patriarchal power in their current 
various conf igurations, in ‘a constant checking.’ To paraphrase Laura 
Nader (2008), we should study upwards, and downwards, and sideways 
simultaneously – an approach that can be re-interpreted as well as an 
intersectional one (cf. Harris 2015).5
Finally, from Foucault’s analysis of the entanglement of science and nor-
malizing power practices, we can learn that it does not take long for scientific 
results to be adopted in government policies and procedures. In the process of 
trying to get funding for a research project employing Muslim women’s own 
perspectives, I received an email of a Dutch-Moroccan woman activist asking 
me what the heck I was thinking. Muslim women in the Netherlands are 
very suspicious of questionnaires and other top down survey research, and 
rightly so. As Foucault formulated it, ‘visibility is a trap’ (Foucault 1979: 200). 
Science reports classify people and are often used to intervene in their lives 
in controlling, social engineering ways (cf. Spivak 1988).
Foucault’s analysis of the entanglement of power and knowledge, how-
ever, did not stop him from doing concrete research, nor from developing 
theoretical concepts and toolsets. His work aims to uncover what he calls 
‘subjugated knowledges’: types of knowledge that are disqualif ied as insuf-
ficiently elaborated, non-scientific and naive. At stake are ‘knowledges from 
below’ that deserve to be revealed by using the tools of scholarship (Foucault 
2003: 7). What makes critique possible at all is exactly ‘the reappearance 
of what people know at a local level, of these disqualif ied knowledges’ (8). 
In a similar vein, the present study aims to uncover women’s and girls’ 
subjugated knowledges, which deserve to be revealed instead of disqualified 
and marginalized, as repertoires of critique and creative transformation of 
dominant models of self and society.
Walters (2012) discusses Foucault’s approach to scientif ic research in 
terms of map making, referring to Foucault’s own ironic description of 
himself as a cartographer (Walters 2012: 141). He adds that ‘there is nothing 
innocent about cartography’ since maps ‘erase as much as they reveal’ (142). 
As Ronald Giere (2006) argues, cultural background, conventions of map 
5 Nader (1969) launched the concept of ‘studying up’ for doing f ieldwork among the powerful 
rather than the powerless. I therefore use the term ‘studying upwards.’ 
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making, and the designation and specif ication of what features are 
mapped, all determine ‘a perspective from which the region is mapped’ 
(Giere 2006: 75).6 However, we can and should discuss our maps in order 
to make better ones. This is what academics do, in reference to the world 
and to other theories, i.e. earlier map making. And this is what demarcates 
academic work from other social power practices or language games, such 
as literature, poetry, religion or spirituality. If there were a def inition of 
academic work at all, I would prefer it to be: the art of accountable map 
making.
6 While Giere (2006) mainly refers to scientif ic ‘models’ in terms of representational maps, 
other authors apply Giere’s scientifc perspectivism to scientif ic theory as such. With thanks to 
Hans Radder.
1 Women’s Freedom Practices
Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986) is the author of an extensive oeuvre. Apart 
from The Second Sex, a series of autobiographies, a play, some philosophical 
articles and reviews, and a voluminous study on the position of old people 
throughout history, she wrote philosophical novels, a genre that gave her the 
opportunity to express her ideas about human existence in a non-academic 
form. In most of her novels she outlines, in indirect ways, her philosophical 
concept of an ethical self in contrast to other models of personhood – as is 
the scheme of Les belles images. 
Laurence, the central character in the novel Les belles images – pub-
lished in French in 1966 – is an advertising manager immersed in a world 
of ‘pretty pictures.’ We meet Laurence as she broods over a slogan to sell 
wooden panels, going through recent psychological surveys and question-
naires that once more show that people want ‘novelty, but with no risk’ 
(Beauvoir 1968a: 36). Laurence knew her job: ‘I am not selling wooden panels: 
I am selling security, success and a touch of poetry into the bargain’ (20). 
In addition to being a career woman with developed market skills, she is 
successful in her personal life as well, with an affluent architect husband, 
two daughters, a lover on demand, and a family house in the country. All 
seems to be well: ‘(e)verything was clear, fresh, perfect: the blue water in 
the swimming pool, the opulent sound of the tennis-balls, the sharp white 
rock of the peaks, the rounded clouds in the smooth sky, the smell of the 
pines’ (19). But cracks begin to show.
Super Woman and Organization Man
‘Every morning when she opened her shutters Laurence gazed at a splendid 
glossy photograph’ (19). Being an advertising specialist, ‘she knew too much 
about how a set was put together – it fell to pieces under her eyes’ (91). 
Laurence increasingly feels like the king who turned everything he touched 
into gold: ‘(e)verything she touched turned into a picture’ (18), including 
her daughter Catherine.
Laurence had always been a pretty picture herself, a ‘faultless child, an 
accomplished adolescent, a perfect young woman,’ ‘so clean-cut, so fresh, 
so perfect’ (19). But Catherine suddenly starts to ask diff icult questions, 
about why people are poor and why there is war in the world, and she cries 
at night in her sleep. Pressed by family members, Laurence arranges for her 
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daughter to see a psychologist. Catherine is advised to break contact with 
a new girlfriend, who worries too much about ‘sad things’ in the world (67). 
Laurence, against the will of her family, ignores the expert advice. Raised 
as socially unaware, she wants a different life for her daughter.
According to Mario Vargas Llosa, Les belles images contains a critique of 
people’s alienation in modern, consumerist society. The work describes the 
depersonalization of human beings and their subtle transformation into 
robots (cf. Vargas Llosa 1996: 56-57). To Irène Pagès (1975), Les belles images 
deals with an attitude of absence and a f light from everyday existence 
(Pagès 1975: 133). However, the main characters in the novel, rather than 
coming across as depersonalized robots or absent minded people, present 
as individuals who are highly invested in their own daily lives. Les belles 
images shows us a deep modification of the modern subject, rather than the 
end of man. It shows us a new – increasingly global – model of personhood: 
the subject of a society of (risk) management, who is a risk-averse executive 
in work and life, focused on status and success and, above all, security.
In her novel, Beauvoir sketches the Americanized way of life of the Paris-
ian upper class in the 1960s. She does so along the lines of William Whyte’s 
1956 bestseller The Organization Man, to which she repeatedly refers in 
her autobiography.1 According to Whyte, the American way of life in the 
1950s had become a life under the protection of organizational planning. 
As corporations increasingly bureaucratized, in their pursuit of success, 
security, and safety, these norms spilled over into American society at large. 
At stake is a collective organization of the American population by planned 
thought and calculative action with the help of the social sciences. Whyte 
analyses the science-based social engineering of people’s life and work, and 
focuses especially on ‘the personal impact that organization life has had 
on the individuals within it’ (Whyte 1956: 4).
According to him, modern society’s bureaucratization, as analysed by 
Max Weber, has most poignantly affected the United States (cf. 5), since it 
went together with a new ideology, holding that the ends of organization 
and morality coincide and that science-based techniques can lead to a 
f inite, achievable harmony (cf. 8). The Organization Man has internalized 
this ideology. As ‘the man of success’, he is actively participating in, and 
endorsing, a corporate society that he instead should resist. Look at the 
growth of business administration courses at universities, Whyte concludes 
with horror; look at the new suburbia, these dormitories where Organization 
1 Authors of the Foucauldian ‘governmentality school’ discussed later in this Chapter as well refer 
to Whyte’s famous study The Organziation Man published in1956 (cf. Miller and Rose 2008: 119). 
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Man lives. And see the growth of personality testing. Pointing out how 
psychological experts are involved in the making of organization man, 
Whyte aptly concludes his book with an appendix entitled ‘How to cheat 
on personality tests’.2
Beauvoir claims that in her travel account America Day by Day (1999), 
published in French in 1948, she had already reached similar conclusions 
on the American way of life: ‘no one, as far as I know, was talking about 
the organization man yet; but that was whom I described in my reports’ 
(Beauvoir 1968b: 132-133). She specif ies that she was struck by how even very 
young boys and girls employed only the abstract measure of money (cf. 133). 
Whyte’s study shows that America has become ‘essentially a consumer 
society […] measuring value by success’ (385) – with people living in suburbs 
where space, air, light and order prevail, and where the world is one big 
‘kitchen garden’ (439).
In her novel Les belles images, we also encounter Organization Man, 
who measures his worth in terms of status, success, and safety. Laurence’s 
father and her husband – who calls himself a ‘feminist’ – are convinced 
that technical organization will change all societies for the better: the ‘gap 
between the capitalist and socialist countries will soon be done away with’ 
(Beauvoir 1968a: 11). The world will form a single entity and men will no 
longer suffer: ‘thanks to synthetic proteins, birth control, automation, and 
atomic energy it was reasonable to think that by about 1990 the civilization 
of abundance and leisure would be in existence’ (61).
The main female characters, Laurence and her mother, ‘design’ their lives 
by organizing and safeguarding their consumption patterns, status, and 
success. Guaranteeing themselves a marital status is a necessary ingredi-
ent to their safety, since – as Laurence’s mother expresses it, ‘(s)ocially a 
woman without a man counts for nothing’ (119), a woman without a man is 
‘a half-failure, a kind of derelict’ (120). Laurence needs her family around her 
as a ‘cocoon,’ alongside her career and luxurious life-style, and is keen ‘to 
prevent anything breaking in upon this security’ (38). The female characters 
in the novel represent the ‘woman of success,’ i.e. Organization Woman.
2 To the sociologist Max Weber mentioned by Whyte, bureaucracy was a necessary element 
of modern society. Weber famously concluded that: ‘once it is fully established, bureaucracy is 
among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy’ (Weber 1968: 987). In contrast, 
Whyte optimistically argues that if ‘organization has been made by man; it can be changed by 
man’ (Whyte 1956: 14). A new balance between individual and organization is needed. To Whyte, 
we need to know ‘how to cooperate with The Organization but, more than ever, so do we need 
to know how to resist it’ (13). Whyte concludes that education is central to the problem (cf. 447) 
and that a revitalizing of the humanities is decisive (cf. 106-107, 109). 
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In Beauvoir’s posthumously published novella Misunderstanding in Mos-
cou (2011), probably dating as well from 1966 (cf. Keefe 2011), we come across 
another example of the Organization Woman. As one of the characters in 
the novel expresses it:
She’s the “super woman” type ( femme totale). […] There are a lot like that 
in Paris. They have some sort of career, they claim to dress well, to engage 
in sports, look after their house perfectly, bring up their children very 
well. They want to prove to themselves that they can be successful at all 
levels. And, in fact, they spread themselves too thinly, they succeed in 
nothing (Beauvoir 2011: 226).
The Super Woman type also appears in Beauvoir’s novel The Woman De-
stroyed (1971), published in French in 1967. These women claim to ‘succeed 
on every level. And they don’t really care deeply about anything at all’ 
(Beauvoir 1971: 19).
In Les belles images, Super Woman’s way of life, with her focus on personal 
success and safety in all domains of life, is contrasted by Beauvoir with 
another way of life that is about friendship and a concern for others. The self-
regarding lifestyle of Super Woman Laurence is contrasted with the voice of 
her former teacher, who told her ‘(s)ay what you think’ (Beauvoir 1968a: 31); 
‘[f]orm your own opinion’ (37); and: ‘(i)t will depend upon us whether these 
deaths [of the past wars] were useless or not’ (22). Laurence f inally decides 
that, rather than enclosing her daughter in a world of beautiful pictures, she 
should allow her to experience the real world and get involved with other 
people. She concludes: ‘(n)ot Catherine. I shan’t let what has been done to 
me be done to her. What have they made of me? This woman who loves no 
one.’ Her daughter won’t be deprived of her girlfriend, and is not going to 
see the psychologist any more. She maybe then ‘will get herself out of it. 
Out of what? Out of this night. Of ignorance, of uncaring’ (152).
For a better understanding of the contours of this more ‘caring’ way of 
life, we must turn to Beauvoir’s essays on ethics, especially to The Ethics of 
Ambiguity (1948).
An Ethics of Ambiguity
Together with the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, Beauvoir 
always opposed abstract morality: both view moral maxims or dogmas as 
false universalities. In her essay The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), published 
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in French under the title Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté (1947), Beauvoir 
explains why she believes this is the case, and how, instead, we should 
conceive of ethics as always radically situated.
She starts her essay by pointing out ‘the ambiguity’ of our human 
condition: as human beings we are a ‘thinking reed.’3 We experience 
ourselves as consciousness, but also as a body, ‘a thing crushed by the 
dark weight of other things’ (Beauvoir 1948: 7). For this dualist approach 
she refers to Sartre’s study Being and Nothingness  (2001), published in 
French in 1943 (cf.  10-12). In this work, Sartre argues that, in contrast 
with ‘immanent beings’ or things in the world, human consciousness 
is always at a distance of being. It acts, so to speak, as a spotlight that 
discloses ‘being’, ‘transcending’ it instead of coinciding with it. Since 
human consciousness involves this distance by def inition, it is devoid of 
any content or ‘being’. We are, therefore, free by def inition, or as Sartre 
has it, we are ‘ontologically’ free, but we experience this as emptiness 
and ‘lack’ of being. To compensate for this lack we seek the recognition 
of others of ourselves as ‘being’ a consciousness. But, according to Sartre, 
this is impossible, since our perception of our fellow humans turns them 
into things as well, or – vice versa – we turn into a thing under their gaze. 
There will always be enmity and struggle between consciousnesses, ac-
cording to Sartre, about who looks and who is looked at: the f irst remains 
a – lonely – consciousness, the second becomes a bodily thing in the world, 
not only for the other but for himself as well, since he petrif ies under the 
gaze of the other.
After a brief introduction to Sartre’s mind-body dualism in Being and 
Nothingness, Beauvoir’s essay sets off in another direction. While many 
philosophies have tried to hide the ‘tragic ambiguity’ from which we 
suffer (7), we have to accept it, and precisely by doing so we can surpass 
it. If we assume our ambiguity by an ethical ‘conversion’ (13), we accept 
our freedom: instead of ‘wanting to be,’ we are ‘wanting to disclose be-
ing’ (12). We then exactly coincide with who we are. Wanting to disclose 
being, we experience ourselves as ‘the positive existence of a lack’ (57, 
cf. 13; cf. Langer 2003: 94). We take upon us that we have to disclose the 
world in concrete projects, and realize our existence as presence in the 
world, in the shape of an ‘engaged freedom’ (Beauvoir 1948: 10). The ethical 
conversion involves that we turn into a situated, incarnated – embodied 
– existence, experiencing emotions like pride, joy, and passion, but also 
3 Beauvoir refers here to a famous phrase of seventeenth-century philosopher Blaise Pascal: 
‘Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed.’
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desire, hate, love, and friendship, in close contact with the world and our 
fellow men.4
Beauvoir, then, in reference to the philosopher Hegel, examines how our 
freedom is related to the freedom of others. We f ind a justif ication of our 
own existence ‘only in the existence of other men’ (72): ‘each one depends 
upon others’ (82). The ethical ‘conversion’ of willing freedom therefore im-
plies willing the freedom of others: ‘(t)o will oneself free is also to will others 
free,’ which ‘points out to each person concrete action to be achieved’ (73). 
Beauvoir thus takes on Hegelian notions of the interdependent and dialogi-
cal character of human existence, and articulates these, moreover, in terms 
of our embodied existence in the world.5 To her, living as an embodied 
and situated ethical self is a preferred, higher phase above pure conscious-
ness. Freedom is not something we have, but is only realized in an ethical 
project: ‘to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same 
decision’ (25). Willing oneself free is to ‘effect the transition from nature 
to morality by establishing a genuine freedom on the original upsurge of 
our existence’ (25). As she formulated it elsewhere: ‘(t)rue freedom comes 
about only through a positive project’ (Beauvoir 1999: 333).
However, living ethically, as a ‘positive’ existence in the world, does 
not mean that our ambiguity is totally left behind. Our existence ‘still 
remains a negativity in the positive aff irmation of itself. […] The failure 
is not surpassed, but assumed’ (Beauvoir 1948: 13). The ethical conversion 
should be compared with ‘taking a trip,’ rather than with ‘escaping from 
prison.’ In the f irst case, our conscious dimension, which separates us from 
others, is ‘present in its surpassing’ insofar as it is accepted; in the latter case, 
it is left behind. Hegel confused these two movements in ‘the ambiguous 
term “aufheben”’ (84); a Hegelian optimism does not recognize that we 
always remain f inite concrete realities.6
4 Her speaking in terms of man as a ‘positive existence’ in the world clearly departs from 
Sartre’s theory. But even more she departs from his original philosophy in valuing emotions as 
ways to connect with others, while to Sartre experiencing emotions is a matter of self-deceit. 
For an explanation of their different outlooks in this respect, see Vintges (1996).
5 Beauvoir mentions Hegel many times in her essay. She adds: ‘I remember having experienced 
a great feeling of calm on reading Hegel in the impersonal framework of the Bibliothèque 
Nationale in August 1940. But once I got into the street again, into my life, out of the system, 
beneath a real sky, the system was no longer of any use to me: what it had offered me, under a 
show of the inf inite, was the consolations of death; and I again wanted to live in the midst of 
living men’ (Beauvoir 1948: 158). In her war diary she as well goes into her reading of Hegel’s 
works in the Bibliothèque Nationale, from July 1940 onwards (cf. Altman 2007).
6 The singularity and f initeness of our existence follows not from our bodily existence per se 
since our situatedness as a lived body can be collectivist as well and only singular in the sense 
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Through ethical conversion, mutual recognition and even connectedness 
between people, in the shape of love and friendship, are possible. They will, 
however, never be f inal since, ‘one can not imagine any reconciliation of 
transcendences: they do not have the indifferent docility of a pure abstrac-
tion; they are concrete and concretely compete with others for being. The 
world which they reveal is a battle-f ield where there is no neutral ground 
and which cannot be divided up into parcels’ (118). Out of ‘the irreducible 
character of ambiguity’ (9), which involves a remaining separation between 
people, the ‘plane of hell, of struggle, will never be eliminated’ (119). People 
will always want to subordinate others to compensate for their own ‘lack’ 
of being. There will always be enmity and ‘evil will’ – elements that are 
diff icult to account for ‘in Kantian ethics, which is at the origin of all ethics 
of autonomy,’ out of its focus on man’s rational will (33).
Since separation and struggle between people shall never be f inally 
overcome, an ethical conversion has to be practiced time and again: ‘ethical 
freedom’ (24) ‘requires a constant tension’ and a ‘permanent choice’ (26). 
Such an ethics ‘experienced in the truth of life’ is to be preferred, however, 
above Hegel’s consolation of an ‘abstract evasion,’ and any abstract human-
ism that claims to speak on behalf of mankind (159). ‘Universal, absolute 
man exists nowhere’ (112), there is but ‘the individual reality of our projects 
and ourselves’  (106). Beauvoir’s ‘realist’ position involves a permanent 
dimension of power and conflict between people and groups of people, to 
be overcome again and again by concrete ethical effort.
The ‘assertion of our f initeness’ (158) implies that abstract moral theories 
do not make sense since, in the end, we can never speak for other people. 
Moral maxims or dogmas hide the fact that we are all concretely situated 
and that our choices often affect others in negative ways. Kant conceives of 
‘the human person insofar as it transcends its empirical embodiment and 
chooses to be universal’ (17). However, ‘it is not impersonal universal man 
who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete, particular men 
projecting themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose 
particularity is as radical and as irreducible as subjectivity itself’ (17-18). 
As soon as ‘one introduces the presence of the f inite individual in the 
world’ (121), one faces concrete and diff icult problems, for which ethics 
‘does not furnish recipes’ (134). Instead of applying abstract and universal 
moral maxims ‘there must be a trial and decision in each case’ (134), as if 
of expressing its momentous collective situatedness. Our f initeness and singularity follow 
particularly from the other side of our ambiguous condition; namely, our conscious dimension 
that to Beauvoir always involves our own situated rather than universal perspective. 
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we are dealing with a work of art. This does not mean ‘that we are likening 
action to a work of art,’ but ‘in any case human transcendence must cope 
with the same problem: it has to found itself’ (130).
Beauvoir’s ‘ethics of ambiguity’ essentially argues for ‘ethics irreducible 
indeterminacy’ (Langer 2003: 90). Time and again her essay underlines the 
ambiguous, contingent character of any ethical decision. There can be no 
‘previous justif ications which might be drawn from the civilization, the 
age, and the culture’; ‘the good of an individual or a group of individuals 
requires that it be taken as an absolute end of our action; but we are not 
authorized to decide upon this end a priori’ (Beauvoir 1948: 142). Instead of 
a ‘total truth,’ there are but ‘necessarily partial truths which every human 
engagement discloses’ (68). When people speak about ‘Nation, Empire, 
Union, Economy, etc.’ we should consider which concrete individuals are 
involved, and which genuine human interests are at stake (145). An ethics of 
ambiguity recognizes that all actions ‘must be legitimized concretely’ (148). 
In each case, we try to establish what is the main danger, so to speak, being 
aware of the fact that ‘all authority is violence’ and that ‘(n)o one governs 
innocently’ (108).
Beauvoir counterposes her notion of a lived, contingent ethics especially 
to the maxims of Kant, criticizing his abstract morality for not addressing 
the real substantive problems of daily life.7 Her approach in this respect 
comes close to Hegel’s view. In an open attack on Kant, Hegel, in his Phi-
losophy of Right, argues that Kant’s abstract universalism is insensitive to 
the particular context of problems that need to be solved. Kant’s morality 
is all about a pure Sollen, comprising moral standards that are more about 
ethical purity than about real life. Instead, to Hegel, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
is grounded in concrete forms of existence.8
Beauvoir likewise grounds ethics in real social life. We even f ind her 
arguing in Hegelian terms that our social conditions can doom us to a 
passive existence, keeping us in ‘a state of servitude and ignorance’ as is 
‘the situation of women in many civilizations’ (37) (cf. Chapter 2).9 But 
while she, like Hegel, grounds ethics in social forms of life, contra Hegel, 
they are radically plural. At stake to her are the forms of life of different 
communities and of different individuals within them: ‘the Arabian fellah 
7 She equally does so in The Second Sex (cf. Beauvoir 2010: 650). 
8 With thanks to Maarten Coolen.
9 Beauvoir in this respect refers to the situation of black slaves and of ‘Mohammedan woman 
enclosed in a harem’ (Beauvoir 1948: 38), as well as to ‘the situation of women in many civiliza-
tions’ (37). In The Second Sex she expanded this to the situation of all women throughout time 
and place (cf. Chapter 2). 
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is oppressed by both the sheiks and the French and English administration. 
[…] The interests of the French proletariat are not the same as those of the 
natives in the colonies’ (89). During the Second World War, black leaders in 
the United States, like Richard Wright, refused ‘to drop their own claims 
for the sake of the general interest.’ Ethico-political choices are socially 
situated, and ‘(f)or each one it also depends upon his individual situation’ 
within these social contexts (89).
However, an ethical attitude requires that we are not blinded by the goals 
that we set up for ourselves (cf. 89), but that, through our own struggle, we 
aim to serve ‘the liberation of all’ (112). Since ‘each is bound to all’ (112), the 
cause which we serve ‘must not lock itself up’ (89-90). In our ‘surpassing 
toward others,’ each one exists as a ‘separate existence engaged in his own 
projects. So much so that the terms “useful to Man,” and “useful to this man,” 
do not overlap’ (112). But to abolish all suppression ‘each one must carry on 
his struggle in connection with that of the other and by integrating it into 
the general pattern’ (89). Our situated ethical projects need to connect to 
a general perspective.
The ethical self that emerges from Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity is 
socially situated, embodied, and engaged in concrete ethical projects in 
the world. To Beauvoir, ‘man’s project toward freedom is embodied for 
him in def inite acts of behavior’ (78). In her novel The Mandarins (2005), 
published in French in 1954, she introduces the concept ‘art of living’ (art 
de vivre), to indicate the personal ethical way of life of one of the novel’s 
main characters (Beauvoir 2005: 180, 182). The term ‘art of living’ refers to 
a critically creative ethical life project that is developed and grounded in 
real social life (Beauvoir 1948: 159; cf. Vintges 1996: 81). It is this ethical way 
of life that Beauvoir posits as an alternative to the model of personhood 
of Organization Man and Super Woman, as depicted in Les belles images.
Later in the chapter we will discuss some remarkable parallels between 
Beauvoir’s notion of a lived ethics and the concepts of ethics that Foucault 
developed in his f inal work. To understand his approach, however, we must 
f irst examine his critique of modern societies and especially his concept of 
the neoliberal, ‘entrepeneurial’ self.
The Entepreneurial Self
Who are we today, what kind of subjects have we become? Foucault, 
throughout his work, aims to answer this question, in order to open up 
possibilities for change. Tracking and tracing practices of power in Western 
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history that have constructed men’s subjectivities through the ages, he 
especially focuses on power practices that are entangled with the social and 
human sciences. According to him, these sciences play a major role in the 
various ways power is exercised in Western modern societies, ranging from 
disciplinary techniques to neoliberal ones – the latter spreading rapidly 
today across the globe. Foucault’s analyses offer us some relevant insights 
into who we are today and especially who women are today.
In his early works (1960-1969), among others The Order of Things (1970), 
published in French in 1966, and The Archeology of Knowledge  (1972), 
published in French in 1969, Foucault, in a discussion of the history of the 
human sciences, criticized the concept of Man as a free, ‘original’ subject, 
i.e. as the origin or source of sense, meaning, and knowledge. Consequently, 
he is often referred to as a structuralist, but, in fact, his approach is more 
historical. To him, the f igure of Man as an original subject is a historical 
product, a temporary effect of history that will be erased like a face drawn 
in sand at the edge of the sea, as the famous last lines of The Order of Things 
state. New forms of subjectivity will emerge: subjectivities to Foucault are 
historical products that change over time.
In his mid-work (1970-1976), among others Discipline and Punish (1979), pub-
lished in French in 1975, and The Will to Knowledge (2006), published in French 
in 1976, Foucault again brings up the human sciences, but now he focuses on 
their entanglement with social practices of power that shape our subjectivities. 
This approach allowed him to conceive of a new type of power techniques, 
which made him one of the most cited authors in the social sciences.
In the two books mentioned, he introduces the concepts of ‘discipline’, 
‘surveillance’, and ‘normalization’ to indicate a type of power that emerged 
and proliferated with the rise of the human sciences. From Foucault’s per-
spective, the latter encompass what now are called social and life sciences: 
at stake are sciences such as psychiatry, biology, medicine, and economics 
and, later, psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, ethnology, pedagogy, 
and criminology. These sciences, in all their practical dimensions – such 
as buildings, therapy rooms, intake procedures, exams, and tests – are 
entangled with a type of power that classif ies and categorizes people, and 
resocializes or treats them when they are deemed abnormal. This normal-
izing type of power that also trains the bodies and behaviour of ‘normal’ 
people, and surveys them on an individual as well as a collective level.
The sciences set out the Norm for these ‘normalizing’ and ‘disciplining’ 
practices: they produce the standards of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour. 
By detailed control and sanctions, ‘normal individuals’, the normal child, 
woman, man, are produced as concrete realities, and the same counts for ‘the 
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abnormal’ who likewise are specified and categorized, trained and treated.10 
Disciplining and normalizing power practices consist of f ine-tuned power 
techniques – i.e. a ‘microphysics’ of power – such as the parcellation of 
groups of people into individual bodies,11 and the organizing of individual 
bodily behaviour by applying timetables, training exercises, examination, 
hierarchical observation and techniques of ‘continuous registration, per-
petual assessment and classif ication’ (Foucault 1979: 220).
Since roughly 1800, these power techniques have spread throughout 
Western societies, among others in armies, workplaces, and in penal, 
medical, welfare, and educational institutions. Foucault’s main example 
is the modern prison, where these science-based techniques from minute 
to minute mould the bodies of the individual criminal. But, as the last lines 
of the chapter Discipline state, ‘prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, 
hospitals, which all resemble prisons’ (228).
However, there is resistance in diffuse, spontaneous, and localized forms. 
In addition to a docile body that internalizes disciplinary power techniques, 
Foucault in his mid-works points to a direct bodily resistance against tech-
niques of surveillance and normalization. From 1978 onwards, however, he 
puts forward some new concepts that involve people’s agency, rather than 
unmediated bodily responses.12 In his lectures at the Collège de France, 
he talks about the state, arguing – in line with his earlier analyses – that 
we should conceive of it as a set of techniques, rather than an institute. 
Speaking about the state from such a perspective is a matter of scale: at 
stake are techniques of managing the whole social body, i.e. the techniques 
of governing a population (cf. Foucault 2008: 186).
Foucault introduces the term ‘governmentality’ to indicate these gov-
erning techniques. A general problematic of governing emerged since the 
sixteenth century, in relation to the family, a household, a convent, a people 
10 By classifying who is normal and abnormal, disciplinary practices at the same time ‘pro-
duce’ abnormal people, i.e. the ‘perverse,’ the sick, the criminal, the madman, the abnormal 
child – each of them categorized in many subdivisions. By f ine-tuning the categorizing of 
‘abnormalities’ – cf. the emergence of the new spectrum of autism disorders – normal man is 
increasingly def ined as well.
11 This happens among others through architectural planning – as is exemplif ied by Jeremy 
Bentham’s Panopticon. Foucault discusses his architectural design of this model prison as a 
metaphor throughout for disciplinary power. Bentham’s design consisted of cells in a circular 
structure, with a watchtower in the middle. The cells are illuminated, with windows on both 
sides, so as to completely overview the behavior of its inmate. For an excellent introduction to 
Foucault’s mid-work see C.G. Prado (2000).
12 ‘Agency’ as a concept standard refers to persons having some room to manoeuvre within 
social structures, or to intervene in and alter their surroundings.
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(Foucault 2007a: 87ff.). At stake is the correct way of managing individu-
als, goods, and wealth – a type of power that can be characterized as ‘a 
conduct of conducts’ (Foucault 2000: 341; cf. 2008: 186). From the eighteenth 
century onwards, a process of ‘governmentalization of the state’ took place. 
Through the development of forms of knowledge such as statistics and 
political economy, and the installing of police institutions and practices, 
a management of the population as a whole became possible. The f inal 
end of government, since then, is ‘not just to govern, but to improve the 
condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its 
health’ (Foucault 2007a: 105).
In the last chapter of The Will to Knowledge (Foucault 2006), he already 
conceptualized the management of the population in the shape of a ‘bi-
opolitics’. At stake is the management of the ‘species body’, i.e. of biological 
processes: ‘births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary’ (Foucault 
2006: 139). But as William Walters (2012) clarif ies, to Foucault the concept 
of biopolitics ‘still offered only a very partial reflection on the nature of 
the modern state’ (Walters 2012: 16). The concept of ‘governmentality’ cov-
ers the state’s regulation of the population through a much broader set of 
management techniques, next to biopolitical ones. According to Foucault, 
the microphysical disciplining of individual behaviour remains important 
as well, since managing a population means managing it ‘in depth, in all 
its f ine points and details’ (Foucault 2007a: 107). But ‘governmentality’ 
has become the dominant model of the modern state, a complex form of 
power ‘that has the population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument’ (108).
In subsequent lectures, Foucault focuses on liberalism and neoliberalism 
as two distinct ‘governmental’ regimes (Foucault 2008). Often these two 
forms of government are identif ied in terms of a minimal(ist) state and 
a maximum freedom of the market – based on the presumption that the 
mechanisms of the market economy will create prosperity and social order. 
Foucault instead characterizes them as political regimes that manage the 
population in extensive ways, and that construct rather than respect a 
free market.
Liberalism, from the eighteenth century onwards, had to organize the 
economy as a f ield where there can be no sovereign or state power (cf. Fou-
cault 2008: 283). By way of concrete political measures and government 
techniques it established a freedom of the market, of property rights, of 
rights of discussion and ‘possible freedom of expression and so on,’ in this 
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way producing ‘free’ buyers and sellers (63). The arousal and production of 
freedom was paired with a management of danger, i.e. the implementation 
of strategies of security that had to guarantee the freedom of economic 
processes (cf. 65). Liberalism as a governmental regime thus organized 
security and freedom, among others by installing penal practices, assur-
ance policies and biopolitics, and by applying techniques of disciplining 
and normalizing such as mass surveillance and the training of individual 
bodies. It thus created a ‘subject of rights’ that is simultaneously a subject 
of extensive control (cf. 67).
Neoliberalism, according to Foucault, likewise comprises an extensive 
set of governmental techniques, installing market competition, organizing 
societal security and producing a specif ic type of subjectivity. Foucault 
especially discusses the American type of neoliberalism13 – introduced by 
economists from the Chicago School like Milton Friedman, Friedrich von 
Hayek, and Gary Becker – that started to spread in the United States after 
the war. To these authors, market competition or the model of the enterprise, 
was a formative power of society as well (cf. 148). They conceived of a ‘society 
made up of enterprise-units’ (225), in other words of a ‘general regulation of 
society by the market’ (145). The model of American neoliberalism turned 
into ‘a whole way of being and thinking.’ Foucault concludes that it became 
‘a method of thought, a grid of economic and sociological analysis’ (218) as 
well as ‘a general style of thought, analysis and imagination’ (219) – as Whyte 
already noted in his study Organization Man (1956).
To Foucault, the most characteristic feature of American neoliberalism is 
the production of the homo oeconomicus (economic man) as ‘entrepreneur 
of himself’ (Foucault 2008: 226). While homo oeconomicus used to be a 
partner of exchange, the new homo oeconomicus is a calculative agent, 
‘being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being 
for himself the source of (his) earnings’ (226). The modern subject today is 
supposed to be a homo oeconomicus all over, a rational actor who calculates 
costs and benef its, and organizes his or her whole life accordingly, thus 
being ‘someone who is eminently governable’ (270).
Foucault goes at length into the emergence of this new neoliberal subject. 
He f irst discusses how, since the second half of the twentieth century, 
13 Foucault discusses two forms of neoliberalism, i.e. German Ordo-liberalism (after the 
journal ‘Ordo’) developing in the 1930s, and the American type of neoliberalism of ‘the Chicago 
school of Economics,’ developing since the 1950s. While German Ordo-liberalism concentrates on 
social policies which enhance the market economy as such, for instance by installing favourable 
tax conditions for people to start enterprises, the Chicago school redef ines the social sphere as 
a form of the economic domain (cf. Foucault 2008).
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economics is ‘no longer the analysis of the historical logic of processes; 
it is the analysis of the internal rationality, the strategic programming of 
individuals’ activity’ (223). The object of economic analysis shifted from 
‘processes of capital, of investment, of the machine, of the product, and so 
on’ into ‘the way in which individuals allocate […] scarce means to alterna-
tive ends’ (222). Economists used to conceive of labour in abstract terms, 
but new scientif ic approaches focus on the labourer as an active person, 
who acts on the basis of cost benefit calculations. The labourer is seen as 
possessing a certain capital – his abilities, his skills, his health – that he 
invests to generate a stream of earnings (cf. 224). This ‘human capital’ is 
made up of acquired elements, through education, good parenting, and 
cultural stimuli, and of innate, hereditary elements, such as good genes, 
that inevitably will become a topic of interventions and investment as well. 
The labouring subject is managed by all kinds of techniques to optimize 
his human capital, for instance by actively seeking skills or opportunities.
Homo oeconomicus’ conduct, involving an optimal allocation of scarce 
resources to alternative ends, became generalized to every form of be-
haviour. Every purposeful conduct was interpreted – and governed – as 
conduct that employs limited means to alternative ends (cf. 268-269). Since 
homo oeconomicus is calculating and planning his or her optimal satisfac-
tion and success in the world (cf. 226-229), it is someone ‘who responds 
systematically to systematic modif ications artif icially introduced into the 
environment’ (270). Homo oeconomicus, as someone who accepts reality ap-
pears ‘precisely as someone manageable’: ‘(b)ehavioural techniques’ can be 
implemented to govern and activate the neoliberal entrepreneurial self (270).
Neoliberalism, far from being a laissez faire politics, according to Fou-
cault, comes down to an active and extensive restructuring of self and 
society. Thomas Lemke (2001) summarizes that, to Foucault, neoliberalism is 
not just an ideological rhetoric or a political-economic reality, but, above all, 
‘a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests 
already exists’ (Lemke 2001: 203). Neoliberalism involves that ‘(g)overnment 
itself becomes a sort of enterprise whose task it is to universalize competi-
tion and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups 
and institutions’ (197).
The sciences play a major role in the construction of the modern, 
entrepreneurial self, as providers of expert knowledge. Foucault espe-
cially shows how we are governed, individually and collectively, by ‘the 
gray sciences, the minor professions, the accountants and insurers, the 
managers and psychologists […] Every practice for the conduct of conduct 
involves authorities, aspirations, programmatic thinking, the invention 
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of redeployment of techniques and technologies.’ The conduct of our 
day-to-day conduct, ‘in our homes, workplaces, schools, and hospitals, in 
our towns, regions, and nations, and by our national and transnational 
governing bodies,’ is based on ‘expert’ knowledge and advice that, for a 
large part, characterize who we are under neoliberal governmental regimes 
(Rose et al. 2006: 101).
Neoliberalism in the Foucauldian sense is more than the latest version 
of capitalism, and cannot be tackled by a purely anti-capitalist struggle. 
Marxism comprises too blunt a set of tools to analyse the specif icity of 
current neoliberal regimes, which cannot be addressed ‘in terms of the 
metastructures of labour and capital’ (McRobbie 2011b: 180). The conduct of 
people is more intensely governed than ever, via their own investments and 
endeavours to run themselves as an enterprise. Neoliberal man, according 
to Foucault, is indirectly manipulated and activated by incentives – in other 
words, is governed by ‘carrot and stick’ (Guus Dix 2014).
Examples of such incentives in my own environment as a university 
teacher involve competitions for ‘the best teacher of the year’; regular ap-
peals to follow time-management or library-skills courses and to improve 
one’s valorisation skills; cutting down research time for those who do not 
‘produce’ enough; invitations to innovate one’s digital learning environment, 
and a constant bombardment of self-assessment forms. These management 
techniques sit side by side with overtly disciplinary ones, such as an exces-
sive and ‘transparent’ monitoring of one’s teaching and research activities.14
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberal self and society has been elaborated in 
‘governmentality studies’ by authors Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller, Mitchell 
Dean, Thomas Lemke and Mariana Valverde, among others. They mostly 
focus on neoliberal governmentality, i.e. on the spreading of enterprise 
regimes all over society and on current techniques of ‘governing the soul’ 
(cf. Rose 1990). Governmentality authors show how these techniques typi-
cally work ‘at a distance’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 16), by installing capacities 
for self-control in ‘autonomous individuals’ (cf. Lemke 2001: 201). To analyse 
the specif ic ways in which their ‘free choice’ is managed, they interestingly 
take on board another concept that Foucault developed in his later work, 
namely the concept of self-techniques.
14 For an extensive overview of these kinds of micro-management in Academia, see Gill (2009) 
and Gill and Ngaire Donaghue (2016). Even cameras turn out to be in ample use across university 
buildings and terrains. When some ICT students at my university hacked the university’s mail 
data base to send out a protest letter against their department’s reorganization, they were tracked 
down a few days later on the basis of camera footage, and suspended. The students sued the 
university and won.
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In 1980, two years after he launched the concept of ‘governmentality’, 
Foucault argues that, in all societies, we f ind
techniques which permit individuals to perform, by their own means, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, 
on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in such a way that 
they transform themselves, modify themselves, and reach a certain state 
of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on 
(Foucault 2007b: 154).
He adds that governing people is all about ‘a subtle integration of coercion-
technologies and self-technologies’ (155) and elsewehere characterizes 
current Western society as ‘a tricky combination in the same political 
structures of individualization techniques, and of totalization proce-
dures’ (Foucault 2000: 332). People’s agency is at stake where it concerns 
the ‘processes through which the self is constructed or modif ied by 
himself ’ (Foucault 2007b: 154). But the tricky part is that their agency is 
created and determined by coercive techniques. In the words of Kevin 
Thompson (2003), we only deal with a ‘minimal freedom,’ since people’s 
options are ‘def ined precisely by the structuring work of governance’ 
(Thompson 2003: 122).
It is this type of ‘minimal freedom’ that is analysed in current govern-
mentality studies, which focus on the indirect way neoliberalism ‘conducts’ 
people’s ‘conduct’, namely through offering them self-techniques. By way of 
these self-techniques, people act as entrepreneurial selves, i.e. as managers 
and designers of their own lives, choosing their behaviour, lifestyle, and 
opinions. In empirical studies, Miller and Rose (2008) demonstrate how 
authorities of various types ‘shape, normalize and instrumentalize the 
conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the 
objectives they consider desirable’ (Miller and Rose 2008: 32). Advertising 
techniques, for instance, link the desires of individuals to the productive 
machine, in such a way that consumers become ‘active agents in their own 
consumption patterns’ (140), shaping ‘a style of life through participation 
in the world of goods’ (141).
Authors of the governmentality school thus focus on the link between self-
techniques and top down social engineering. Exemplary to their approach is 
the argument that ‘the language of individual freedom, personal choice and 
self-fulfillment came to underpin programmes of government’ (48), and that 
‘(p)ersonal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term 
in its exercise’ (54). In that sense, governmentality studies, in the words of 
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Walters (2012), suffer from ‘panopticitis,’ while ‘[o]ur time is perhaps more 
open and plural than some would have us suppose’ (Walters 2012: 81).
From a postcolonial perspective, Aihwa Ong (2006), Van Baar (2011), and 
Walters (2012) identify neoliberal governmental techniques as a set of power 
techniques next to, and in entanglement with, other power techniques. They 
focus on the spreading of neoliberal governmental techniques today across 
the globe, in Eastern Europe, Latin America, China, and East Asia, especially, 
where ‘technocrats embrace business agenda’s and legitimize ideals of human 
talent and self-enterprise’ (Ong 2006: 12). Ong shows how governments all 
over the world have ‘fragmented the national territory and the population in 
the interest of economic development,’ (77), by creating areas of neglect and 
marginalization on the one hand, and areas of open markets on the other 
hand, where people are turned into world citizens with marketable skills.
Van Baar (2011) analyses how neoliberal governmentality is introduced 
in Eastern European policies, exploring the ‘hybrid assemblages’ of power 
technologies, and ‘the continuities with past socioeconomic and cultural 
formations’ (Van Baar 2011: 166-167). Neoliberal ‘activation’ techniques are 
imposed on the Roma, such as radical cuts in social benefits and awards for 
those who actively seek work, develop skills, or participate in public work 
programs. Neoliberal power techniques thus ‘responsibilize’ the members 
of this heavily discriminated and marginalized group to their deprived 
situation. Van Baar shows that, with the scarcity of jobs, the results of such 
activation policies have been that one per cent of the Roma has found work, 
while all others are living in extreme poverty, with no basic housing, jobs, 
or human rights.
Since neoliberalism in world perspective is but one set of power practices 
and techniques next to, and entangled with, others, Van Baar and Walters 
adopt Foucault’s concepts of neoliberalism as a toolset, instead of as an 
all-encompassing theory. From their perspective, and in line with Foucault’s 
aversion to totalizing theories and his own patchwork approach of societies 
(cf. the Introduction), neoliberalism in Western contexts also emerges as 
a dominant set of power patterns – in hybrid entanglement with other 
hierarchical power patterns – rather than an all-encompassing system.
Foucault explicitly pointed to the persistence of disciplinary power 
techniques and of sovereign – juridical – power: ‘we should not see things 
as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and 
then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact, we 
have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, 
which has population as it main target and apparatuses of security as its 
essential mechanism’ (Foucault 2007a: 107-108). This perspective allows for 
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an analysis of possible tensions and struggles between multiple layers and 
kinds of power techniques present in societies.
Neoliberal governmental power techniques, i.e. the proliferation of 
the model of the enterprise over society, can be countered, for instance, 
by a rights-based discourse that – as part of the sovereign state – may 
overrule neoliberal tendencies. An example is the furious reaction of the 
Dutch population in recent years against the secret f ilming of patients 
in the emergency centre at a main hospital, with a view to it being sold 
to a commercial television station. The juridical discourse on ‘privacy’ 
turned against this exploitation: the board of the hospital had to resign 
and the television programme was cancelled. Similarly, when the Dutch 
bank ING announced a plan to sell its client data, public opinion forced 
them to back off and to apologize for not ‘sticking to their core business’ 
and guaranteeing the privacy of their clients. Other layers of society as well 
may counter neoliberal tendencies, such as communitarian traditions. An 
example is the boycott some time ago by the Dutch population of a new 
commercial television station (TALPA), which had obtained the rights to 
broadcast summaries of the soccer matches in the Dutch League and did 
so interrupted by commercial breaks. TALPA went bankrupt, countered 
as it was by a communitarian trend that resisted the commodif ication of 
what was considered to be a Dutch common good.15
But other counter practices than those mentioned above can be detected 
as well. In the words of Walters (2012), instead of overvaluing neoliberalism, 
we should be keen on discerning ‘other ways of governing and contesting 
governance, however minor they might be’ (Walters 2012: 42). According to 
Walters, the concept of governmentality in principle allows for more mobile 
ways of seeing the world (cf. 53 ff.). However, its main definition (‘the conduct 
of conducts’), in my view, urged Foucault to develop some new concepts. 
From 1980 onwards, he points to another kind of power practices involving 
other types of self-techniques, uncoupled from techniques of coercion.
Practices of Freedom
In his f inal works after 1980, Foucault focuses on specif ic kinds of ethical 
techniques of the self, as they are found – in exemplary ways – in Western 
antiquity. As Frédéric Gros (2005) notes, the only salvation in Foucault’s 
15 However, FOX now has obtained the rights, and will undoubtedly commodify the broadcast-
ing of the Dutch soccer competition again in the near future.
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early and mid-works beyond a disciplined identity was madness, crime, or 
literature (cf. Gros 2005: 513). But from 1980 onwards, Foucault discusses 
certain ethical techniques of the self to defy coercive regimes. He did so 
‘not to abandon politics, but complicating the study of governmentali-
ties through the exploration of the care of the self ’ (512-513). However, 
as Colin Gordon contends, the full implications of Foucault’s ethics for 
current governmentality studies are not yet understood (Donzelot and 
Gordon 2008: 53).
To date, Foucault’s work on ethics is undertheorized in social and 
political theory, since it supposedly proposes a lifestyle politics without 
any meso and macro political aims. But what Foucault actually provides is 
another concept of politics, contra top down political programs and social 
engineering: a bottom up way of practicing politics that not only involves 
micro-aims, but meso- and macro-aims as well.
In two books, The Use of Pleasure (Foucault 1986a) and The Care of the 
Self (Foucault 1986b), both published in French in 1984, in interviews, and 
especially in his 1981-1982 lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject (Fou-
cault 2005a), Foucault draws attention to what he calls ‘prescriptive texts’ in 
Greek and Roman antiquity that offer tools for ethical self-improvement. At 
stake are ‘texts whose main object, whatever their form (speech, dialogue, 
treatise, collection of precepts, etc.) is to suggest rules of conduct. […] These 
texts thus served as functional devices that would enable individuals to 
question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape to it, and shape 
themselves as ethical subjects’ (Foucault 1986a: 12-13).
Crucial to Foucault is the difference between what he calls ‘ethics-
oriented moralities’ and ‘code-oriented moralities’ (30). Today, we only think 
of ethics in terms of moral codes or moral rules that we should apply. But in 
antiquity, ethics mainly consists of vocabularies that are intended as guides 
for the concrete shaping of one’s personal existence. These vocabularies 
constitute a relationship of the self to the self; they envision ‘intentional 
and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of con-
duct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their 
singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria’ (10-11).
All moral systems, Foucault says, require an ethical self-formation, an 
ethical work on the self, since people are to become the type of agents that can 
act in accodance with the moral rules of the system (cf. Foucault 1997c: 263). 
Every ‘self-formation as an “ethical subject”’ (Foucault 1986a: 28) has four 
aspects, which we can coin as the answers to the questions what, why, 
how, and to what purpose: What is the material that should be worked 
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over in the ethical self-practices, i.e. ‘the ethical substance’? Why should 
this work on the self be done, on behalf of what or which instance, i.e. what 
is ‘the mode of subjection’? How should this work be done, i.e. what is the 
‘self-forming activity’ or ‘ascesis’? And, f inally, to what purpose should it be 
done, i.e. what is the ‘telos’? (cf. Foucault 1986a, 1997c; Vintges 1996). While 
ethical self-formation is inherent to every moral system, the type of moral 
agency at stake varies with the relationship between, and the content of, 
these four aspects.
The space of this dimension of ethical self-formation varies as well. It is 
only limited when moral codes dominate the moral system. But it can also 
take the upper hand. The latter is the case in Western antiquity, according to 
Foucault. All the emphasis was on developing a personal ethos. The vocabu-
laries that offered the self-techniques for one’s ethical self-formation were 
relatively independent from social and legal institutions and from moral 
rules (cf. Foucault 1997c: 255). Ancient ethics was not ‘a unif ied, coherent, 
authoritarian moral system’ (Foucault 1986a: 21). Instead, it was a matter of 
self-stylization, through the practicing of self-techniques (‘ascesis’), rather 
than of prohibitions (cf. 23). One cannot f ind ‘any normalization in, for 
instance, the Stoic ethics’ (Foucault 1997c: 254). Ethical self-formation was 
practiced ‘in the midst of many separate groups’ which ‘proposed – more 
than they imposed’ different styles of behaviour, ‘each having its specif ic 
character or “shape”’ (Foucault 1986a: 21).
To indicate the relatively independent status of ancient ethical ‘self-
practices’ (with moral codes or rules only functioning in the background), 
Foucault develops the concepts ‘care of the self ’, ‘ethos’, ‘aesthetics of 
existence’, and ‘practice of freedom’ (for the latter cf. Foucault 1997d). 
A freedom to create oneself was offered through vocabularies that provided 
the tools and techniques to acquire an ‘ethos’, i.e. a personal ethical way 
of life. At stake was an ethical self-creation in contrast to an ethical self-
formation that is determined and limited by the moral codes of a moral 
system. Still, in ethics-oriented moralities, codes are not unimportant, 
‘but they revolve around a rather small number of rather simple principles’ 
(Foucault 1986a: 32) The main emphasis in ethics-oriented moralities is not 
placed on the code or ‘the instances of authority that enforce the code’ (29), 
to which the ethical subject ‘must submit at the risk of committing offenses 
that make him liable to punishment’ (29-30). Instead, the accent is placed 
on the relationship with the self and on the exercises and self-techniques 
that enable one to develop an ethos (cf. 30).
Ethical self-techniques are, for instance, the practicing of bodily self-tests 
(can I stop eating for some time?), writing exercises (such as the keeping of 
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notebooks, ‘hypomnemata’, to record insights and ideas to guide one’s future 
actions), meditation, reflection, and dialogue with oneself and others. By 
practicing ethical self-techniques, one strives to acquire a personal ethos, 
which is ‘a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, 
a way visible to others’ (Foucault 1997d: 286). Ancient ethics thus concerned 
one’s whole way of life, as Foucault’s colleague at the Collège de France, 
classicist Pierre Hadot, already had pointed out.16
Acquiring an ethos in ancient Greece is also ‘a way of caring for others.’ It 
enables one to be a good politician, citizen, and friend, and to occupy one’s 
‘rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal relationships’ 
(Foucault 1997d: 287). Foucault specif ies that human relations preferably 
consist of dynamic power relations. Often, we are faced with a situation 
of domination, however, when ‘an individual or social group succeeds in 
blocking a f ield of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any 
reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means’ (283). 
Acquiring an ethos through a care of the self is about trying to play the 
games of power with ‘as little domination as possible’ (298).
Gros (2005) notes that the care of the self, rather than isolating us from 
the world, ‘enables us to situate ourselves within it correctly. […] The sub-
ject discovered in the care of the self is quite the opposite of an isolated 
individual: he is a citizen of the world. The care of the self is therefore a 
regulative principle of activity, of our relationship to the world and to others’ 
(Gros 2005: 538). Instead of a solipsism, narcissism, or aestheticism, we deal 
with an ethico-political attitude: at stake is one’s acting in the world.
Foucault, moreover, suggests that inherent to ethical practices of freedom 
is a critique of domination. According to him, ancient philosophy ‘calls into 
question domination at every level and in every form in which it exists, 
whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you. To a 
certain extent, this critical function of philosophy derives from the Socratic 
injunction “Take care of yourself”’ (Foucault 1997d: 300-301). In practicing 
an ethical care of the self we aff irm the principle of ethical self-creation, 
since, as Thompson (2003) aptly notes: ‘the activity of constitution is its 
own norm’ (Thompson 2003: 124). Ethical care of the self in that sense can 
be said to be ‘critically creative’ in itself (Taylor 2004: 266).
16 Arnold Davidson (1990) argues that in order to fully understand Foucault’s f inal work, 
one must take into account that it is guided or framed in terms of Hadot’s approach of ancient 
philosophy as spiritual exercises or ascesis (cf. Davidson 1990, 1994). Davidson clarif ies that 
Foucault was a careful reader of Hadot’s major essay on ancient spiritual exercises, originally 
published in 1977 and reprinted as the f irst chapter of his Philosophy as a Way of Life (Hadot 1995). 
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The care of the self also implies a relationship with others insofar as an 
ethos is never invented by the individual himself, but concerns models that 
one finds in one’s culture and are proposed and suggested by one’s culture, 
society, and ‘social group’ (cf. Foucault 1997d: 291). In The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject (Foucault 2005a), Foucault repeatedly states that ‘the care of the self 
always takes shape within definite and distinct networks or groups,’ involving
relationships that vary according to the different groups, milieus and 
cases […] If you like, you cannot take care of the self in the realm and 
form of the universal. The care of the self cannot appear, and, above all, 
cannot be practiced simply by virtue of being human as such, just by 
belonging to the human community, although this membership is very 
important. It can only be practiced within the group, and within the 
group in its distinctive character (117).
Speaking of these groups, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault not 
only refers to ancient philosophical schools, but also to some religious 
groups such as the Therapeutae (Foucault 2005a: 91, 114, 116). Membership 
of such communities, that offer self-techniques for a critically creative care 
of the self, is necessary, since people need others, preferably friends and 
tutors, to create a personal ethos. Gros (2005) summarizes that ‘practices 
of the self are neither individual nor communal: they are relational and 
transversal [crosswise KV]’ (Gros 2005: 545). Group membership enables the 
creation of a personal ethos, and the fabrics of such groups are the ethical 
life projects of their members.
When asked whether the care of the self in the classical sense should be 
updated, Foucault answers: ‘Absolutely,’ quickly adding that in modern times 
this will, of course, lead to something new (Foucault 1997d: 294, cf. 295). 
Ancient ethics developed from the fourth century BCE till the first and second 
centuries CE, from an elitist practice into a care of the self that appeals to a 
more general public. But it was always linked ‘to a virile society, to dissym-
metry, exclusion,’ with slaves and women as the excluded others (Foucault 
1997c: 258). Instead, ‘couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?’ (261).
According to his colleagues at the Collège de France, Hadot and Paul 
Veyne, Foucault’s f inal work is his ‘tacit attempt to offer contemporary 
mankind a model of life’ (Hadot 1995: 208). In the words of Veyne (1993):
Greek ethics is quite dead and Foucault judged it as undesirable as it 
would be impossible to resuscitate this ethics; but he considered one if its 
elements, namely, the idea of a work of the self on the self, to be capable 
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of reacquiring a contemporary meaning, in the manner of those pagan 
temple columns that one occasionally sees reutilized in more recent 
structures (Veyne 1993: 7, quoted in Davidson 1994: 67).
Foucault was especially interested in the ‘relatively independent’ status 
of the ancient practices of the self, which to him formed an alternative 
to the self-techniques of modern man that are linked to coercive power 
regimes. What fascinated him is the idea ‘that ethics can be a very strong 
structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with 
an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure’ (Foucault 1997c: 260; 
emphasis added). Foucault repeatedly highlights the relatively independent 
status of ancient ethical self-practices, for instance when he states that in 
the Greek and Roman civilizations ‘such practices of the self were much 
more important and especially more autonomous than they were later, 
after they were taken over to a certain extent by religious, pedagogical, 
medical, or psychiatric institutions’ (Foucault 1997d: 282; emphasis added). 
Elsewehere he argues that the ancient ‘“arts of existence,” these “techniques 
of the self,” no doubt lost some of their importance and autonomy when they 
were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power in early Christianity, 
and later, into educative, medical, and psychological types of practices’ 
(Foucault 1986a: 11; emphasis added). He adds that codes of behaviour and 
forms of subjectivation ‘can never be entirely dissociated, though they may 
develop in relative independence from one another’ (29; emphasis added). 
Important is ‘the distinction between the code elements of a morality and 
the elements of ascesis’ and ‘their relative autonomy’ (31; emphasis added). 
The classical care of the self, however, ‘disappeared, that is, was integrated 
and lost a large part of its autonomy’ (Foucault 1997c: 278; emphasis added).
Foucault at some point suggests that the ‘growth of capabilities’ of mod-
ern humankind can be disentangled from the dominant power regime 
(cf. Foucault 1997e: 317) and turned into ethical self-practices. Cressida 
Heyes (2007) elaborates on this suggestion, in a superb chapter on dieting 
entitled ‘Foucault goes Weight Watchers’. Heyes analyses the tricky ways 
in which current weight-loss dieting programs install ‘self-techniques’ 
that, in fact, are integrated with a coercive regime of micro-management. 
Commenting on the Weight Watchers meetings she concludes: ‘I have 
never been in an another adult milieu where discipline was applied to 
such tiny behaviors, and deviance greeted with such serious and inflexible 
responses from the staff’ (Heyes 2007: 74). However, approaching dieting as 
a set of ‘self-techniques’, allows to conceive of their enabling effects as well, 
Heyes argues. She recalls the ‘paradox’ that Foucault hinted at, namely that 
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normalizing disciplinary practices also enable new skills and capacities ‘that 
may exceed the framing of the original activity’ (67). The self-techniques 
used in the Weight Watchers program, such as the keeping of notebooks 
(compare the use of ‘hypomnemata’ in Greek ethics), ‘have a resonance and 
potential that could exceed the regime of normalization that generated 
them’ (79). Drawing on Foucault’s ethics, Heyes mentions the possibility 
that dieting’s enabling aspects may lead people to a care of the self (cf. 87). 
Heyes gives us an idea of how the use of self-techniques in a constraining 
context may spill over into the developing of ethical practices of freedom.17
In a similar vein, Thompson (2003) examines Foucault’s strategic perspec-
tive, arguing that the minimal freedom of the neoliberally governmental-
ized agent can be transformed into practices of freedom. This happens not 
by rejecting present techniques of the self, but by changing their goals and 
key features, placing them in service of the aims of an ethical care of the 
self (cf. Thompson 2003: 131).
Gros (2005), in my view, most adequately captures Foucault’s strategic 
perspectives by highlighting the collective dimension of the concept of 
practices of freedom. While community and individual today are produced, 
regulated, and dominated by the modern State as ‘complementary op-
posites’ (Gros 2005: 544), we should move beyond this opposition. Foucault 
counterposed ‘what he calls “modes of life,” “choices of existence,” styles of 
life,” and “cultural forms” to both the demands of community and individual 
rights together’ (544).
Moving beyond the opposition between individual and community is not 
only Foucault’s critical alternative to current neoliberal models of self and 
society, but at the same time a strategy to realize this alternative, as is clear 
from his articles on the gay movement. In one of these articles, he explicitly 
proposes to concieve of the movement’s politics in terms of an ‘art of life’ 
(Foucault 1997a: 163). He moreover adds that decisive social changes have 
taken place by way of bottom up, critical socio-political movements such 
as the gay movement. In the 1960s and 70s, they invented new ways of life 
and changed ‘our mentality, our attitudes, and the attitudes and mentality 
of other people – people who do not belong to these movements. And that 
is something very important and positive. I repeat, it is not the normal and 
old political organizations that have led to this examination’ (173).
Elsewhere he writes that ‘(r)ecent liberation movements suffer from the 
fact that they cannot f ind any principle on which to base the elaboration 
of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot f ind any other ethics 
17 For further discussion of her assessment of dieting and cosmetic surgery, see Chapter 4.
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than an ethics founded on so-called scientif ic knowledge of what the self is, 
what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on’ (Foucault 1997c: 255-256). 
The ‘art of life’ to Foucault is an answer to this dilemma. Transforming self 
and society preferably takes place through collective practices of freedom 
that explicitly criticize forms of domination while at the same time creating 
ethical alternatives for self and society on micro- meso- and macro-levels 
(cf. Thompson 2003: 131; Vintges 2004a: 293).18
Foucault in his f inal lectures points to some practices in Western an-
tiquity that were particularly critical in character. In his discussion of the 
notion of ‘parrhesia’ – literally meaning ‘fearless speech’ – he points to the 
way this was elaborated by the Cynics into a whole ethos (cf. Foucault 2001, 
2005a, 2011). As he explains, parrhesia has more meanings in antiquity, 
namely criticizing oneself and one’s friends, among others. But Foucault 
is mostly interested in parrhesia as the fearless speech of the powerless 
to those in power, which involves serious risk-taking, as was practiced by 
the Cynics in particular. Foucault explains that the ‘right’ parrhesiast in 
antiquity, the one who is believed a truth-teller, is he who says what he 
knows to be true: his way of life and words are in harmony; in other words, 
his bios is in sync with his logos. Such a ‘harmonious accord’ (Foucault 
2001: 136, 90) of one’s deeds and one’s words is exemplif ied by Socrates, but 
also by a farmer in Euripides’ play Orestes, who has the courage to express 
controversial political opinions, and who is respected as a parrhesiast since 
he is ‘a man of blameless principle and integrity’ (69). Overall, ‘the manner 
in which a person lived was a touchstone of his relation to truth’ (117).
Elsewhere, Foucault again suggests that critique preferably is an at-
titude, or a lived practice, in which bios and logos are linked and one’s 
acts and speech activities accord.19 An outspoken critical, socio-political 
18 Foucault argues that practices of liberation can be necessary but that they need to be linked 
to practices of freedom. A colonized people has to liberate itself from its colonizers, but also 
needs practices of freedom to def ine ‘admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political 
society. This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation; again, the latter 
indeed have their place, but they do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of def ining all 
the practical forms of freedom’ (Foucault 1997c: 283). 
19 The parrhesiastic attitude according to Foucault is at ‘the roots of what we could call the 
“critical tradition in the West”’; he specif ies his research on parrhesia as ‘a genealogy of the criti-
cal attitude in Western philosophy’ (Foucault 2001: 170-171). Rather than as the triumph of pure 
Reason, Western Enlightenment according to him should be interpreted as the re-emergence 
of a critical attitude of testing limits and as such should be conceived of as an ethos instead 
of an analytics of truth (cf. Foucault 1997d). Foucault rereads Kant’s famous treatise ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ through this lens, arguing that Kant’s question already involves an acceptance 
of the fact that we deal here with an event in time, and not with pure Reason. 
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movement in that sense entails such an accord as well; that is to say, it 
practices what it preaches. If the gay movement has to offer a critically 
creative ‘art of life’, it preferably consists of a set of critically creative 
ethical life projects.
Foucault’s notion of fearless speech indirectly addresses the fact that 
assemblages of neoliberal and disciplinary micro-management in Western 
societies install a lot of fear in people, demanding courage to counter them. 
From my experience as an academic in a corporatized university, practic-
ing parrhesiastic critique on an individual basis is exhausting, especially 
with the rise of a bully culture in neoliberal academia (cf.   Zabrodska 
et al. 2011). A collective, outspokenly critical practice of freedom, as 
developed by students and staff at the University of Amsterdam in early 
spring 2015, is far more energizing and effective (cf. Gray 2015). From 
Foucault’s main interest in politics as bottom up, collective practices 
of freedom, comprising micro-, meso- and macro-aims, I take that par-
rhesiastic practices preferably take place in the context and shape of such 
socio-political movements.
Foucault’s notion of either explicitly critical (what he calls parrhesiastic), 
or implicitly critical practices of freedom, involve a new concept of homo 
politicus, something Wendy Brown (2015) does not notice when she com-
plains about the lack of a homo politicus in Foucault’s work. While Brown 
advocates a return of the homo politicus in its sovereign classical shape, 
in terms of the original subject of Western political philosophy, Foucault 
posits a different concept of homo politicus, one that is embedded in and 
produced by collective practices of freedom, which allow him or her to im- or 
explicitly counter coercive frames while moving beyond them.
Summing up, we can distinguish f ive basic positions in Foucault’s work 
that people can occupy in power constellations. The f irst two we coined 
as (1) the docile body; and (2) direct bodily resistance – both with no room for 
people’s agency. Since 1978, however, Foucault introduces various concepts 
of human agency. Neoliberal man as theorized by Foucault is an agent who 
manoeuvres within the constraints of his neoliberal surroundings, and 
whose position we may coin – in the terms of Thompson (2003) – as (3) 
neoliberal ‘minimal freedom’. Discussing people’s ethical self-formation 
within code-oriented moral systems, which equally gives them some room 
to manoeuvre, Foucault points out a kind of agency that we can label as (4) 
moral minimal freedom. Finally, in Foucault’s works since 1980, there is a 
notion of (5) free agency – as constructed in relatively independent practices 
of freedom. While most governmentality studies focus on (3), i.e. on peo-
ple’s agency in the sense of a neoliberally constrained ‘minimal freedom’, 
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they do not incorporate (5), i.e. people’s free agency as constructed in 
relatively independent practices of freedom. They sometimes mention 
Foucault’s notion of self-care, but without noticing the possible dynamics 
the concept allows for.20 The concept of practices of freedom, however, 
not only involves a strategic perspective, but can be used in analytical 
ways as well. Self-techniques can be transformed and overdetermined 
in such a way that we deal with ethical practices of freedom, rather than 
with self-techniques that are linked to coercion, as will be illustrated in 
following chapters.
Freedom Practices: Five Core Characteristics
Foucault’s and Beauvoir’s works on ethics show some remarkable paral-
lels that allow us to f inally synthesize their approaches in a concept of 
ethical ‘freedom practices’, i.e. distinct sets of critically creative ethical 
life projects, coined in terms of the following f ive core characteristics. 
A f irst similarity is that both authors conceive of freedom in terms of an 
ethical practice, and not as an attribute or quality of human beings per se. 
To Beauvoir, ‘true freedom’ involves the creation of an ethical life project, 
in a concern for the well being of others. To Foucault, freedom comprises 
creating an ethical life project that involves ‘a way of caring for others’ 
(Foucault 1997d: 287). Paraphrasing Beauvoir’s formulation ‘One is not born, 
but rather becomes, woman’ (Beauvoir 2010: 293), we can conclude that 
to both authors one is not born, but rather becomes free, by developing a 
personal ethos, i.e. by developing a personal ethical life project in a concern 
for others.
A second similar component is that developing a personal ethical life 
project to both authors concerns one’s visble behaviour and acting in the 
world, rather than inner life – being, in that sense, ethico-political in 
character.
Thirdly, to both, an ethical life project inherently involves a critique of 
any domination. To Beauvoir ‘willing ourselves free’ entails willing oth-
ers free, and involves a concrete commitment to those who are denied a 
personal ethical life project. To Foucault, practicing a personal ethos in 
20 Lemke (2001) argues that neoliberalism is a political rationality that ‘tries to render the 
social domain economic and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems 
to the increasing call for “personal responsibility” and “self-care”’ (Lemke 2001: 203). Self-care 
here is directly linked to neoliberalism (see also Miller and Rose 2008: 7).
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explicitly critical, parrhesiastic ways, or in implicitly critical ways, op-
poses any domination, since the activity is its own norm. Their normative 
perspective can be articulated in terms of ‘access for all’ to a personal 
ethical life project.
Fourth, to both, developing an ethical life project is not a matter of ap-
plying rules or laws but of creation. To Foucault, the relatively independent 
status of ethical self-practices means that one’s actions cannot be distilled 
from moral codes or dogmas, but are a matter of stylization and invention, 
as is clear from his use of the terms ‘art of life’, ‘aesthetics of existence’, and 
‘arts of existence’. Beauvoir argued for the creative aspect of any ethical 
decision from the perspective of our situatedness as f inite beings in the 
world, and she, too, spoke of ethics in terms of an ‘art of living’. To both 
authors, ethics involves inventing our behaviour and weighing our solutions, 
instead of obeying rules, or deciding upon ends a priori. To both, in the 
words of Foucault, ‘the ethico-political choice we have to make every day 
is to determine which is the main danger’ (Foucault 1997c: 256).
Fifth, both authors ground any ethics in social contexts. In The Ethics 
of Ambiguity, Beauvoir situates ethics as the concrete projects of groups 
of individuals and of individuals within them. She argues, moreover, that 
social conditions can deny people access to a personal ethical life project, 
which is the basic – Hegelian – premise of The Second Sex as well (cf. Chap-
ter 2). Foucault more concretely refers to specif ic collective settings that 
are necessary for people to be able to acquire an ethos. At stake are groups 
and networks that operate relatively independent from moral codes and 
that offer people self-techniques to create a personal ethical life project. 
Our concept of freedom practices refers as well to this collective level, i.e. to 
identif iable and distinct relatively independent ethical communities, groups 
or networks offering self-techniques, and models for creating a concrete 
ethical way of life. But it also covers the personal level, i.e. the creation of a 
personal ethos in such a context. The term ‘freedom practices’ thus refers 
to both the collective and the individual level as two sides of the same 
coin, and can be used to indicate the creation of a personal ethos within 
such communities, groups, or networks, as well as these collective settings 
themselves – the fabric of which are the ethical ways of life developed by 
their members.
From the above, I propose to coin a concept of ‘freedom practices’ in 
terms of the following f ive core characteristics. At stake are distinct sets 
of critically creative ethical life projects that involve: 1) the development of 
a personal ethical life project in a concern for others; 2) consisting of one’s 
visible behaviour and acting in the world; 3) implicit or explicit critique of 
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any domination; 4) creation; 5) relatively independent ethical communities, 
groups, or movements offering self-techniques and models.
In an analogy with causal overdetermination – meaning that a social 
phenomenon or practice is the effect of multiple causes at once, one of which 
alone is not enough to account for the effect – I propose that a freedom 
practice is at stake as an effect of multifactorialism, i.e. of overdetermina-
tion by the f ive different factors, or f ive core characteristics specified above.
Where do the parallels between Foucault’s and Beauvoir’s concepts of 
ethics in terms of distinct sets of critically creative ethical life projects come 
from? Their respective theoretical backgrounds, i.e. poststructuralism and 
existentialism, do differ substantially. But to both intellectual movements 
power is an inherent dimension of social relations. Both share a critique on 
abstract moralism and abstract humanism, and specifically on Hegelian and 
Marxist notions of a f inal reconciliation between people. As we have seen, 
Beauvoir recommends looking at which concrete individuals are at stake 
behind abstract ideas, since there is only the multiplicity of life forms and 
projects, instead of one single ethical community. From his Nietzschean 
orientation, Foucault considers power as permeating the whole of society 
and knowledge, as do postmodern – i.e. neo-Nietzschean – thinkers. To 
existentialists and postmodernists alike, universal values and dogmas 
involve (a will to) power of concrete individuals or social groups. To both 
Beauvoir and Foucault, abstract universal morality is to be surpassed by a 
concept of ethics as radically situated embodied life projects that partake 
in power relations, being power practices themselves.
Furthermore, we should take seriously that Foucault explicitly distanced 
himself from postmodernism. Both Beauvoir and Foucault share an existen-
tial ethical perspective, arguing for a personal, ethical self-creation, rather 
than a deconstruction of the self.21
Moreover, both counterpose their notion of a radically situated ethical 
life project to collectivist ideals and programs. Foucault integrated the idea 
of a personal ethical life project in his f inal work, convinced as he was that 
there is no way we can return to totalitarian models of Hegelian-Marxist 
signature. Beauvoir, in The Ethics of Ambiguity  (1948), criticized Hegel 
21 Foucault, in this respect, refers to nineteenth-century poet Charles Baudelaire’s vision of 
‘modern man’ as the man ‘who tries to invent himself ’ (312). He adds, though, that Baudelaire 
unfortunately did not imagine that this ascetic elaboration of the self has ‘any place in society 
itself or in the body politic’ and is not limited to the domain of art as such (312). Beauvoir, in a 
similar vein, criticizes Oscar Wilde and surrealist writer Anaïs Nin for their ‘aestheticism,’ i.e. 
for making the beauty of their own lives their main focus as an art work in itself (cf. Beauvoir 
1988: 165, 170; cf. Vintges 2001). 
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for his collectivist conception of man, and explicitly targeted a Marxist 
politics that subordinated the individual to collectivity (cf. Beauvoir 1948: 
18 ff.). But Foucault and Beauvoir not only criticize a stifling collectivism or 
communitarianism, they also keep their distance from an unencumbered 
individualism. To them, a personal ethical life project takes shape within 
a specif ic collective setting, instead of being its counterpoint. They point 
to collective and personal dimensions as two sides of the same coin – as 
do postcolonial authors like Audre Lorde (1984). The latter, in a similar 
vein, conceives of a ‘community in difference’ that balances individual and 
collective dimensions – expressing a vision of community that is ‘shared 
by a number of black women scholars’ (Havis 2014: 247; Lorde 1984: 111).22
Beauvoir and Foucault also share a certain distrust in academic 
philosophy. According to Hadot (1995), academic philosophy increas-
ingly narrows itself into abstract reasoning; moreover, it risks losing its 
independence and turning into state ideology. In the words of Schopen-
hauer, university philosophy as a ‘state-f inanced philosophy’ aims ‘to give 
students opinions which are the liking of the minister who hands out 
the Chairs’ (cf. Hadot 1995: 271). In contrast, ancient ethics was relatively 
autonomous from moral codes, and engaged one’s whole mode of being in 
a practice of freedom. Hadot contends that remainders of this concept of 
philosophy as a way of life are present in the works of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Marx, and Husserl, and, last but not 
least, in ‘the movement of thought inaugurated by Heidegger and car-
ried on by existentialism (that) seeks – in theory and in principle – to 
engage man’s freedom and action in the philosophical process’ (272). 
Both Beauvoir and Foucault can be grouped under this tradition. They 
counterpose their concept of ethics as a way of life to certain academic 
strands of philosophy that, according to them, come down to an empty, 
timeless reasoning.
Besides these parallels between Beauvoir’s existential-ethical perspective 
and Foucault’s f inal work, some crucial differences remain. Most important 
is Foucault’s critique of the free, ‘original’ subject of existentialism. While 
Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity does situate the ethical self in social 
contexts, Foucault does so in more specif ic ways, pointing to certain rela-
tively independent, identif iable networks and groups that offer the tools 
and models necessary for people to freely create and cultivate a personal 
ethical life project. Foucault’s f inal, more radical, socio-historical approach 
22 Akeel Bilgrami (2014) interestingly argues for a ‘non-individualistic’ notion of individual 
liberty in terms of a larger view of the unalienated life (Bilgrami 2014: 173).
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is an indispensable ‘update’ of Beauvoir’s ethics, transforming it into a 
timely philosophy.23
Whereas Beauvoir recognizes that social conditions may deny people 
access to a personal ethical life project, she does not specify these in terms 
of access to concrete ethical vocabularies. People kept in a state of servitude 
and ignorance should seize the opportunity ‘once there appears a possibility 
of liberation’ (Beauvoir 1948: 37). At some points in her essay, her emphasis 
on ‘willing freedom’ leads her to a moralism, which she later admitted and 
regretted. From Foucault’s more concrete, historicizing approach we take 
that people can develop critically creative ethical life projects only within 
relatively independent ethical communities, groups or movements offering 
self-techniques and models – i.e. our f ifth core characteristic of a freedom 
practice – that, like other discourses, emerge over time and cannot simply 
be made to happen.
As discussed in previous sections, Beauvoir and Foucault launch their 
concept of the critically creative ethical life project within collective 
settings as a counterpoint not only to abstract humanist and collectivist 
doctrines, but also to the current neoliberal models of Super Woman and 
Organization Man and the Entrepreneurial Self. But to what extent do their 
concepts of ethical self-creation differ from these models? Do the latter not 
involve similar projects of self-stylization and self-creation?
Comparing the ethical self involved in a freedom practice with the 
models of the neoliberal self, we can f irst conclude that the notion of an 
ethical life project involves a concern for the well-being of others, while the 
model of personhood of the neoliberal self is focused on personal success 
and safety. Developing a critically creative ethical life project moreover 
demands ‘slow, sustained, and arduous work,’ as Arnold Davidson notes 
(Davidson 2005: xxviii), instead of some quick and ‘Easy steps to Accessing 
More Happiness and Boosting Your Success.’ Furthermore, it concerns our 
acting in the world, rather than f inding the truth of one’s inner self, as is 
standard in current training programs of self-improvement designed by 
‘experts’. Next, it implicitly or explicitly opposes domination, instead of 
accommodating hierarchical and competitive frames, with dividing lines 
between winners and losers. And lastly, it is concretely situated within a 
distinct social group, community, or movement, while the neoliberal self 
is supposed to be autonomous and to independently choose his or her own 
way of life.
23 In this respect, I read Beauvoir through the lens of Foucault, while Kruks (2006) does vice versa. 
52 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
While, thus far, only freedom practices of men have come to the fore, 
we can f inally ask whether the concept is of any use to analyse women’s 
positions in past and present. Is the concept of ‘freedom practices’ applicable 
to women as it is to men? And: is it not inherently Western? In Chapter 2, 
I will elaborate on the concept’s culturally plural character, especially 
on its cross-cultural model of the ethical self as well as its plural ‘keys’. 
Here, I will focus on the existence of women’s freedom practices from the 
main theoretical perspective articulated thus far, i.e. as developed within 
philosophical schools and circles.
Women’s Freedom Practices: Some Examples
In view of Foucault’s claim that ethical practices of freedom in antiquity 
were only meant for free men, where do women and girls come into the 
picture? As we have seen, Foucault explicitly criticized the hierarchical, 
male character of antiquity’s ethics. When discussing how ‘Greek ethics 
were linked to a purely virile society with slaves, in which the women 
were underdogs’ (Foucault 1997c: 256), he adds: ‘(a)ll that is quite disgust-
ing!’ (258). Moreover, when he points to remainders of the ‘care of the self ’ 
tradition in Christianity (Foucault 1989: 451), and in a string of religious 
groups in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (e.g. Foucault 1997c: 278, 
cf.  Chapter  2), he never refers to women either. Hadot  (1995) likewise 
only mentions men, in ancient times and thereafter, as practitioners of 
philosophy as a way of life.
In Chapter 2, I will argue that many women in history developed freedom 
practices in ways that Hadot and Foucault never conceived of. But, already 
from their concepts of philosophy as a way of life, we find women engaged in 
such practices. Since ancient times, women have been members of relatively 
independent philosophical schools and circles that offered self-techniques 
to develop an ethical life trajectory. They created a personal ethical life 
project that challenged the dominant gender patterns of their time. In what 
follows, I mention only some women who became famous role models. 
However, they stand for many others who developed a critically creative 
ethical life project within the context of such circles, but who never made 
it into history books.24
24 Historical research today shows the existence of women philosophers from ancient time 
onwards. In what follows I especially make use of Carolien Ceton et al. (2012), a volume comprising 
65 entries on women philosophers throughout times and cultures, composed by a range of scholars.
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Examples of women philosophers in Western antiquity are Hipparchia 
(c. 300 BCE) – member of the Cynic school of philosophy – and Leontion and 
Hypatia. Leontion (c. 300 BCE), commonly described as a hetaera, was a mem-
ber of the Epicurean philosophical school that had slaves and women among 
its pupils. The members of this school, founded by the philosopher Epicurus, 
lived in a community a few miles outside the centre of Athens, away from 
the hectic life of the city. They bought a garden near their home, the famous 
Garden of Epicurus, where they together practiced the hedonist Epicurean 
lifestyle of friendship and pleasure. The Epicureans strived for tranquility of 
the soul and bodily health. Death to them is a natural phenomenon, nothing 
to be afraid of. We should, moreover, only strive for the fulf illing of simple 
natural desires, and abstain from unnecessary ones like ambition, wealth 
and power: man needs little to be happy and free. Leontion’s works are lost, 
but she is praised for her sharp writing style – and especially for her treatise 
against the reputed leader of the Peripatetic school, Aristotle’s successor, 
Theophrastus. Leontion thus carved her own path as a woman within the 
context of the Epicurean school, endorsing its values of cultivating friendship, 
philosophical contemplation, and living in harmony with nature.
Hypatia of Alexandria (355-415 CE), a skilled philosopher, mathematician, 
and astronomer, was a member of the Neoplatonist movement. This was 
a group of scholars, pupils, and friends that practiced an ascetic ethical 
lifestyle, marked by the study of theology, mathematics, astronomy, and 
oriented to higher forms of goodness and harmony. Some fragments and 
themes of Hypatia’s work are known, such as her ideas on friendship. As 
the f irst female head of the Alexandrian Platonic school, she developed and 
passed on her own philosophical way of life to her students.25
Dutch seventeenth-century philosopher Anna Maria van Schur-
man (1607-1678) created a personal ethical life project as a woman within 
the context of philosophical as well as religious circles.26 Born in a wealthy 
Reformed family, and educated in the f ine arts and literature, she became a 
very accomplished scholar, artist, and linguist, f luent not only in European 
languages, but also in Hebrew, Chaldean (Throat), Aramaic, Ethiopian, 
Arabic and Syriac, Latin and Greek.27 She was the f irst woman in the 
Netherlands permitted to attend a university – seated behind a wooden 
25 Cf. the f ilm Agora (2009) on Hypatia’s life and work. 
26 The following is based on Jeannette Bloem (2004) and (2012).
27 Museum Martena in Franeker, the Netherlands, shows some of her artistic work and her 
collection of insects, as well as diaries and correspondence, and the self-portrait inserted in 
the text.
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partition so the other students could not see her. Van Schurman wrote 
several public treatises, including a dissertation on the suitability of the 
female mind for scholarship and literature (1641), in which she argues that 
women who have the means to do so can, and should be allowed to study. 
She travelled widely, corresponded with prominent male philosophers of 
her time, including Descartes, and became something of a celebrity, due 
to her erudition.
Later in life she joined the religious community of preacher Jean de 
Labadie. When he was dismissed from the Reformed Church for his ‘hereti-
cal’ views, and founded his own house church in Amsterdam, Van Schurman 
made a radical decision. She sold her house and part of her library and 
joined his community, a choice that caused great commotion among her 
friends, admirers, and theologians, not least because she lived as a single 
woman under one roof with men. The attack on her reputation resulted in 
Van Schurman writing the Eucleria – published in 1673 in Latin, in 1684 in 
Dutch – in which she justif ies her new way of life.
Van Schurman had always carved her own path as a Christian woman, 
and refused to be guided by others, hence her joining the Labadist com-
munity is often seen as a betrayal. This pietist movement, however, similarly 
refused to be guided by church institutions. Van Schurman’s membership of 
this community, moreover, allowed her to share her life with like-minded 
peers on a daily basis, inspired as she was by the prototype of the f irst 
Christian communities.
Rather than as a betrayal, her life qualif ies as a freedom practice, as 
an effect of multifactorialism, i.e. its being overdetermined by the f ive 
different factors specif ied earlier. She: (1) developed a personal ethical life 
project; (2) expressed in actions in the world such as attending university, 
publishing, corresponding; (3) in an explicit critique of the stereotype of 
the silent and humble Christian woman; (4) creating and inventing a way 
of life as a woman that challenged the dominant gender patterns of her 
time; (5) within philosophical circles, and later, within a relatively independ-
ent, religious community, both offering her self-techniques and models for 
a personal ethical self-creation.
Eightteenth-century philosophers Belle van Zuylen, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
and Caroline Schlegel, to name but a few, all belonged to philosophical 
circles that resisted traditional dogmas and conventions. Within these 
contexts, they consciously created their own personal ethical life project, 
in an explicit critique of the traditional roles for women. Their ethical ways 
of life comprise alternative models for self and society that challenge the 
dominant gender patterns of their time.
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Anna Maria van Schurman: Self-Portrait (1640)
copy provided by museum martena, franeker
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The life of Anna Julia Cooper (1858-1964), who is generally considered 
the f irst black feminist, similarly comprises alternative models for self and 
society in relation to dominant patterns of race and gender. Cooper was an 
American scholar who participated in circles of abolitionist intellectuals.28 
In her book A Voice from the South: By a Woman from the South  (1892), 
she advocated the rights of African American women and girls to higher 
education. She created her own ethical life trajectory, by acting in the world, 
lecturing and publishing widely on racial and gender equality and setting 
up black communities and cultural organizations, in a challenge to the 
prevailing ideas about black women.
Russian born activist Emma Goldman (1869-1940), who participated in 
the international anarchist movement, likewise ‘lived’ her political philoso-
phy.29 While Goldman initially sympathized with the Russian revolution, 
after a few years she became one of its sharpest critics. She also changed 
her initially positive attitude towards political violence. As an activist, 
she created a lifestyle that combined an anarchist political ‘spirit’ with 
passion, commitment, creativity, and courage. Goldman’s personal ethical 
life project, comprising her actions in the world, can be seen as political 
philosophy in action. As such, it contains a set of cultural alternatives for 
self and society, on micro-, meso-, and macro level, such as the necessity of 
improving the social condition and rights of workers, of access for women 
to birth control, of new forms of direct democracy, and of resistance against 
patriottism and war, militarism, and nationalism. Emma Goldman (E.G.) 
made her life into ‘an example’ (Ferguson 2011: 283).
Simone de Beauvoir, within the philosophical ‘school’ of existentialism, 
not only conceived of ethics as a freedom practice, but created a personal 
ethical life project along these lines as well. She cultivated a personal life 
trajectory as a woman intellectual, against the conventions of her time, 
by carefully stylizing her acting in the world, in concrete commitments 
against sexism, colonialism, and racism, within the collective setting of an 
existentialist circle of friends that she often called her ‘family’. Although 
she did not elaborate a concept of ethical self-techniques, and merely spoke 
of the necessity of permanent ethical effort, her autobiographies give us an 
account of the concrete self-techniques that she and other existentialists 
developed, such as the establishing of daily routines of work and leisure, 
living in hotel rooms, and eating in restaurants. Other self-techniques 
that she developed include undertaking long walking trips on her own 
28 Kathryn Gines (2010) characterizes Cooper as forerunner of an intersectional approach.
29 The following is based on Kathy Ferguson (2004) and (2011).
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(cf. Hesp 2015), and the writing of f ive autobiographies, which can be seen as 
‘hypomnemata’, i.e. writing exercises to create herself as the ethical subject 
she aspired to be (cf. Vintges 2004b, 1996).
In her introduction to The Second Sex, Beauvoir positions herself as living 
in a time of transition, when women, for the f irst time in history, could 
develop a critically creative ethical life project. In the next chapter, we 
will see that many women in past and present did so, in ways that neither 
Beauvoir, nor Foucault have imagined.




2 Women’s Freedom Practices in World 
Perspective
Is the concept of freedom practices Western-centric in character? Or does 
it involve a culturally plural notion that is present throughout cultures, 
and that, as such, allows for a critical reformulation of feminism in world 
perspective? ‘Feminism’ is often criticized for being inherently white and 
Western – a critique that largely corresponds with mainstream feminism’s 
claims that women in the West are the liberated, autonomous subjects 
that women from ‘other cultures’ are yet to become. Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty  (1991) and Lila Abu-Lughod  (1986, 2002) famously criticized 
Western feminists for a priori victimizing non-Western women, instead of 
approaching them as agents. Sawitri Saharso (2000), in a similar vein, argued 
that Western feminists should take different models of self into account, 
rather than imposing a Western view, in informal and formal, even violent 
ways. According to Saba Mahmood (2008), ‘feminism’ today ‘runs the risk 
of becoming more of a handmaiden of empire’ (Mahmood 2008: 82). Refer-
ring to the American invasion of Muslim countries to bring freedom and 
democracy, especially to their female inhabitants, she concludes that we face 
a ‘collusion of empire and feminism in this historical moment’ (84, cf. 89).
Mahmood (2012) specif ies what is intrinsically wrong with Western 
feminism’s model of the self; namely, its reliance on a conception of au-
tonomized agency and its refusal ‘to grant legitimacy to any other form of 
subjectivity or criticality’ (Mahmood 2012: xii). Feminism’s model of the 
autonomous self, moreover, is paired to a ‘normative secularism’, i.e. the 
assumption that only in a secular society can people be free and liberated 
autonomous persons (Mahmood 2008: 82). The concept of freedom ‘as an 
individual capacity to act autonomously in accord with one’s own desires 
and interests,’ wrongly presupposes ‘a necessary antagonism between the 
individual and the social’ (Mahmood 2007: 148). According to Mahmood, 
this concept of ‘freedom is normative to feminism as it is to liberalism’; 
she therefore, not surprisingly, keeps her distance from any ‘feminism’ 
(Mahmood 2005: 10).
Eléonore Lépinard (2011) concludes that the value of autonomy is ‘a 
site of feminist divisions,’ and the reason why we face a serious ‘crisis of 
the feminist subject’ (Lépinard 2011: 217). While Lépinard argues that a 
reformulation of the concept of autonomy is ‘an urgent task to pursue for 
feminist theory’ (217), it seems necessary to replace it by another, culturally 
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plural concept. Before we assess the merit of the concept of ethical ‘freedom 
practices’ (i.e. critically creative ethical life projects developed within dis-
tinct communities) in this regard, we must f irst take a brief look at some of 
the philosophical debates about the concept of autonomy.1
Surpassing autonomy
Autonomy (literally: giving oneself one’s own law) is one of the main prin-
ciples of Western liberal philosophy. It can be traced back to the ideas of 
seventeenth-century thinker John Locke, especially to his idea that individuals 
have basic human rights that the state should respect and protect. Arguably, 
more important are the ideas of the eighteenth-century – Western Enlighten-
ment – philosopher Kant, who held that people should lead self-authorizing, 
self-determining, and self-governing lives. To Kant, acting autonomously 
meant to act in accordance with reason’s requirements, i.e. in accordance 
with maxims or rules that can simultaneously be willed as universal laws.
Mainstream Western feminism is based on the idea (l) of women’s au-
tonomy. Liberal feminist philosophers like Susan Moller Okin and Martha 
Nussbaum argue for a global implementation of this idea (l). Okin (1999) 
criticizes multiculturalism and claims that feminism essentially should 
be based on Western liberalism’s ‘fundamentals’, such as the principle of 
autonomy (Okin 1999: 24). According to her, discriminatory practices against 
women are inherent to all cultures, whereas the norm of gender equality ‘is 
at least formally endorsed by liberal states’ (8). Nussbaum (2000) argues that 
personal autonomy is part of ‘the good life,’ and belongs to the principles a 
global feminism should be based on.
To these and other liberal thinkers, autonomy, in line with the ideas 
of philosopher Kant, involves the capacity to rationally choose one’s own 
way of life. To Kant, being rational meant following substantive moral 
standards, on the basis of independent deliberation.2 Kantians today often 
argue in more procedural, i.e. content-neutral ways, holding that indepen-
dent deliberation is important for autonomy, no matter what the outcome, 
moral or not. Decisive is whether one acts according to one’s own will. 
Beate Rössler (2002) synthesizes the two approaches, arguing that what is 
important is that a ‘rich’ reflection takes place on ‘the practical question,’ 
1 The philosophical literature on autonomy is complex and extensive. I only discuss some 
issues that I consider relevant to the debate on feminism in world perspective.
2 ‘Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law unto itself ’ (Kant 1948: 108).
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i.e. the moral question of how one wants to live one’s life and who one 
wants to be, a reflection that is not only rational but can be informed by 
emotions as well. What is crucial is ‘that a person, to be autonomous, asks 
herself this practical question in the proper, that is, independent, way’ 
(Rössler 2002: 144). Autonomy should be taken as a normative principle, 
rather than an ontological one. Persons should be able and be allowed to 
live in a ‘self-chosen way,’ leading a ‘self-determined life’ (147, 150).3
Some prominent ‘second wave’ feminist scholars have attacked the concept 
of autonomy as independent moral decision-making for being inherently 
masculine (cf. Jaggar 1983) and for wrongly presuming an atomistic conception 
of the self (cf. Young 1990). Seyla Benhabib (1987) traces this model of the self 
back to philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ proposal to think of men as ‘mush-
rooms’, emerging from the earth and coming to full maturity without any 
kind of engagement with each other (Benhabib 1987: 84). Other authors have 
characterized the model of the autonomous self as a ‘Teflon subject’ to which 
nothing sticks (White 2000: 4), or as ‘disembedded,’ ‘punctual,’ or ‘disengaged’ 
self (Taylor 1989: 159 ff.). All these concepts critically target the liberal notion 
of the person as ‘inner citadel’ (cf. Christman 1988), capable of independent 
decision-making and self-control, as if the person is extension-less and not 
constrained by established custom (cf. Van Leeuwen and Vintges 2010: 654).
In response to these critiques, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stol-
jar (2000) elaborated the concept of ‘relational autonomy’. The notion aims to 
cover the variety of ways in which people’s identities are shaped within social 
relationships; namely, ‘by a complex of intersecting social determinants, 
such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity’ (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 4).4 By 
taking these social dimensions into account, the authors aim to rehabilitate 
the concept of autonomy for feminist theory, ‘disentangling it from suspect 
ideals of radical independence and self-reliance’ (Westlund 2009: 26).
Rössler (2002) points out the problematic side of the concept of ‘relational 
autonomy.’ If relationality is to be seen as inherent to the concept of autonomy 
itself, it is legitimate to wonder whether we are dealing with autonomy at 
all. That is to say, it ‘is precisely the distinction between a relational and 
a nonrelational concept of autonomy that allows a person the possibility 
of extricating herself from relationships’ (Rössler 2002: 149). Of course, a 
Kantian notion of moral freedom or personal autonomy is situated in a social 
3 With thanks to Matthé Scholten.
4 An extensive debate has ensued on the heuristics of the concept of relational autonomy. 
Again, I selectively discuss some issues only, in the light of the debate on feminism in world 
perspective.
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world where subjects have to ‘orient themselves more or less autonomously 
in their social relations. But this is, strictly speaking, a chronological depend-
ency: moral freedom has to keep its priority over existing social contexts 
and institutions since otherwise it would not be what it is supposed to be: 
individual freedom’ (Rössler 2013: 17). Mackenzie (2014) seems to endorse 
Rössler’s argument for the external character of relationality when she 
argues for an improvement of women’s social conditions that should enable 
them to be self-authorizing, self-determining and self-governing agents. Be it 
that the person is always socially embedded, Mackenzie’s perspective thus, 
in a normative respect, covers the Kantian liberal one.
Lisa Schwartzman (2006) explicitly challenges the liberal feminist ap-
proach. She criticizes liberal theory’s abstract, ‘ideal theoretical’ method – as 
propagated by, for instance, liberal feminists Onara O’Neill and Nussbaum – for 
not dealing with our actual, non-ideal, social world. Schwartzman especially 
criticizes liberal theory for its individualist methodology, i.e. its individualist 
approaches of society, from which social relations of power – such as women’s 
oppression by men – cannot come to the fore. Elizabeth Anderson (2009) 
counters Schwartzman’s critique by arguing that liberal theory is not ‘group 
blind’ at all. She points to Montesquieu’s and Mill’s critiques of women’s 
oppression, arguing that ‘liberalism has long been interested in oppressive 
social practices defined on group lines’ (Anderson 2009: 139). Endorsing a 
normative individualism does not necessarily imply a methodological or 
ontological individualism. Anderson concludes that liberalism is entirely 
consistent with the methods Schwartzman advances (131).
In these philosophical debates, Western feminists tend to agree not so much 
on an ontological individualism, but rather on a normative individualism, i.e. 
on a normative Kantian ideal of independent individual choice and decision 
making. Anderson’s reply to Schwartzman illustrates how liberal theory is 
currently able to incorporate any critique. John Dryzek et al. (2006) contend 
that liberalism will become more conscious of its own historical contingency, 
however, and that new alternatives to liberalism will gain strength in future 
years, among others from postcolonial and feminist signature (Dryzek et al. 
2006: 24-26). The work of anthropologist Mahmood is a case in point.
Ethical Self-Formation in Religious Contexts
Mahmood’s critique on Western feminism’s too narrow models of self and 
society is based on her study of a grassroots women’s piety movement in 
Cairo (Mahmood 2005). The women participating in this Islamist movement, 
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instead of being the oppressed creatures that Western feminists hold them to 
be, are religious agents who practice an ethical ‘self-cultivation’ that engages 
their entire way of life (Mahmood 2005: 158). Liberal feminists with their 
‘conceptions of the subject, autonomous reason, and objectivity, through 
which the pietists are understood to be lacking in faculties of criticism and 
reason’ (Mahmood 2012: xii) cannot imagine that Muslim women strive for 
completely different values; namely, a pious instead of a free, autonomous life.
For an alternative concept of human agency, in her study, Mahmood 
turns to Foucault’s f inal work. His ethics approach is ‘particularly helpful for 
conceptualizing agency’ since it allows us to conceive of its multiple forms 
(Mahmood 2005: 29). Authors like Daisy Dwyer (1978), Abu-Lughod (1986), 
and Janice Boddy  (1989) have already approached Arab and Muslim 
women as active agents. However, their studies remain grounded in a 
binary framework of agency as either consolidating or resisting norms – and 
the same counts, in a general sense, for Judith Butler’s concept of agency 
(cf. Mahmood 2005: 20 ff.). Instead, Foucault’s f inal approach allows for a 
conception of the variety of ways in which norms are ‘performed, inhabited 
and experienced’ (22).
Mahmood especially refers to Foucault’s four axes of ethical self-forma-
tion (cf. 32), distinguished by him in terms of ethical substance, mode of 
subjection, means, and telos and reformulated by us in terms of the answers 
to the questions: what, why, how, and to what purpose (cf. Chapter 1). This 
analytical toolset allows for a conception of multiple forms of moral agency, 
to be specif ied in terms of the concepts and models that cover the four 
aspects of ethical self-formation.
As discussed earlier, Foucault argued that the dimension of ethical self-
formation is present in all moral systems. He also added that ‘techniques 
of the self’ ‘can be found in all cultures in different forms’ (Foucault 1997c: 
277). Mahmood’s study builds on Foucault’s approach and demonstrates 
that it allows for an analysis of the moral agency of the Muslim women of 
the Egyptian piety movement. Foucault’s notion of ethical self-formation 
conceptualizes ‘the work bodily practices perform in crafting a subject’ 
(Mahmood 2005: 122), i.e. the techniques of ‘self-fashioning’ (Mahmood 
2001: 223). The concept of ethical self-formation captures how piety in Islam 
must become an embodied habit by simultaneous exercise of the body, the 
emotions, and reason, through the practicing of self-techniques. As such, it 
involves a situated and integrated notion of the self that a Western notion 
of autonomy does not cover.
Mahmood specif ies the moral agency of the women of the grassroots 
piety movement in Cairo in terms of Foucault’s four axes, concluding that 
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the ethical substance of their moral agency are the movements of the body; 
its mode of subjection the divine plan for human life – embodied in the 
Qur’an; its telos to approximate the exemplary model of the pious self of the 
Prophet and his Companions; and its self-techniques the ‘ritual practices, 
styles of comporting oneself, dress and so on,’ that establish a coordination 
between outer conduct and inner states, i.e. one’s intentions, movements 
of desire and thought (Mahmood 2005: 31).
According to Mahmood, the Muslim women of the Egyptian piety 
movement practice their ethical self-formation without questioning the 
dominant rules of gender segregation and their own subordinate status 
as women. But though she wants to stay away from ‘the binary terms of 
resistance and subordination’ (Mahmood 2005: 15) and from a concept of 
freedom, her own study more than once addresses the question whether 
or not the Egyptian women’s mosque movement can be said to have ‘latent 
liberatory potentials’ (5). Repeatedly, Mahmood discusses whether the 
movement not only challenges Western secular-liberal models of the self 
– as is central to the movement’s self-understanding – but male authority 
in Islam as well, which is not claimed by the movement itself (cf. 175). The 
movement is ‘altering the historically male-centered character of mosques 
as well as Islamic pedagogy’ (2, cf. 15) to the effect that it is ‘undermining 
the authority of dominant norms, institutions, and structures’ (174-175, 
cf. 34, 89, 175, 179). Foucault’s notion of ethical practices of freedom seems 
to resonate at the background of Mahmood’s study. However, Mahmood 
only takes on board Foucault’s concept of ethical self-formation within 
‘code-oriented’ moral systems. She convincingly demonstrates that this 
concept is culturally plural in character. Her work is exemplary in this 
respect and has inspired many others (e.g. Bracke 2007; Longman 2007). 
But is Foucault’s concept of practices of freedom – and by extension 
our concept of ‘freedom practices’ – equally applicable in non-Western 
perspective?
Freedom Practices: A Culturally Plural Concept
Is the concept of freedom practices Eurocentric or culturally plural in 
character? Since the concept especially capitalizes on Foucault’s notion of 
ethical practices of freedom, to answer this question we must f irst examine 
his concepts – among others his occasional use of the term ‘spirituality’, 
in reference to Hadot’s approach of ancient philosophy as a way of life 
(cf. Chapter 1).
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According to Hadot  (1995), ancient philosophy consists of ‘spiritual 
exercises’ that require effort and training and that aim for the stylization 
of one’s whole way of life. It is therefore necessary, Hadot argues, to use the 
term ‘spiritual’,
because none of the other adjectives we could use – “psychic,” “moral,” 
“ethical,” “intellectual,” “of thought,” “of the soul” – covers all the aspects 
of the reality we want to describe […] the word “thought” does not indicate 
clearly enough that imagination and sensibility play a very important 
role in these exercises (Hadot 1995: 81-82).
In his f inal work, Foucault uses the concept ‘spirituality’ in a similar vein 
(cf. Vintges 2011). He states:
By spirituality I mean – but I’m not sure this def inition can hold for 
very long – the subject’s attainment of a certain mode of being and the 
transformation that the subject must carry out on itself to attain this 
mode of being. I believe that spirituality and philosophy were identical 
or nearly identical in ancient spirituality (Foucault 1997d: 294).
According to Foucault, this spiritual self-transformation took place in 
ancient times within ‘“scattered centers” whose origins were in different 
philosophical or religious movements’ (Foucault 1986a: 21).5 Jeremy Car-
rette (2000) criticizes Foucault’s concept of spirituality for ‘expunging’ 
any metaphysical reference (Carrette 2000: 114, cf. 180). But to Foucault, 
‘spirituality’ does not cover religion as such, as Carrette presumes, but when 
used in the context of religion, refers to an ethical care for the self; in other 
words, to practices of freedom in religious contexts.
The concept of spirituality in this sense returns in Foucault’s comments 
on the 1978 Iranian Revolution, which he, like many others at that time, 
5 Foucault (2005a) distinguishes between two major poles: ‘on one side a more popular, 
religious, cultic and theoretically unpolished pole; and, at the other end, care of the soul, care of 
the self, practices of the self, which are more individual, personal and cultivated’ (Foucault 2005a: 
115). But, as he argues, the practice of the self was nevertheless important in the latter kind of 
groups as well. He states: ‘I certainly do not mean that there is this distinction between popular 
and crude versus learned, cultivated and friendly, things were much more complicated’ (115). 
To show ‘the complexity and variety of all these institutional dimensions of the care of the 
self, there is another example: this is the famous group of the Therapeutae’ (116). This religious 
community combined religious rituals and practices, with ‘care for the soul’ by searching for 
knowledge, meditation, reading, apprenticeship and so on (cf. 117, 127).
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considered primarily as an anti-imperialist revolution (cf. Honig 2008). 
Arguing that people were ‘spiritually’ involved, he meant that, to them, 
their whole way of life was at stake. In a similar vein, he spoke of a ‘po-
litical spirituality,’ opposing Truth regimes and producing something new 
(Foucault 2005b: 209). He also talks about Shi’ism as a form of Islam that 
differentiates between ‘mere external obedience to the code’ and ‘the pro-
found spiritual life.’ In revolutionary Iran, identif ication with the Islamic 
tradition combined with ‘the renewal of spiritual experiences,’ i.e. people’s 
‘desire to renew their entire existence’ (Foucault 2005c: 255).6
Elsewhere, Foucault discusses the presence of practices of freedom in 
religious contexts in more explicit terms. As discussed briefly in the previ-
ous chapter, in this respect he pointed to some religious groups in ancient 
times as well as to certain religious groups during the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance. The latter resist pastoral power and
claim the right to make their own statuses for themselves. According 
to these groups, the individual should take care of his own salvation 
independently of the ecclesiastical institution and of the ecclesiastical 
pastorate. We can see, therefore, a reappearance, up to a certain point, 
not of the culture of the self, which had never disappeared, but a reaf-
f irmation of its autonomy (Foucault 1997c: 278).7
Discussing the status of ascetic practices within Christianity, he states 
that ‘with the religion of the text, the idea of God’s will and the principle 
of obedience, morality took much more the form of a code of rules. Only 
certain ascetic practices of Christianity were more closely linked to the 
exercise of a personal liberty’ (Foucault 1989: 451). While the Church 
stressed the principle of ‘a morality whose precepts were compulsory and 
whose scope was universal,’ this did not rule out ‘the existence of ascetic 
movements having their own aspirations’ (Foucault 1986a: 21). In sum, 
‘(e)thics-oriented moralities […] have been very important in Christianity, 
functioning alongside the “code-oriented” moralities’ (30).
6 Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson (2005) criticize Foucault’s stances concerning the Iranian 
revolution in 978. Foucault, however, explicitly criticized the violence that marked the post-
revolutionary power struggle in Iran, distancing himself from its outcome. In newspaper articles 
published in April and May 1979 he supported the rights of the individual against the ‘bloody 
government of a fundamentalist clergy’ (Foucault 2005d: 265). 
7 Notice once again that it is the relative independence of ethical self-practices that interests 
him – cf. Chapter 1.
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Foucault’s conceptualizing of practices of freedom that involve a personal 
creative ethical self-formation in the context of Christianity and Islam 
can be extended to other religious contexts as well. As Inoue Tatsuo (1999) 
states, Chinese culture and philosophy are too rich and complex ‘to be 
presumed ignorant of the value of individuality’ (Tatsuo 1999: 51). Espe-
cially the seventeenth-century Neo-Confucian movement has a tendency 
to emphasize ‘the worth of individual self-development and the importance 
of an independent, critical, and creative attitude toward the Confucian 
texts and their authoritative exegeses’ (51). This critical tendency competes 
with an authoritarian tendency that originated from Confucianism, but 
it has been present all along, cultivating a ‘critical spirit toward political 
power and the courage to resist persecution’ (51). In Buddhism, a ‘spiritual 
individuality’ (52) exists ‘perhaps even more vividly’ (51) and the same 
counts for the Islamic mystical tradition of Sufism (52).
Foucault, during his visit to Japan in 1978, showed a great interest in 
the practice of Zen Buddhism. He took lessons and afterwards said to his 
teacher: ‘I’d like to ask you just one question. It’s about the universality 
of Zen. Is it possible to separate the practice of Zen from the totality of 
the religion and the practice of Buddhism?’ (Foucault 1999: 113). He also 
remarks that whereas Zen and Christian mysticism cannot be compared, 
the techniques of Christian spirituality and that of Zen are comparable. 
Foucault’s question and remark show his interest in non-Western, ethical-
spiritual self-techniques during these years.
As discussed earlier, Foucault was convinced that Western philosophy 
must change its concepts and turn into a philosophy that is worldwide in 
its vision (cf. Foucault 1999: 113, cf. the Introduction). His own concept of 
practices of freedom qualif ies as a cross-cultural concept in that it refers to 
rich traditions throughout cultures, and implies a notion of an integrated 
ethical self, engaged in techniques and practices of ethical self-creation, in 
an implicit or explicit critique of constraining models of self and society.
Beauvoir presented the concept of a personal, critically creative ethical 
life project as a counterpoint to constraining neoliberal models of the self. 
For her, a lived ethics has many faces, situated as it is in social contexts that 
are radically plural. As we have seen, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir 
criticizes the Kantian concept of moral autonomy, which holds that a person’s 
ethical choice is achieved ‘in the intelligible world by a purely rational will,’ 
requiring that the human person ‘transcends its empirical embodiment 
and chooses to be universal’ (Beauvoir 1948: 33, 17). To her, however, rather 
than being universal, the ethical self is socially embedded within distinct 
communities and is an interdependent, embodied self. The culturally plural 
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character of our concept of freedom practices is also rooted in Beauvoir’s 
culturally plural notion of the ethical self. Although, throughout her work, 
she criticized dogma-oriented religious systems that oppressed women on 
behalf of rigid doctrines, her perspective, i.e. that the ethical life project is 
always radically situated, is open, in principle, to an ethics-oriented kind 
of religiosity that involves personal ethical-spiritual life projects developed 
within communities, in the shape of a freedom practice.
During her stay in the US, in 1947, she was invited by her friend Rich-
ard Wright to attend several Harlem church services. In America Day by 
Day (1999) she notes how black religion is a source of inspiration to black 
people that may be used for their submission – since black people’s religion 
is ‘exploited as a distraction’ – but also as a source of black subversion (Beau-
voir 1999: 57). The sermons of the pastors of the many churches in Harlem 
‘have immediate social resonance and help black people become conscious 
of their problems because they allude to the burning issues of justice and 
happiness. This is why many black intellectuals display a certain goodwill 
to the Church, even as they deplore its submissive attitude’ (275-276). She 
concludes that the cultural sources of the black community are taken on in a 
critically creative way by its leaders, in an inventive politics (cf. Simons 2002: 
282-283; Van Leeuwen and Vintges 2010: 657).
Next to its culturally plural notion of the ethical self, the concept of 
freedom practices involves a cultural pluralism in yet another sense; namely, 
in its comprising other ‘modes of thought’ alongside strictly verbal ones. At 
several points in his work, Foucault discusses non-verbal modes of thought; 
for instance, when he argues that ‘(t)hought does exist, both beyond and 
before systems and edif ices of discourse. It is something that is often hid-
den but always drives everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought 
occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even 
in silent habits’ (Foucault 2000: 456). As we have seen, like Hadot (1995), 
he conceives of ancient philosophy’s bodily practices, rituals, and habits 
as comprising thought and knowledge (cf.  McLaren 2002). Moreover, 
motivated by his critique on modern science’s normalizing dimensions, 
Foucault explicitly argues for a philosophy that studies and revalues people’s 
‘subjugated knowledges,’ i.e. ‘historical contents’ and types of knowledge 
that have been disqualif ied as non-conceptual, and as ‘below the required 
level of erudition or scientif icity’ (Foucault 2003: 7, cf. the Introduction).
In reference to Foucault’s concepts of ‘art of living’ and ‘subjugated knowl-
edges’, Havis (2014) discusses the ways some black women use ancestral 
narratives, folk-wisdom, music, and other cultural repositories to redefine 
‘individual and group identity’ in non-static ways. To Havis, their use of these 
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cultural repertoires comprises philosophical ideas and a certain philosophi-
cal praxis that academic philosophy can learn from (Havis 2014: 239, 249).
Langer (1960) explicitly argues for academic philosophy to build on other 
modes of thought alongside verbal ones, and develops a set of concepts to 
conceive of some important ‘non-verbal’ modes of thought. She especially 
points to religious rite, art, and myth, which together she defines as ‘presen-
tational’ modes of thought, since they are characterized by a ‘simultaneous, 
integral presentation’ of ideas (Langer 1960: 79). Rite, myth, and art do 
present thought in ‘forms’, i.e. an arrangement of elements, among others 
in visual forms ‘grasped in one act of vision’ (75). Their ‘presentational,’ 
non-verbal, ‘forms’ address perception, intuition, insight and imagination 
in a direct way and have an emotive import. Yet, they are the bearer of 
ideas, showing these holistically and simultaneously – instead of stating 
them in a linear way as verbal language does. Their ‘forms’ express a certain 
proportion of parts, a structure in the sense of a relational order, and thus 
articulate a certain pattern. As such, they comprise ideas and in that sense, 
to Langer, not only science, but rite, art, and myth ‘are intellectual activities’ 
(Langer 1960: Preface). A ‘philosophy in a new key’ should recognize the 
‘presentational’ realms as modes of thought in their own right (71).
The term myth, to Langer, refers to a specif ic, secular genre of narratives. 
Other than religion, mythology does not originate in ‘religious feeling,’ but 
in fantasy and specif ically in its primary form, the dream (139). Myth is a 
‘dream-narrative’ (144), made of ‘dream-material’ (139). Mythical tales are 
’the great dreams of mankind’ (159). Fairy tales, too, are made of dream 
material, namely ‘image and fantasy.’ Both the fairy tale and myth have 
‘symbols for father and son, maiden and wife and mother, possession and 
passion, birth and death’ (144). But myth, other than fairy tales, expresses 
the cosmic setting of mankind and its relation to nature (cf. 146); as such, 
it comprises ‘mystic’ truth (cf. 142). While fairy tales are a form of wishful 
thinking and allow people to cope with actual experiences, myths, whether 
literally believed or not, are for understanding actual experiences. Myth’s 
typical themes are tragic, its characters are often supernatural, and its 
purpose is more diff icult and serious. At its best, myth entails a ‘recognition 
of natural conflicts, of human desire frustrated by non-human powers, 
hostile oppression, or contrary desires’ (143).
According to Langer, the heyday of myth is over, but its ways of thinking 
live on today, side by side with philosophy and science (cf. 165). We have 
to recognize that ‘emotional attitudes that have long centered on a myth 
are not easily broken; the vital ideas embodied in it cannot be repudiated 
because someone discovers that the myth does not constitute a fact ’ (164). 
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In sum, ‘(t)he Gods have their twilight, the heroes are forgotten’ (165), but 
myth’s vital meanings, and ‘moral orientation’ (143) live on in ‘the mode of 
art ’ (165), such as music, painting, architecture, poetry, dance, and drama.
To Langer, myth represents the primitive phase of man’s metaphysical 
thinking (cf. 163). Academic philosophy today risks losing its relevance 
and vitality if it denies its roots and debunks all ‘presentational’ modes of 
thought as irrelevant to intellectual progress. A ‘philosophy in a new key’ 
f inds timely ‘new conceptual forms’ (cf. 238-239) in the presentational realm 
that it can articulate and build on.
Langer’s elaboration of various non-verbal modes of thought allows for 
an articulation of ethical freedom practices comprising several other ‘keys’ 
in addition to verbal language. Foucault already pointed to the practicing of 
rite, and of bodily exercises in a broader sense, as an integral part of ethical 
freedom practices. His approach can be enriched by applying Langer’s 
concept of the ‘presentational’ keys of art and myth, alongside rite: ethical 
freedom practices from this perspective comprise several ‘keys’ in combina-
tion with verbal modes of thought – comprising, among others, religious, 
artistic, and mythical ‘forms’.
Freedom practices in the ‘forms’ of art are present in jazz scenes, as is 
argued in ‘jazz studies’, but also in blues- and hip hop scenes. But many 
more art styles, shared by – male and female – dancers, actors, musicians, 
painters, and others, comprise a distinct set of critically creative ethical life 
projects, embodied in a ‘presentational’ mode. An example more related to 
myths, concerns the performance of Asian martial arts, which have their 
roots in pre-history and are rich with mythical f igures and stories. According 
to former Dutch Kendo champion/teacher and academic philosopher Henk 
Oosterling, these martial skills involve a physical spirituality, comparable 
to the ethical bodily self-techniques that Foucault focused on. Oosterling 
inspired Rotterdam primary schools in underprivileged neighbourhoods 
to include martial arts lessons in their curriculum as well as gardening, 
cooking, and philosophy in an eco-social program that has become a shared 
educational freedom practice (cf. Oosterling 2015).
We can conclude that because the concept of freedom practices involves 
a set of culturally plural ‘keys’ and also relies on a cross-cultural notion of 
an ethical self, it is culturally plural in character. As such, the concept of 
freedom practices covers a treasury of identif iable sets of critically creative 
ethical life projects, through time and space, which conform to our f ive core 
characteristics. The present study only focuses on (a variety of) women’s 
freedom practices in past and present, especially in light of the debate on 
feminism in world perspective. A f irst conclusion can be that, because of 
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its culturally plural character, the concept of freedom practices allows for 
a critical reformulation of feminism in world perspective; namely, in terms 
of a set of critically creative movements that in several ‘keys’ struggle for 
women’s access to an ethical freedom practice, i.e. a personal ethical way 
of life within their distinct communities. A feminism in world perspective 
that strives for access for all women to a ‘freedom practice’, practices what 
it preaches and consists of a set of freedom practices itself, i.e. collectives 
that offer self-techniques, and that develop new ethical ways of life and 
models for self and society, in critically creative ways, and in various ‘keys’.8
Re-reading The Second Sex in World Perspective
Whereas the concept of freedom practices, with its culturally plural char-
acter, in principle, allows for a critical reformulation of feminism in world 
perspective, does the classic text of feminism, i.e. Beauvoir’s study The 
Second Sex, support such a critical and culturally plural reformulation? 
While Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) – contra a Kantian notion 
of moral ‘autonomy’ – presented a radically situated and integrated notion 
of an ethical self, do we f ind a similar notion in her study The Second Sex? 
Or does The Second Sex, the work that we classif ied as the ‘exemplar’ of 
contemporary feminism, propagate a Western-centric concept of individual 
freedom? In what follows, I will examine the work’s normative perspective.
According to many, Beauvoir merely applied Sartre’s concepts of human 
consciousness as ‘transcendence’ and ontological freedom in The Second 
Sex. Thus, The Second Sex is criticized for taking a male perspective, 
privileging male activities over traditional female roles.9 According to 
Mackenzie  (1998), Beauvoir favours a model of autonomous subjectiv-
ity to be associated with masculinity, and denies bodily dimensions 
(Mackenzie 1998: 150). Eva Lundgren-Gothlin (1996) argues that Beauvoir 
imported the androcentric perspective of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, 
privileging work as productive activity above caregiving tasks – to mention 
but a few examples of critique from this direction. However, re-reading 
Beauvoir’s study through the lens of The Ethics of Ambiguity, published 
8 Cf. Vintges (2004a). Foucauldian feminists Margaret Mclaren, Ladelle Mcwhorter, and 
Dianna Taylor, from whose works I draw heavily, in similar ways propose to conceive of femi-
nism in terms of practices of freedom (cf. McLaren 2002; Taylor 2004; Taylor and Vintges 2004; 
McWhorter 2013).
9 For an overview of these critiques from the time of The Second Sex’s publication see Jo-Ann 
Pilardi (1993).
72 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
two years before The Second Sex, clarif ies the work’s actual normative 
perspective.
In the Introduction to the work, Beauvoir immediately states that her 
‘ethical background’ (Beauvoir 2010: 16) is ‘existentialist morality’ (17). She 
clarif ies that rather than trying to conceal one’s principles, it is better to 
state them from the start: ‘then it would not be necessary to specify on each 
page the meaning given to the words “superior,” “inferior,” “better,” “worse,” 
“progress,” “regression,” and so on’ (16). Instead of referring to the public good, 
general interest, or personal happiness, an existential ethical perspective 
involves that ‘(e)very subject posits itself as a transcendence concretely, 
through projects; it accomplishes its freedom only by perpetual surpassing 
toward other freedoms’ (17). Here, Beauvoir hints to the normative perspec-
tive she developed in The Ethics of Ambiguity; namely, to an existence as 
an engaged freedom, involved in ethical projects in the world and living 
in interdependence with others. Later, in The Second Sex, she refers to her 
ethical theory more explicitly, as will be discussed below. To understand the 
work’s normative perspective more fully, however, we f irst have to examine 
the work’s main thesis; namely, that societies have always been patriarchal, 
based as they were on male authority and women’s subordination.
According to Beauvoir, whatever a society considered the most important 
activities were the prerogatives of adult males. In subsequent chapters, she 
discusses how biology, psychoanalysis, and historical materialism each have 
explained this fundamental asymmetry between the sexes in reductionist 
ways, i.e. on the basis of nature, sexual desire, and the economy, respectively. 
In contrast, woman’s ‘total situation’ should be studied, instead of reducing 
her secondary position to one single cause.10
To Beauvoir, the power asymmetry between the sexes is the outcome of a 
combination of factors, as will become clear after a brief detour through the 
work of Hegel. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, we saw her arguing in line with 
Hegel that human freedom is interdependent, since we find a justif ication 
of our own existence ‘only in the existence of other men’ (Beauvoir 1948: 72). 
But in The Second Sex she explicitly refers to Hegel’s ideas on the necessity of 
recognition, as explained in his ‘master-slave’ or ‘lord-bondsman’ metaphor 
(Hegel 1977: 104-119). Hegel started from the premise that human conscious-
ness ‘exists only in being acknowledged’ (111). It needs another consciousness 
to aff irm the truth, or objectivity, of its own existence. Therefore, when two 
10 In line with philosopher Edmund Husserl’s articulation of the task of philosophy, she aims to 
elucidate the whole phenomenon, i.e. women’s total situation, in contrast to scientif ic approaches 
that are necessarily reductionist in character (cf. Vintges 1996).
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consciousnesses meet, a struggle for life and death emerges: each seeks to 
utilize the other one for its own purposes; namely, to be recognized as an 
independent or pure consciousness. The one who has the courage to struggle 
till the end becomes the master, because, by ultimately risking his life, he 
demonstrates that he is not attached to life but pure consciousness instead.
The one who surrenders fails in f inally staking his life and becomes the 
slave. As the outcome of this struggle we have ‘a pure self-consciousness, 
and a consciousness which is not purely for itself, but for another.’ The 
former is the master, the other is the slave, who is a ‘consciousness in the 
form of thinghood,’ still bound to Nature. The master ‘is the independent 
consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself; the other is the 
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be 
for another’ (115). The latter is an inferior, dependent consciousness, instead 
of an ‘essential being.’ But he is constitutive for the master’s existence. The 
superior consciousness needs the other, inferior consciousness ‘in order 
thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being’ (111).
However, the slave realizes himself in labour, gaining a measure of 
independence. He f inally beats the master in a life-and-death struggle, 
which, to Hegel, is essential for the slave’s rising to self-certainty. According 
to him, the individual ‘who has not risked his life may well be recognized 
as a person, but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an 
independent self-consciousness’ (114). To Hegel, in a higher phase of human 
history, reconciliation and mutual respect between human consciousnesses 
is achieved. Not only the slave, but the master, too, is f inally free, since, only 
then, can he be fully recognized, by a free subject like himself. According 
to Hegel, the master-slave relationship – often referred to in terms of (the 
mechanism of) ‘Othering,’ i.e. degrading others into an inferior conscious-
ness bound to thinghood – is a phase in history that is overcome when 
consciousnesses mutually recognize one another.
It is Hegel’s master-slave dynamics, rather than Sartrean theory, that is 
the basic schedule of The Second Sex. Instead of applying Sartre’s ontological 
concept of freedom, as is presumed by, among others, Mackenzie (1998) 
and Gail Linsenbard (1999),11 Beauvoir, following Hegel, points out how 
women have been kept in a state of servitude and ignorance that denied 
them access to a personal ethical life project. According to her, men have 
been the masters in history who made women into the Other, i.e. men’s 
11 Many authors argue that Beauvoir’s philosophical framework in The Second Sex differs 
substantially from Sartre’s (cf. Sonia Kruks 1990; Eva Lundgren-Gothlin 1996 [1991]; Vintges 
1996 [1992]); Debra Bergoffen 1997; Sarah Heinämaa 1999; Margaret Simons 1999; Bauer 2001.
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slave or ‘vassal’. Women have shared their experience of being revealed 
to themselves as ‘an inferior caste’ with other Others, like proletarians, or 
blacks. But while the latter have revolted, positing themselves as subjects, 
women, as a group, remained the absolute Other (cf. Beauvoir 2010: 322; 
cf. Gines 2010: 43). They were never able, as a group, to invert the power 
dynamic, switch roles, and become masters themselves.
One of the reasons is that women have always been more ‘enslaved to 
the species’ than men (Beauvoir 2010: 277). As robust as women may have 
been in prehistoric times, ‘the burdens of reproduction represented for 
them a severe handicap in the f ight against a hostile world’ (74). Through 
their frequent pregnancies, women could not participate in the activities 
of men, who, by hunting and f ighting, willingly risked their lives, proving 
themselves to be the sovereign consciousness that does not coincide with 
life. Men thus could claim their superior status, and women consented since 
they recognize men’s superiority in putting their lives at stake in the activi-
ties of war and hunting. It was the combination of these two factors; namely, 
men’s biological privilege in combination with the mechanism of Othering, 
which led to the ‘triumph of patriarchy’ (88). History has shown that ‘men 
have always held all the concrete powers; from patriarchy’s earliest times 
they have deemed it useful to keep woman in a state of dependence; their 
codes were set up against her; she was thus concretely established as the 
Other. This condition served males’ economic interests; but it also suited 
their ontological and moral ambitions’ (163).
To consolidate women’s consent with their secondary role, women have 
been conditioned to fulf il their role as men’s Other, which is the meaning of 
Beauvoir’s famous line ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, woman’ (293). 
‘Myths’ of Woman moreover have been invented by men to justify the 
hierarchical relationship between the two sexes. Through these Myths, 
patriarchal society ‘imposed its laws and customs on individuals in an 
imagistic and sensible way; it is in a mythical form that the group imperative 
insinuated itself into each consciousness’ (281). In the great collective Myths 
of mankind, men appear as mind, spirit, and consciousness, and women 
as inferior consciousness bound to thinghood, Nature, and Flesh. Women 
have never created their own Myths, but experience themselves through 
men’s eyes: they ‘still dream through men’s dreams’ (166).
In the second part of her study, Beauvoir discusses that only a limited 
range of roles is available for a woman, because she is ‘exclusively def ined 
in her relation to man’ (166). These roles are wife, mother, prostitute, mystic, 
and ‘amoureuse’. In subsequent chapters, Beauvoir presents these roles from 
women’s own perspectives, i.e. as lived experiences.
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She concludes the work by arguing that we have arrived at a new moment 
in history, now that women have access to contraceptives as well as to paid 
jobs and education. According to her, the ‘convergence of these two factors – 
participation in production and freedom from reproductive slavery – explains 
the evolution of woman’s condition’ (142). With these new developments, the 
master-vassal relationship between men and women can be overcome.
In line with The Ethics of Ambiguity, she concludes that reconciliation and 
mutual recognition between the sexes will never ultimately be reached, but 
that they require permanent ethical effort. A definite reconciliation between 
the sexes is impossible due to a remaining dimension of power and enmity 
between people, which will always lead to conflicts between dualities (cf. 10). 
But conflicts between the sexes can and need to be overcome time and again, 
‘by the free recognition of each individual in the other, each one positing both 
itself and the other as object and as subject in a reciprocal movement’ (163).
Men and women in history have projected that part of their ambiguity that 
they rejected onto each other: ‘instead of living the ambiguity of their condi-
tion, each one tries to make the other accept the abjection of this condition 
and reserves the honour of it for one’s self,’ thus ‘projecting onto their partner 
the part of themselves they repudiate’ (Beauvoir 2010: 779). Men have lived 
their conscious dimension and women their bodily one, and women often 
consented with their position as – bodily – Other in order to avoid ‘the anguish 
and stress of authentically assumed existence’ (10). Instead, men and women 
should assume both sides of their ambiguous human condition, i.e. their 
conscious and bodily dimension, and live as an embodied existence in the 
world. In fact, ‘man is, like woman, a flesh, thus a passivity, the plaything of 
his hormones and the species, uneasy prey to his desire; […] each of them lives 
the strange ambiguity of existence made body in his or her own way’ (779). 
If both men and women ‘assumed it with lucid modesty, as the correlate of 
authentic pride, they would recognise each other as peers and live the erotic 
drama in harmony’ (779). Only as embodied consciousness can they meet 
each other, as singular persons. Only then will love and friendship between 
them involve the uniqueness of the beloved, instead of mutual projections.
But friendship and generosity […] are not easy virtues […]; it demands 
that man surpass himself at each instant. Put into other words, man 
attains an authentically moral attitude when he renounces being in order 
to assume his existence; through this conversion he also renounces all 
possession, because possession is a way of searching for being; but the 
conversion by which he attains true wisdom is never f inished, it has to 
be made ceaselessly, it demands constant effort (163-164).
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The Second Sex’s normative perspective involves that both men and women 
must assume their fundamental ambiguity in order to attain ‘an authenti-
cally moral attitude’ (164). In other words, they should turn into embodied 
ethical selves, and only then can they meet in friendship and love. While 
to Hegel achieving a fully realized self-consciousness is the ultimate end, 
to Beauvoir turning into – and recognizing each other as – an embodied, 
incarnated consciousness is decisive.12 If the work emphasizes what have 
been ‘male’ activities in history, i.e. the dimension of ‘transcendence’, it 
is to argue that women should (be able to) fully assume this side of their 
ambiguous human condition as well.
To Beauvoir, men in history also have led one-dimensional lives: they too 
should assume both sides of their human condition. From our re-reading 
of The Second Sex through the lens of Beauvoir’s own ethics, the normative 
perspective of The Second Sex emerges. Rather than arguing for women’s 
assimilation to dominant male identities, the work argues for both men 
and women to turn into embodied ethical selves, and for thorough societal 
changes. The cross-cultural, embodied, and situated notion of the ethi-
cal self of The Ethics of Ambiguity turns out to be the normative premise 
of feminism’s exemplary text, The Second Sex, as well. But do the work’s 
analytical, explanatory approaches still hold in the light of recent scientif ic 
results and current social developments?
Re-writing The Second Sex in World Perspective
Beauvoir’s claim that men have oppressed women throughout history 
has been criticized as too narrow to do justice to the variety of women’s 
positions in time and place. Cultural anthropologists Peggy Sanday and 
Ruth Goodenough (1990) argue that we must move beyond The Second 
Sex in order to address the variability and contradictions in male-female 
12 While I read The Second Sex through the lens of Beauvoir’s essay The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
Bauer (2001) comes to a similar conclusion, on different grounds. She especially refutes the argu-
ment of Lundgren-Gothlin (1996) that The Second Sex is based on androcentric notions that echo 
a Hegelian / Marxist privileging of labour. Bauer, in contrast, argues that Beauvoir’s philosophical 
position in The Second Sex amounts to a specif ic appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy. While 
Hegel’s normative perspective entails our mutual recognition as subjects, Beauvoir argues 
that conflict can be overcome by our mutual recognition as subjects and objects. Beauvoir 
reformulates ‘the free recognition of each individual in the other’ in terms of ‘each one positing 
both itself and the other as object and as subject in a reciprocal movement’ (cf. Bauer 2001: 186; 
Beauvoir 2010: 163; emphasis added). 
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relations in past and present. Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) criticizes Beauvoir 
for universalizing her own experiences as a woman in France, and shows 
that seniority, rather than gender, is fundamental for organizing society in 
Western Nigeria.13 According to Gines (2010), by drawing a parallel between 
women’s oppression and racial oppression, Beauvoir fails to address the 
ways racial and gender oppression intersect, which ‘results in the eras-
ure of black women who experience both racial and gender oppression’ 
(Gines 2010: 43).
The Second Sex’s Hegelian schedule of men as master and women as 
absolute Other, hardly allows for any differences between women’s posi-
tions, let alone for an approach that takes into account how class, racial, 
and ethnic oppression intersect with patriarchal oppression. Is The Second 
Sex heavily f lawed in this respect? In what follows, I argue that the work 
is f lawed as ‘grand theory’, but that it comprises an indispensible set of 
theoretical tools for current analyses.
The Hegelian mechanism of Othering, which Beauvoir applies in her work 
as an all-encompassing theory, can be re-articulated as a still relevant tool to 
address typical patterns of power. This mechanism involves people seeking 
superiority and self-certainty by degrading others to an inferior status, as 
devalued and dehumanized ‘Other’, a position that is internalized by this 
‘Other’ and that he or she can only overcome by defeating the master. Hegel’s 
master-slave theory has been taken up by Marxists and interpreted through 
the prism of the class struggle in history by, among others, Alexandre Kojève 
in his famous 1930s seminars in Paris. Other – mainly French – thinkers have 
applied Hegel’s mechanism of Othering in dimensions beyond the sphere of 
economy (cf. Descombes 1980). Sartre elaborated this perspective into an 
analysis of racial and colonial oppression – in, for example, his Anti-Semite 
and Jew (1995) and in his essays on colonialism (cf. Young 2006; Gordon 
2008; Judaken 2008) – which inspired Frantz Fanon and Richard Wright, 
among others, to articulate anti-black racism and Western colonialism 
and their negative psychological impact on the oppressed in similar terms. 
In a similar vein, it was adopted by Beauvoir to articulate sexism and its 
negative impact on women.
The mechanism of ‘Othering’ is still confirmed today by social identity 
theorists. Sociological and social psychology studies of group behaviour 
show that people often identify in contrast to a – negatively discrimi-
nated – out group, or several out groups (cf. Reynolds and Turner 2010). 
13 Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997) argues that instead of importing European concepts, African 
scholars should produce their own concepts. For a discussion see Bibi Bakare-Yusuf (2003). 
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‘Psychological oppression,’ and ‘Misrecognition’ are concepts that today 
are used in feminist, multicultural and postcolonial studies to indicate that 
the mechanism of Othering saddles its victims with a ‘crippling self-hatred’ 
(cf. Taylor 1994: 26), as empirical research amply confirms (e.g. Bartky 1990; 
Prilleltensky and Gonick 1996). While to Hegel the mechanism of Othering 
was rooted in the quest for (self-) certainty of human consciousness,14 this 
mechanism can also be interpreted in line with ‘Nietzsche’s hypothesis’ in 
terms of man’s fundamental ‘will to power,’ and of power being a ‘warlike 
clash between forces’ (Foucault 2003: 16).15
By applying the mechanism of ‘Othering’ to the relations between the 
sexes, Beauvoir disclosed a set of patriarchal power patterns that is deeply 
ingrained in human history. The Second Sex’s purpose was to lay bare these 
patterns in their multiple, i.e. cultural, societal, political, economic, mythi-
cal, and psychic dimensions. Disclosing this set of strong power patterns 
was the major task Beauvoir set herself in The Second Sex. Due to her focus 
on these patterns, she rather carelessly dealt with the fact that in her more 
empirical chapter on history, women pop up as agents on almost every 
page, in their roles as peasants, workers, and artists. Since her theme was 
patriarchal power in all its ramif ications, she did not address women’s 
agency in theoretical terms.
She did not conceive of women’s limited kinds of moral agency, which 
we have characterized in terms of a minimal freedom; nor did she have 
a place for women’s critically creative ethical life projects or ‘freedom 
practices’. Beauvoir only mentions some examples of women who escaped 
the stereotypical role of men’s Other, but she hardly addresses them in 
their own right. When she complains that women never confronted the 
world and the universe in the way the genius painter Vincent van Gogh did, 
she overlooks f igures like nineteenth-century Dutch-Norwegian paintress 
Betzy Akersloot-Berg, who used to sail on f isher ships and rescue boats, 
securing herself on deck to observe sea storms (Bell 2000: 52); and artist 
Frida Kahlo, whose self-portraits, like van Gogh’s, are radically brutal.
Women’s agencies are the topic of many studies today (cf. for instance 
Ahmed 1992 for women’s agencies in Islamic history; Duby and Perrot 
1992-1994 for idem in Western history). The present study, on a very 
14 Beauvoir later rejected her Hegelian approach as an ‘idealistic and a priori struggle of 
consciences,’ adding that she should have based her study of woman as Other on economic 
‘facts of supply and demand’ (Beauvoir 1968b: 202). 
15 ‘Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power (Nietzsche 
2007: 15).
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modest scale, aims to contribute to these projects, by examining examples 
of women’s moral agencies and freedom practices throughout cultures. 
However, in studying upwards, downwards, and sideways (cf. the Introduc-
tion), Beauvoir’s gendered ‘mechanism of Othering’ is still relevant as an 
analytical tool that covers strong and dominant patterns.
Does the second part of Beauvoir’s explanation of women’s typically 
subordinated status in history – namely, that in prehistory they were more 
‘enslaved to the species’ than men – still hold in the light of current an-
thropological research? Anthropological surveys show that hunting and 
gathering societies, typical of the past, are mostly patrilocal, probably 
due to the importance of men in hunting and war, while women’s roles 
were as gatherers (Ortner 1974; Ember 1978). But feminist anthropologists 
have demonstrated that complementarity between the sexes, rather than 
hierarchical relations, also occur in hunting and gathering societies; for 
instance, in Minangkabau and Hopi societies (cf. Schlegel 1977; Sanday 
1990). They have showed, too, that the degree to which women’s work as 
gatherers substantially contributed to subsistence varies, and that forag-
ing, not hunting, was the principle economic strategy throughout most of 
human evolutionary history (cf. Slocum 1975). Based on research among 
pastoral, shepherd societies, Philip Carl Salzman (1999) likewise argues that 
a universal gender inequality in prehistory cannot be assumed.16
Recent anthropological research conf irms that bi-locality, instead of 
patrilocal residence, exists as well, dependent on geographic contexts.17 
As many authors contend, drawing inferences from studies on current 
hunting and gatherers societies about the Paleolithic Era remains a matter 
of plausible conjecture. But Beauvoir’s too general assumption of women’s 
lower social status in prehistory, due to their procreative role, is refuted by 
research that shows, not so much the existence of matriarchal societies in 
16 Beauvoir refers to the work of Lévi-Strauss, especially to his thesis The Elementary Structures 
of Kinship (1969), published in French in 1949. In a footnote to the Introduction of The Second 
Sex, she thanks him ‘for sharing the proofs of his thesis, that I drew on heavily’ (Beauvoir 2010: 
7). Lévi-Strauss, in a comparison of human cultures, claims that society is founded on the 
prohibition of incest that involves the necessary exchange of women between (tribes of) men. 
As Beauvoir summarizes in a review of his work, ‘the incest prohibition represents the very 
moment of the passage from nature to culture’ (Beauvoir 2015a: 59). She distils from his analysis 
that societies in the past were always dominated by men, quoting from his work: ‘“Political 
authority, or simply social authority, always belongs to men” […] For men, the counterpart – or 
the other – who is also the same, with whom reciprocal relationships are established, is always 
another male individual’ (Beauvoir 2010: 82). 
17 Bi-local residence refers to the couple’s living alternately with the wife’s group as well as 
with the husband’s group (the latter comprising ‘patri-locality’). 
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the sense of a rule by women over men, but patterns of ‘complementary 
equality’ between them.18 While Beauvoir’s model of women as the second 
sex is ‘probably relevant to a good many societies, there is less and less 
reason to suppose that it is applicable everywhere’ (Gottlieb 1990: 130). 
Studying upwards, downwards, and sideways turns out to be necessary 
here as well. Beauvoir’s schedule again emerges as a relevant analytical 
toolset that covers typical, dominant gender patterns, rather than as an 
adequate total theory.
Does The Second Sex comprise other explanatory and analytical tools 
that are still relevant today, in view of new scientif ic insights and of the 
political, economic, and social (under)currents of our time? I will selectively 
discuss some developments that I consider relevant.19
New neuroscience research has claimed that male and female brains are 
essentially different – due to an XY foetus being flooded with testosterone 
during pregnancy and an XX foetus not being flooded with testosterone 
during pregnancy, respectively (cf. Baron-Cohen 2003; Bao and Swaab 
2011). On the basis of this research, it is argued that the brains of men 
are systematizing and the brains of women are empathizing. Yet, other 
scholars have criticized and refuted the claims. Not only are hormones not 
the major determining factor for foetal brain behaviour, brains are not the 
major determining factor for cognition, behaviour, and interests. Causality 
goes both ways in that hormone levels impact mental states and, vice versa, 
behaviour and mental states impact brains. The brain is a plastic organ 
(cf. Eliot 2009; Jordan-Young 2010; Vasterling 2013; Kleinherenbrink 2014). 
Beauvoir’s rebuttal of monist biological explanations, i.e. her argument 
that women’s behaviour is the outcome of their total situation, apparently 
still holds today.
Her historicizing and de-essentializing approach of psychoanalysis in 
The Second Sex similarly is also still relevant. To Freud, the development of 
human life is based on sexuality alone. All human behaviour is driven by 
unconscious desires that are structured by universal ‘laws’, as symbolized in 
the myth of Oedipus. Instead, Beauvoir argues, sexual desires should be seen 
as an integrated part of one’s total personality, developed in social contexts. 
Freud’s thesis of woman’s inferiority complex, due to her lack of a penis, then 
emerges in a totally different light. Freudian psychoanalysis adequately 
grasps that society today is male, with male sexual organ embodying ‘all 
18 With thanks to Willy Jansen.
19 For in depth discussions of Beauvoir’s integration in The Second Sex of the results of several 
scientif ic disciplines of her time, see Galster (2004).
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the privileges of virility’ (cf. Beauvoir 2010: 769). But Freud proposes this 
descriptive schema in terms of universal laws (cf. 60). According to him, the 
girl, due to her feeling inferior in relation to man, will always be
faced with the alternative of either maintaining her autonomy, becoming 
virilised […] or else f inding happy self-fulf ilment in amorous submission, 
a solution facilitated by the love she felt for her sovereign father; it is he 
whom she is looking for in her lover or husband, and her sexual love is 
mingled with her desire to be dominated. Maternity will be her reward, 
restoring to her a new kind of autonomy (Beauvoir 2010: 55).
Beauvoir refutes Feud’s ‘laws’ by arguing that, from an existential point 
of view, which takes into account woman’s total situation, the girl is not 
so much ‘torn between “viriloid” and “feminine” tendencies,’ but instead 
hesitates ‘between the role of object, of Other that is proposed to her and her 
claim for freedom; thus it is possible to agree on certain points: in particular 
when we consider the paths of inauthentic f light offered to women. But 
we do not give them the same Freudian or Adlerian signif ication’ (61-62). 
Sexuality does play a considerable role in human life, but ‘the body and 
sexuality are concrete expressions of existence,’ of which sexuality is but 
one, albeit important, aspect. Moreover, it ‘must not be taken as an ir-
reducible given,’ (56) but as influenced by ‘social forms’ (57). The meanings 
of the ‘castration complex’ and the ‘Oedipus complex’ will be ‘profoundly 
modif ied,’ in a society where the mother would enjoy the same lasting 
prestige as the father and assumes equal material and moral responsibility 
for the couple. The girl would no longer turn to passivity, and the boy would 
not have a superiority complex ‘if it were not instilled in him’ (778).
Confirmation of Beauvoir’s thesis that Freud’s ‘laws’ of sexual desire in 
fact are linked to patriarchy as a historical phase of mankind, can be taken 
from the changing of myths in current societies, involving some – not in-
signif icant – shifts in women’s and girls’ dreams and desires (cf. Chapter 4). 
They can be taken as well from the emergence of alternatives to the Oedipus 
myth, for instance as developed by Butler in Antigone’s Claim (Butler 2000). 
As Annemie Halsema (2015) argues, Butler’s alternative reading of the myth 
of Antigone – namely, as showing the socially contingent character of kin-
ship instead of simply representing family bloodlines – covers multiple 
forms of kinship other than the nuclear family system (cf. Butler 2000: 6).
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir also criticized Marxism for its monistic 
approach, examining in particular Engels’ claim that economic equality 
will end women’s oppression. According to Beauvoir, modifying women’s 
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economic situation will not be enough: ‘this factor has been and remains 
the primordial factor of her development, but until it brings about the 
moral, social and cultural consequences it heralds and requires, the new 
woman cannot appear; as of now, these consequences have been real-
ised nowhere: in the USSR no more than in France or the United States’ 
(Beauvoir 2010: 777).
While Marxists argue that a socialist mode of production has never 
fully been established, due to the absence of a world revolution, Beauvoir’s 
thesis that economic equality is not enough to change women’s secondary 
status is proven in indirect ways; namely, by current neoliberal develop-
ments that recruit women for paid work on a scale never witnessed before. 
Neoliberal economies are not built on a gendered division of labour. They 
do not need women to perform traditionally feminine activities – since 
domestic and caring work can be outsourced and purchased on the market 
– and they recruit women like men in the production process (cf. Oksala 
2013: 42). Not constrained by nation states and without their social protec-
tion, neoliberal economies even show a growing interest in women as a 
reliable global work force (cf. Eisenstein 2009). Gender and development 
programs of neoliberal signature even privilege women as the preferred 
economic agent, since, in a commitment to their family, they regularly save 
and repay, and urge others to do so as well (cf. Batliwala 2007; Cornwall 
et al. 2008).
Women’s growing participation in the labour market goes together with 
an increasing ‘feminization’ of labour. Their entrance has facilitated the 
decrease of good and steady jobs, and the rapid growth of flexibly paid work 
and increasing levels of exploitation.20 Men and women in the current global 
economy are working in precarious, low income jobs with flexible and even 
‘on call’ working schedules. Many have more than one job, in order to earn 
a minimum income for their families, and many work in so called ‘global 
factories’ and sweatshops, under conditions of low pay, unsafe workplaces 
and long hours. Men and women today are equally exploited within the 
neoliberal system on a global scale (cf. Young 2000: 95).
But women still have a disadvantaged position because they are 
(perceived as) a woman. At all levels, women earn less than men, a 
phenomenon that is known as the ‘gender pay gap’. Women workers – 
despite working more hours than men – earn only ten per cent of the 
world’s income (cf. Moghadam 2005). Moreover, they experience that the 
20 For a discussion of the current feminist debates on the different stages and dimensions of 
this process see, among others, Oksala (2013) and Fraser (2009).
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perceived quality of their work is lower than that of their male counter-
parts. Recent studies show that unconscious and conscious preference 
for males, because of the power they traditionally symbolize, is still in 
place. Women still have to work two or three times harder than men just 
to be considered okay.21
Given the double burden of work and care-taking, women all over the 
world conf irm cutting down on sleeping hours to get everything done. 
Women of privileged classes and groups hire others – mostly women – to 
do their housework. But women of all classes, especially those with young 
children, are often exhausted – due to their double, and even triple, shifts 
– something they hide from the world and from each other.22 The old ‘sexual 
contract’ that relegated women to care-taking tasks in the domestic sphere 
(cf. Pateman 1988) turns out to be quite resilient.23
Furthermore, women are still overrepresented among the poor, and 
largely absent from the power structures that rule us. The ranks of society 
where crucial decisions are made and large sums of money are involved, 
remain predominantly male and diff icult for women to enter.24 Sexual 
violence against women and girls moreover continues worldwide,25 and 
21 A study from North Carolina State University shows that instructors of online courses were 
given much higher evaluations when students were told that their instructors were men. The 
instructor was given a 4.35 rating out of 5 when the students were told he was male, whereas the 
same instructor got a 3.5 rating when the students were told she was female. This proves that 
men get higher satisfaction rates from their students simply because they are male. A similar 
kind of research shows that when gamers on the internet are told that they have lost from a 
woman their reactions are debunking, in contrast to when they suppose to have lost from a 
man. Women writers, academics, journalists, politicians, all experience – and rightly so, as 
scientif ic research conf irms – that their contributions are less noticed or taken seriously. As 
a senior female UN off icial said at a recent symposium: ‘my male colleagues always listened 
politely, but then the meeting went on just as if I did not speak at all.’ 
22 With the cutting down in the West of social and medical service provision for the elderly, 
and the propagation of informal care, mainly women prove to f ill in these tasks again, often in 
combination with a working life. In the Netherlands today one out of three working women is 
a so called ‘informal carer.’ 
23 The term ‘sexual contract’ was introduced by Pateman (1988), to argue that the ‘social 
contract’ as a contract among only the male heads of the family, was paired to the relegation of 
women to the domestic sphere. 
24 Cf. the implicit gender bias tests of Harvard University: https://www.projectimplicit.net/
about.html (last accessed, 21 September 2016). 
25 For a recent report from the United Nations see http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/
situation.shtml (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Recent research shows that in the Netherlands one in nine women have been raped, and that 
half of all women aged 22-24 years have encountered involuntary sex – against one in f ive men 
in the same age group. 
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today takes new forms such as a rise in the traff icking of women and chil-
dren on a global scale for the purpose of sexual exploitation.26 Though the 
extent to which – mainly – female sex workers are exploited, for instance 
in the Amsterdam red light district, is not transparent, the new globalized, 
mafia-conditions of the sex industry are insuff iciently taken into account 
when local feminists and liberals focus – in juridical terms – on the rights 
of the ‘happy hooker’. Similarly, when Amnesty International claims that 
prostitution should be legal, studying upwards, downwards, and sideways 
seems to be more appropriate, so as to establish what ‘the main danger’ is 
for the sex workers involved.27
In the Middle East and Africa, new ‘jihadist’ movements have emerged 
that exchange girls and women as sex slaves. Cyber stalking as a new way of 
intimidating girls and women (the majority of cyber stalkers being men) and 
the amount and accessibility of sexually abusive imagery via the internet, 
including child pornography, increase on a daily basis (cf. Akdeniz 2008). 
Rape of women and girls is used in conflict areas all over the world as a 
weapon of war to destroy individuals, families, and communities and the 
fabric of society as such, but also affects many others, such as single women 
refugees who have to survive in asylum centres as well as girls on American 
college campuses. Popular media in the West, such as advertisements, 
women’s magazines, television programmes, music videos, games, and 
mainstream f ilm, increasingly portray women as synonymous with sex, in 
stereotypical objectifying ways, but also in new ways, i.e. as sexual agents 
who are always ‘up for it’ (cf. Gill 2008; cf. Chapter 4).
In spite of Beauvoir’s claim that patriarchal power patterns will be 
surpassed in a new age, they turn out to be more resilient than she, and 
26 Amnesty International estimates that worldwide over 2.4 million people are victims of 
human traff icking, mostly women and children: http://www.amnesty.nl/mensenhandel-en-
mensensmokkel (last accessed, 21 September 2016). According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), in 2007 more than 12.3 million people worldwide were victims of forced 
labour, many of whom were women that ended up in the sex industry. For the year 2013, it is 
estimated that between 1,500 to 3,000 people – mostly women – are victims of human traff icking 
in the Netherlands, ending up in prostitution and the sex industry. Regarding the Amsterdam 
red light district, estimated numbers of forced prostitution vary enormously, ranging from 
seven to 90 per cent, with local police off icers estimating more than 50 per cent. A reliable 
website is for example http://sekswerkerfgoed.nl/mensenhandel-neemt-toe-vooral-door-de-
legalisering-van-prostitutie-waar-of-niet-waar/ (last accessed, 21 September 2016). For the report 
of the Dutch National Rapporteur on human traff icking see http://www.nationaalrapporteur.
nl (last accessed, 21 September 2016). For a discussion of the range in estimated numbers see 
http://behindtheredlightdistrict.blogspot.nl/2015/01/what-do-rapports-say-about-forced.html. 
(last accessed, 21 September 2016).
27 With thanks to Janja Rakus.
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many with her, presumed. When pushed down in one place, like a waterbed 
mattress, they rise up in a new place. From Beauvoir’s argument that social 
changes should take place at all levels, we distilled the image of patriarchy 
as a many-headed monster with a legal ‘head’, next to a moral one, economic, 
institutional, social, and public one – to name the aspects she mentions – 
each of which should be slayed (cf. Beauvoir 2010: 777; cf. the Introduction). 
From the newly emerged faces of patriarchy discussed above, we can indeed 
conclude that we are dealing with a dominant set of power patterns in the 
shape of a hydra, the mythical multi-headed monster that grows new heads 
when one is cut off. Patriarchal patterns, persistent as they are, turn out to 
grow ever new ‘heads’.
But what then is the ‘immortal’, most resilient head of the hydra today, 
that has to be slayed for the monster to disappear into the sky? And is it a 
similar one everywhere? Could it be that women all over the world share 
a common enemy after all? Beauvoir’s The Second Sex gives us a clue to 
answering these questions. While we found that biology, economy, and 
psychoanalysis fall short as suff icient explanations for the persisting power 
hierarchy between men and women, I take from Beauvoir’s work that the 
dominant Myths of Woman comprise the hydra’s most resilient head today.28 
In light of her lengthy Chapter on Myths – at 120 pages, almost a book in 
itself – the f irst chapter that she wrote, did Beauvoir suspect herself that 
this was the most resilient head of the hydra after all?
In the chapter she argues that men have created the Myth of the ‘Eternel 
Feminine’ (Beauvoir: 2010: 275), which insinuates its laws and customs 
in an ‘imagistic and sensible way’ in each consciousness (281). The Myth 
of Woman, which invariably is about woman as the absolute Other and 
specif ically as Flesh and Nature, is a ‘masculine dream’  (165) that af-
fects everyone by way of ‘religions, traditions, language, tales, songs and 
f ilm’ (281). Women also ‘dream through men’s dreams’; they have ‘neither 
religion nor poetry that belongs to them alone’ (166) To Beauvoir, ‘Myth’ 
thus involves dreams, poetry, religion, and mythical tales as well as an 
‘imagistic’ way of presentation. Her concept of Myth largely covers the 
three ‘presentational’ realms of Langer (1960), i.e. rite, art, and the genre 
of mythical secular tales. In her chapter, she states that, today, the Myth 
of Woman ‘still exists in the hearts of all men’ (Beauvoir 2010: 166). At the 
28 We, of course, have no full evidence and can only hint to how things work, but this is 
not unusual in social theory and research, nor is it in natural science. We seldom have full or 
complete evidence in terms of a full known mechanism, yet can hint to how things work in 
useful ways. With thanks to Federica Russo.
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end of The Second Sex she concludes that the ‘conflict will last as long as 
men and women do not recognise each other as peers, that is, as long as 
femininity is perpetuated as such’ (771).
But Myth is ‘situated beyond the given’ and ‘endowed with an absolute 
truth,’ and, as such, ‘escapes any act of consciousness’ (Beauvoir 2010: 275, 
277). Myth cannot be managed or made, nor made to disappear. Yet, the 
dominant Myths of ‘femininity’ as Nature, according to Beauvoir, will ‘be 
phased out one day’ (166), when women will be recognized as full human 
beings, and will no longer be the absolute Other. The supposed ‘Eternel 
Feminine’ is f ixed and unique, and divides humanity into two categories, 
whereas in reality there is only ‘the dispersed, contingent and multiple 
existence of women’ (275). The Myth of Woman, as a representation of the 
world from men’s point of view, is a ‘false objectivity’ (282), which ‘they 
confound with the absolute truth’ (166), but which is bound to fade way.
At certain points in her work, Beauvoir hints at the possible emergence 
of new myths; for instance, when she states: ‘(t)hat for woman it is man 
who is sexed and carnal is a truth that has never been proclaimed be-
cause there is no one to proclaim it’ (166). Elsewhere, she concludes that, 
today, ‘little by little,’ ‘a new form of eroticism seems to be coming about: 
perhaps it will produce new myths’ (283). Her suggestion that Myths will 
change, rather than being replaced by adequate insight or knowledge, 
approaches Langer’s claim of the continuity of the non-verbal modes of 
thought of rite, art, and myth (cf. Langer 1960). The perspective that the 
‘presentational forms’ of rite, art, and myth will continue to sit side by side 
with verbal, argumentative language and scientif ic knowledge, involves 
that stereotypical Myths of femininity can only be defeated by replacing 
them with new ‘forms’.
While the dominant Myths of Woman entail the dreams and beliefs of 
men, do we f ind new ‘forms’ emerging in the presentational realms of rite, 
art, and mythical tales, which comprise women’s dreams and beliefs? Are 
women involved in freedom practices in these domains, critically creating 
new ‘forms’? And, if so, do they not risk recycling stereotypical Myths of 
femininity and practice a conservative kind of ‘identity politics’?
Women’s Freedom Practices in World Perspective
The concept of ‘identity politics’ has been used since the 1980s to indicate the 
strategies of movements, such as second wave feminism, black civil rights 
in the US, gay and lesbian liberation, and the American Indian movements, 
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who claim their particular identities in explicit political ways (cf. Heyes 
2002).29 Sonia Kruks (2001) def ines ‘identity politics’ as the demands of 
groups of people for their recognition on the very grounds on which it 
previously was denied: ‘it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups 
demand recognition. […] what is demanded is respect for oneself as dif-
ferent’ (Kruks 2001: 85, quoted in Heyes 2002). Marginalized or oppressed 
social groups, like women, blacks, gays, and indigenous peoples, not only 
f ight their discrimination, but demand and develop social change on behalf 
of their identities. The identity claims of these groups have been contested 
from the outset and from various angles.30 Identity politics is criticized for 
being, among other things: an essentialist conservatism, i.e. a defending 
of traditional identities and cultures instead of an openness to dialogue 
and change; as group coercion, i.e. the applying of internal restrictions to 
group members; as identif ication with the aggressor, i.e. a taking on of a 
negatively stereotyped identity instead of leaving it behind. In spite of all 
these criticisms, however, the substance of identity politics has not gone 
away, as Linda Alcoff (2006) aptly states.
For a critique of identity politics, postmodern and postcolonial thinkers 
often refer to Foucault’s mid-work, which discusses f ixed identities as ef-
fects of normalization and discipline. However, in his f inal work, Foucault 
addresses the issues of identity and identity politics in a positive way, albeit 
in different terms. As we have seen, care of the self implies a work on the 
self, but what is this self? In a discussion of Plato’s text Alcibiades, Foucault 
argues that the notion of ‘self’ conveys the notion of identity. ‘Departing 
from what ground shall I f ind my identity? Alcibiades becomes aware that 
this principle is the soul, not in the sense of a substance but as ‘a principle 
of activity’ (Foucault 1997b: 230). Identity thus involves one’s acting in the 
world, rather than an inner essence or deep self. The self at stake in the care 
of the self is a self in action.
Rosi Braidotti and Rick Dolphijn (2015), in line with the work of philoso-
pher Gilles Deleuze, also criticize notions of a pre-given self and argue for 
an art of life in terms of a nomadic impersonal life that ‘does not respond 
to our names’ (Braidotti and Dolphijn 2015: 26). While Foucault similarly 
29 The label ‘identity politics’ usually refers to the strategies of these groups, although the 
substance of identity politics can be taken much broader, including forms of nationalism if we 
take nations as ‘imagined political communities’ in the terms of Benedict Anderson (1983). 
30 Mainstream liberal theory opposes identity politics as obstructing the integration of minori-
ties. Marxists rebut the relevance of cultural identif ication processes in favour of socio-economic 
ones; postmoderns criticize identity politics as a disciplining strategy of in- and excluding 
people, and postcolonials target its dealing with cultures as clear cut and f ixed entities. 
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does away with any pre-given self or original subject, and speaks of a self in 
action, his concept of an ethical art of life involves the creation of a personal 
ethical life project – within distinct groups or networks that emerge over 
time and that offer tools and models. A Foucauldian art of life is both more 
socially grounded and more personal than a Deleuzian kind of nomadic life.
As indicated in the previous chapter, Foucault not only pointed to certain 
philosophical schools and religious groups as identifiable freedom practices, 
but spoke of the gay movement in similar terms. In one of his articles on the 
gay movement, titled ‘Sex, Power and The Politics of Identity’ (Foucault 1997a), 
he argues that the gay movement rather needs an ‘art of life than a science 
or scientif ic knowledge (or pseudoscientif ic knowledge) of what sexuality 
is’ (Foucault 1997a: 163). What is important is ‘the creation of new forms of 
life, relationships, friendships in society, art, culture, and so on through our 
sexual, ethical, and political choices. Not only do we have to defend ourselves, 
not only aff irm ourselves, as an identity but as a creative force’ (164). We do 
not know in advance ‘which forms these creations would take. […] Yet, I am 
sure that from the point of departure of our ethical choices, we can create 
something that will have a certain relationship to gayness’ (164).
Foucault, while pointing to the relevance of the substance of identity poli-
tics, thus avoids some of its pitfalls and dangers. Creating new culture with 
a certain relation to ‘gayness’ replaces an essentialist concept of identity; 
ascribed group identities can be taken up in critically creative ways; and 
group coercion is avoided since creation takes place on the collective and 
individual level in transversal ways, the fabric of the movement in other 
words being the ethical life projects of its members. Foucault re-articulates 
identity politics in terms of an art of living, or practice of freedom that 
comprises ‘political innovation, political creation, and political experimen-
tation’ (Foucault 1997a: 172).
In line with this approach, feminist ‘identity politics’ can be re-articulated 
in terms of a set of freedom practices31 that have a – certain – relationship 
31 Marieke Borren (2013), in reference to Linda Zerelli (2005), also argues for a feminism in 
terms of ‘a set of practices of freedom,’ from the perspective of Hannah Arendt’s concept of 
the political. Feminist freedom practices concern a political, non-identity based feminism. 
They consist of manifestations in the public sphere, not on the basis of ‘a shared natural or 
essential collective identity [… ] but by common action in the service of a particular worldly 
issue or common end’ (Borren 2013: 198). Borren’s picture of ‘playful-though-serious’ feminist 
freedom practices, however, does not cover the steady work that freedom practices involve in 
our def inition. Feminism as a set of freedom practices in a Foucauldian sense, moreover, include 
not only political struggles in the public sense, but also the critical creation of new ways of life 
and models for self and society. 
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to ‘womanness.’ ‘Feminist freedom practices’ can be re-articulated as the 
explicitly critical, parrhesiastic version of women’s freedom practices, which 
simultaneously create new modes of life in some relation to womanness. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the core characteristics of freedom 
practices, as distinct sets of critically creative ethical life projects are: 1) 
the development of a personal ethical life project out of concern for others 
2) consisting of one’s action in the world; 3) in an implicit or explicit critique 
of any domination; 4) by creation; 5) (within) relatively independent ethical 
communities, groups or movements. The term freedom practices thus refers 
to the personal and collective level as two sides of the same coin, i.e. to the 
creation of a personal ethical life project as well as to the collective setting 
that offers the models and tools to do so. Moreover, the concept of freedom 
practices turned out to be culturally plural as it comprises a cross-cultural 
notion of an ethical self, and a plural set of ‘keys’.
Feminist, culturally plural freedom practices can now be more fully 
articulated, analogous to our f ive general characteristics, namely as: (ad 1) 
comprising women’s personal ethical life projects in a concern for other 
women; (ad 2) consisting of actions in the world; (ad 3) that involve an 
explicit, political critique of practices that deny women access to a personal 
ethical life project; (ad 4) by creating new ways of life or new ‘forms’ in a 
certain relationship to womanness; (ad 5) within relatively autonomous 
groups, networks or movements, the fabric of which consists of (1).
Creating new ways of life, and new ‘forms’ in the sense of Langer (1960), 
in a ‘certain relationship to womanness’ does not presuppose ‘an essential 
womanness,’ to borrow a phrase from Elizabeth Spelman (1988: 158). Maria 
Lugones and Spelman (1983), and Butler (1990), among others, have rightly 
argued that women do not possess a common nature and that woman-
ness is inseparable from other aspects of one’s identity, such as race and 
class. Intersectionality theory, as developed by, among others, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1991), puts the focus on women who are oppressed along gender, 
race, and class dividing lines simultaneously, aiming for a politics based on 
distinct group interests, rather than on the concept of universal woman. 
Any approach of women in abstract universal terms masks the privileged 
position of white upper-class women, who, for years, have dominated the 
feminist discourse (bell hooks 1984, cf. 25, 26; cf. Lutz et al. 2011).
Several feminist philosophers today advocate the restoration of universal 
woman as a realist category. Alcoff (2006) does so on the grounds that all 
women have a special position in regard to the reproduction of the species. 
However, with today’s widespread access to contraception, and with, for 
instance, the increasing numbers of babies born as a result of gestational 
womeN’S freeDom PrAc tIceS IN worlD PerSPec tIve 91
surrogate motherhood, and the possibilities of ‘outsourcing’ domestic (care) 
work, a division in two sexes along the lines of their reproductive functions 
is no longer obvious (which may explain the new focus on women’s brains 
instead of their procreative functions, as discussed above).
Sally Haslanger (2000), rather than referring to women’s reproductive 
functions, argues for a ‘materialist feminism’ that recognizes that males 
and females ‘not only differ physically, but also systematically differ in their 
social positions’ (Haslanger 2000: 38; cf. Mikkola 2013). Women’s identities 
may be shaped in numerous ways, yet they have a feature in common that 
makes them women; namely, they are all socially positioned as subordinate 
to men, ‘“marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in 
reproduction’ (39). Haslanger’s approach involves ‘total theory’, which stud-
ies ‘downwards’ (cf. the Introduction), analyzing how ideologies implement 
‘schemes’ and, thereby, reproduce women’s subordinate status.
Bauer (2015) – in reference to Beauvoir’s The Second Sex – argues that as 
long as women are socially constructed and made into women, real women 
do exist. In contrast to Haslanger, Bauer not only studies downwards but up-
wards as well. This means that she captures today’s configurations of gender 
and power in some of their specif ic new shapes in the West (cf. Chapter 4). 
Haslanger and Bauer rightly claim that real women do exist as long as people 
are turned into, or perceived as, ‘women’. However, the different heads and 
faces of the hydra in world perspective turn them into ‘women’ in multiple 
ways in multiple contexts. The dominant heads of the patriarchal hydra and 
the concrete shapes of its presentational head do differ throughout cultural 
frameworks – moreover, representing dominant power patterns rather than 
an all-encompassing system – to the effect that universal woman cannot 
exist in any realist or materialist sense. Studying upwards, downwards, and 
sideways simultaneously is necessary to uncover patriarchy’s hybrid faces, 
which construct ‘women’ in concrete contexts.
Women’s specif ic freedom practices do emerge from these concrete, 
hybrid contexts. When they invoke ‘womanness’ in their critical creation of 
alternative models for self and society, they do so out of a ‘thrown aff inity’, 
to paraphrase Young (1990).32 One identif ies with a group in which one f inds 
oneself thrown and, like ethnicity, gender is often felt as a core aspect of one’s 
subjectivity, which one has aff inity with. But invoking ‘womanness’ does 
not necessarily mean invoking a binary gender frame. Feminist freedom 
32 ‘(A) group aff inity which has the character of what Martin Heidegger (1962) calls “thrown-
ness”’ (Young 1990: 46).
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practices today happily sit side by side with others, such as queer freedom 
practices that aim to undermine a binary gender division (cf. Chapter 4).
The feminist freedom practices that have emerged in recent decades in 
the presentational realms of rite, art, and myth, critically create new ‘forms’, 
and new ‘modes of thought’ in a certain relationship to womanness, with 
women and girls being involved in grim fights, as will be clear from Chapters 
3 and 4. A ‘feminism in a new key’ takes on board these battles within the 
presentational realms, instead of debunking them as lower forms, or as 
a counterproductive identity politics (cf. Chapter 5). Feminist freedom 
practices, being the explicitly critical version of women’s many – culturally 
plural – freedom practices, can tap from the latter as treasuries of ethical 
life forms and sources of inspiration. Some examples of women’s freedom 
practices in the past that function as inspiring role models have already 
been discussed at the end of Chapter 1, from a Western-centric perspective. 
In what follows, a number of women’s freedom practices are discussed in 
culturally plural contexts and ‘forms’.
Women’s Freedom Practices in World Perspective: Some Examples
The examples discussed below f inally substantiate the claim that the 
concept of women’s freedom practices – i.e. women’s personal ethical life 
projects developed within relatively independent ethical communities 
– is culturally plural, and as such allows for a critical reformulation of 
feminism in world perspective, as movements sharing this perspective. 
The examples also show that women developed freedom practices in more 
‘keys’ than verbal language. Chapter 1 – from the perspective of Foucault 
and Hadot – presented some examples of women’s ethical freedom practices 
as developed within distinct, relatively independent, philosophical circles. 
But women in the past also participated in other relatively independent 
collectives, such as art movements and religious groups and circles, in the 
context of which they developed a personal ethos that implicitly challenged 
the dominant patriarchal patterns of their time.
Female Sufi mystics in Islamic history, for example, developed freedom 
practices within a religious movement, as is discussed in the next chap-
ter. Women have done so in other religious contexts, for instance in the 
context of Taoism (cf. Despeux 2000). In the context of Catholicism, the 
Christian mystic Hildegard von Bingen (1098-1179) founded an independent 
community of nuns, where together they created a lifestyle of singing, 
reading, studying theology, and training themselves in artistic and musical 
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skills. The Northern European Beguine movement (thirteenth-sixteenth 
century) is another case of women changing religion’s ritual ‘forms’. This 
spiritual movement consisted of a variety of women, from all classes and 
backgrounds, who interpreted the bible in their own ways and lived together 
in communities, f ixing their own order of living. One of them, the woman 
mystic Marguerite Porete (1250-1310), author of The Mirror of Simple Souls 
(dating from the 1290s) was condemned by the Catholic Church for being 
a heretic and burnt at the stake.
An example of a woman who developed a personal freedom practice 
within yet other religious circles, is Indian activist Pandita Rama-
bai (1858-1922). She was an expert in Sanskrit poetry, social reformer, and 
author of a famous book on the oppressed position of women in India, 
The High-Caste Hindu Woman (1888).33 Ramabai’s father, who practiced the 
Brahmanic lifestyle, against the will of his family and community, educated 
not only his son, but also his wife and daughters in the ‘sacred language’ of 
Sanskrit, in which the classics of Hinduism are written. Every morning, as 
a child, Ramabai repeated her lessons with her mother and, by the age of 
twelve, she had memorized 18,000 verses of the ancient Hindu texts. She 
was also fluent in many languages, including Marathi, Kannada, and Hindi. 
The family traversed India for several years, earning a living by reciting the 
Hindu texts in public. At the age of 20, Ramabai was publicly honoured in 
Calcutta for her knowledge and given the title Pandita (learned woman).
The family’s travels across India gave Ramabai experience in public 
speaking and an awareness of women’s conditions throughout the country. 
Ramabai became a member of the Indian social reform movement, which 
sought to modernize the traditional caste system and the treatment of 
women in India. She particularly focused on the stigmatizing treatment of 
widows in her country, of which there were many due to the child-marriage 
system. When she became widowed herself at the age of 24, she def ied 
the conventions and continued travelling, lecturing, and publishing, thus 
earning a living for herself and her daughter. In 1881, she founded the f irst 
feminist organization in India, the ‘Arya Mahila Sabha’. During a stay in 
England and the US, she raised money to found a safe community for Indian 
widows of all castes, where they could gain skills in carpentry weaving, 
printing, and gardening, so as to be able to earn a living.
In her quest for a personal ethical-spiritual life project, Ramabai 
turned to Christianity during her stay in England. Her conversion is often 
interpreted as a betrayal of her Indian identity and is a reason why she is 
33 The following is based on Uma Chakravarti (1998) and Meera Kosambi (2003). 
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obscured from off icial histories of Western India. Uma Chakravarti (1998) 
argues, however, that Ramabai’s turn to Christianity should be interpreted 
as a protest against the Hindu patriarchs of the time. Ramabai continued 
to pursue her own spiritual path, refusing to accept the authorities of the 
Anglican Church. While living amidst the widows in the community that 
she had founded, she increasingly practiced the ascetic Brahmanic lifestyle 
of her father. By cultivating a personal ethical life project within religious 
contexts and by acting in the world, lecturing and travelling widely, raising 
a feminist movement and building a community for widows, in an explicit 
critique of women’s oppression, by changing ritual ‘forms’ and creating a 
way of life that challenged the dominant gender patters of her time, her life 
counts as a remarkable freedom practice.
A woman’s freedom practice comprising ‘keys’ of art, rite, and myth, is 
the ethical life project of Werewere Liking (1950-), born Eddy Nicole Njock 
in 1950 in Cameroon. Liking has published poetry and novels, among others 
Orphée-dafric (1981) and Elle sera de jaspe et de corail (1983), and moreover 
is a paintress, performer, f ilmmaker and choreographer. She leads an art 
colony in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, where street children are given the op-
portunity to develop as artists.34 Liking uses elements of African symbols, 
rites, and myths to articulate a new African identity and consciousness. 
Her life and work aim to contribute to a new vision of the African world, by 
re-articulating African identity in its diversity, creativity, and dynamism.35 
Music, sound, rhythm, and metaphor, are prominent in her texts and 
especially in her theatre plays, which aim to be life-changing experiences 
for people. Liking argues for a commitment of both men and women to 
a better society, criticizing any idea of a battle between the sexes. Her 
ethical personal life project, and her cultural centre Village Ki-Yi, comprise 
a critically creative re-invention of the African cultural heritage in more 
‘keys’ than verbal language.
Women in our time from all continents, such as Bing Xin, Maria Zam-
brano, Sophie Oluwole, and Gloria Anzaldúa, each of whom stands for many 
others, engage in freedom practices that create new ethical ways of life and 
models for self and society, and a new world. The next chapter discusses 
Muslim women’s freedom practices in this respect.
34 The following is based on Christa Stevens (2012).
35 Liking’s ideas link up with nineteenth century Pan-Africanism and the twentieth century 
movement of négritude, that hold that Africans across the continent and in the diaspora share the 
same cultural and philosophical values, anchored in the precolonial cultures of the continent.
3 Muslim Women’s Freedom Practices1
In January 2011, an unusual event unfolded in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. An 
unexpected youth-driven revolution, backed by social media, took place 
and was broadcast live by Al Jazeera and witnessed all over the world. Egypt 
had followed Tunisia’s December 2010 ‘Jasmine Revolution’. The uprisings 
spread to Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Morocco and many other countries 
in the region, causing major problems for their governments.2
Women were clearly present during these spontaneous uprisings in 
2010-2011 in North Africa and the Middle East, commonly known as the 
‘Arab Spring’. They, too, used Facebook, blogs, and other social media 
tools to contribute to the political struggle (cf. Sadiqi 2012; Brouwer and 
Bartels 2014). Sadiqi (2016) argues that these revolutions, which called for 
karamah (dignity) and democracy, involved the rise of women as new actors 
in the region, a presence that has continued in the years after the revolu-
tions, demonstrating ‘women’s feminist persistence in the face of cultural 
resistance and backlash’ (Sadiqi 2016: 3). In spite of women’s absence in 
spaces of authority after the Arab Spring, there is ‘a lot of dynamism of 
women, in civil society. And on the net we have a very new breed of women 
feminists, women who are neither Islamists, neither secularists, they want 
a better life for themselves’ (Sadiqi 2013). Women’s roles before, during, and 
after the uprisings deserve to be highlighted more than is the case in recent 
analyses by Tariq Ramadan (2012) and Hamid Dabashi (2012), which are for 
the most part ‘ungendered’ (Sadiqi 2016: 2).
Muslim women’s agency is even more overlooked in the heavily polarized 
debates that take place in the Euro-Atlantic region, especially since 9/11, 
about ‘the nature of Islam’. The issue of ‘women’s oppression in Islam’ is 
a critical topic in these debates. In Western Europe especially, many are 
convinced that Islamic culture and religion are extremely hostile to women. 
With the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and with 
terrorist attacks in Brussel and Paris ‘in the name of Allah’, anti-Islam and 
anti-Muslim opposition have only increased in recent years in Western 
Europe. Marine Le Pen, political leader of the French ‘Front National’ wrote 
a letter to the New York Times (8 January 2015) claiming that ‘the massive 
waves of immigration’ have to be stopped, since the values of the French 
1 The chapter is based on the research of the participants in the project ‘Women and Islam: 
New Perspectives’ (2008-2013) (cf. Acknowledgements).
2 In Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Kuwait, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Oman, and Djibouti.
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Republic are at risk. According to her, ‘the presence of Muslims in France 
is a danger to the country,’ since ‘culture has a major influence on the way 
immigrants relate to French society and its values, on issues such as the 
status of women and the separation of state and religious authority.’ Le Pen, 
like other political leaders of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, 
routinely raises the issue of the status of women in Islam to underpin her 
political anti-immigration stances. French feminist philosopher Elisabeth 
Badinter also contrasts the status of Muslim women with the French repub-
lican values of laicism, which guarantee women the right to autonomously 
choose their own lives independent from their communities. Badinter, who 
supported the legal ban on the headscarf in French public schools in 2004, 
complained in a 2011 interview with Le Monde that ‘apart from Marine Le 
Pen, nobody defends laicism’ (Badinter 2011).3
French laicism is a political model that advocates the strict separation 
of Church and State. Essentially, it is a specific, radical secularist version of 
Western liberalism (cf. Jansen 2013: 233 ff.).4 However, Badinter’s outlook 
largely corresponds to mainstream feminism’s claim that only liberalism’s 
‘fundamentals’, i.e. its concepts of autonomy and a secular state, guarantee 
women’s rights to live their lives as free persons (cf. Okin 1999: 24; cf. Chapter 2).
As discussed in the previous chapter, many postcolonial thinkers also 
equate ‘feminism’ with the ‘fundamentals’ of Western liberalism. To 
them, feminism is inherently secular in character. However, new kinds of 
feminism have emerged in the Muslim world that are based on religious 
principles. Islamic and Muslim feminists contest ‘patriarchy’ and f ight for 
‘women’s empowerment’, women’s rights’, and ‘gender justice’ within the 
realm of religion, in a religious vocabulary and within religious ‘forms’. 
By re-interpreting the Qur’an and Islamic history from the perspective of 
modern Muslim women, they re-articulate beliefs and idea(l)s that matter 
deeply to Muslim women and men. Western mainstream feminists, from 
their focus on concepts of autonomy and secularism, overlook the ‘forms’ 
of religion – as well as those of other ‘presentational’ realms – as modes 
of thought in their own right (cf. Langer 1960). They mistakenly debunk 
religious ‘forms’ that ‘present’ ideas in ways other than linear language, 
underestimating their relevance as intellectual activities (cf. Chapter 2).
3 Badinter later said her remark was meant as irony. 
4 The model of French laicism goes back to French Neo-Kantianism. While the liberal 
legal-political framework accommodates expressions of religion, French radical secular-
ism in principle inhibits such an accommodation, though it in practice shows otherwise 
(cf. Jansen 2013: 233 ff.).
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The present chapter, written from the perspective of Langer – and in line 
with Foucault’s discussion of certain religious strands in Christianity and 
Islam – articulates Muslim feminists’ re-contextualizing of Islamic rituals 
and beliefs in terms of ethical freedom practices that comprise important 
new visions for self and society.
Women’s Freedom Practices in Islamic History
As a world religion with a long history, Islam contains much diversity. 
Focusing on Muslim women’s freedom practices, I specif ically discuss the 
ethical-spiritual dimension of Islamic belief, i.e. the dimension of moral 
systems that fascinated Foucault in his f inal work.
Like all moral systems, Islam involves a dimension of ethical self-
formation, which is necessary for people to become the ethical subject that 
can follow the moral codes of Islam. Verse 2:256 of the Qur’an explicates 
that there should be no compulsion in religion: the Qur’an’s core teaching is 
loyalty only to Allah. Religion is a matter of one’s personal relation to God, 
which, in principle, invites one to create a personal ethical life project. But 
the relationship between the codes of the religious system and the space 
for personal ethical self-formation varies in Islamic history.
The latter dimension manifests itself most clearly in the original tra-
ditions of Islamic mysticism, which are oriented to the ethical-spiritual 
message of Islam (cf. Ahmed 1992) and that have their ‘roots in the ritual 
practices taught by the Koran’ (Schimmel 1975: 24). One of these traditions 
is Sufism. Aziza Ouguir (2013) shows that this mystical tradition originally 
addressed men and women in similar ways. Sufi scholars of the past made 
no distinction between men and women, and made it explicit that both 
can reach the highest ranks in Sufism. Ouguir discusses, among others, the 
works of Ibn Arabi (twelfth century) and Ibn Taymiyya (fourteenth century), 
who explicitly approve women being religious leaders and performing 
sermons (Ouguir 2013: 47).5 Their works thus convey an intrinsic gender 
equality in the heart of Islam.
Ouguir discusses the many strands of Sufism that developed over time, 
orthodox as well as popular, and Sufism’s basic principles, formulated by 
eleventh-century Persian religious scholar Al-Ghazali. The telos of ascetic 
exercises in Sufism was not death to the self, but life in God, i.e. a state in 
5 This is all the more striking since Ibn Taymiyya is often invoked by extreme Sunni radicals, 
including Daesh, to back their archaic attitude towards women. 
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which the mystic is endowed with Divine attributes. This telos necessitates 
cultivating and embodying a number of qualities, such as repentance, grati-
tude, patience, and love (38). By means of exercises, such as ritual prayer, 
Sufi mystics search to unite with God, without vanishing, but with the hope 
of manifesting God’s virtues in their lives. Suf ism thus is not only oriented 
to the spiritual life on the level of the mind, but also to the practicing of an 
embodied ethical-spiritual life way of life.
Until the twentieth century, Sufism was a moving force in the Middle 
East. Today, it continues to play an important part in the lives of many 
Muslims at a more personal level. Many believers read Sufi literature and 
visit graves of Sufi saints to cultivate their spirituality, often in a reaction 
to the formalist rule following required by the more conventional forms of 
Islam. Not well known to many Muslim believers, however, are the female 
spiritual Sufi leaders of the past.
Margaret Smith (1984) discusses how, in Sufism, the gender of the believ-
ers was seen as less important than their devotional exercise. The title of 
saint ‘was bestowed upon women equally with men, and since Islam has 
no order of priesthood and no priest caste, there was nothing to prevent a 
woman from reaching the highest religious rank in the hierarchy of Muslim 
saints’ (Smith 1984: 2). Biographies of Muslim saints are full of references to 
women saints as well. Female Sufi saints were so influential that Muslim 
theologians, who opposed the Suf i movement, explicitly denounced the 
veneration of these women (cf. 3).
A famous Sufi saint and mystic is Rabia al Adawiyya (c. 720-801). A former 
slave from Basra, a city in the South of Iraq, she developed herself into a 
spiritual and intellectual leader within the emerging Sufism movement. 
Fom the many legends on her life, dating from several periods, she presents 
as a woman who self-consciously carved her own path, in ways that many 
female Sufi’s followed. She consistently rejected the many marriage propos-
als she received, with words such as: ‘God can give me all you offer and 
even double it. It does not please me to be distracted from Him for a single 
moment. So farewell’ (Smith 1984: 11). Her own contribution to Sufism lies in 
her call to avoid being led by traditions or rules. To a male Sufi mystic that 
tried to surpass her in piety she said: ‘You traversed [the desert] in ritual 
prayer, but I with personal supplication’ (9). About another Sufi she said: 
‘(Y)es, Sufyan would be a good man, if he did not love the Traditions,’ (16) 
thus conveying that the most important thing is to achieve a personal 
relationship with God.
Discussing Rabia’s contribution to Sufism, Smith argues that she made 
her life into ‘her plainest teaching’ on this subject’ (59). A well-known story 
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relates how Rabia walked the streets of Basra with a torch in one hand and a 
bucket of water in the other, while saying: ‘I am going to light f ire in Paradise 
and to pour water on to Hell so that both veils […] may completely disappear 
[…] and the servants of God may see Him, without any object of hope or 
motive of fear. What if the hope of Paradise and the fear of Hell did not 
exist?’ (99). According to her, one should love God in unself ish ways (cf. 98).
In the stories, Rabia never speaks about the equality of men and women 
explicitly, and it would be nonsense to call her a ‘feminist’, as Mariëtte van 
Beek (2002) rightly argues. However, as Ouguir (2013) contends, the legends 
about Rabia’s life convey ‘equality effects’ and even ‘egalitarian effects.’6 
Rabia’s life did not f it the patriarchal patterns of her time; on the contrary, 
it broke these moulds. Moreover, the high-spiritedness with which Rabia 
put the men around her in their place – especially her defeat of Sufi leader 
Hasan al-Basri in ‘contests’ of mystical capacities and miracle-working – has 
‘egalitarian effects’ as they convey a critique on the men around her for not 
taking women seriously. The same is true of her rejection of all marriage 
proposals, her taking up of the position of a female intellectual and spiritual 
leader, and her emphasis on everyone’s personal relationship with God.
Muslim feminist scholar Ahmed points out that Rabia was ‘neither wife, 
nor slave, nor under any male authority’ (Ahmed 1989: 149). She argues that 
Rabia lived a life of self-def inition, a path she largely forged for herself, and 
thus opened for other women. Suf ism ‘cherished and projected as ideal 
the example of a woman leader,’ regarding women ‘not as embodiments of 
biological urges but as creatures needing resourcefully and thoughtfully 
to balance, as Rabia does, spiritual, biological and social dimensions’ (149).
From the legends on Rabia’s life emerge the f ive core characteristics 
of a freedom practice. She developed a personal ethical life project as a 
female mystic; acting in the world, as a spiritual leader ‘in free and open 
6 According to Siep Stuurman (2004a), a history of equality can be written that focuses on 
‘equality-effects’ in discourses and texts that express notions and thoughts of equality without 
necessarily using the term equality as such. Equality can be expressed in a rational Enlighten-
ment discourse, but also in mythical or religious discourses. We can recognize ‘aff inities and 
parallels […] Stories may suggest similarity and equality without any explicit reference to them’ 
(Stuurman 2004a: 24-25). Stuurman adds that there is a difference between equality effects 
and egalitarian effects. He states: ‘it is useful to distinguish between equality and egalitarian-
ism. Egalitarianism denotes the conscious pursuit of some specif ic variety of equality, while 
discourses and concepts of equality refer to specif ic senses in which persons are deemed equal 
in particular respects. The relation between equality and egalitarianism is one of potentiality: 
concepts of equality are not necessary egalitarian. On the other hand, it is obvious that ideas of 
equality can easily spill over into egalitarian discourses’ holding that when things are alike they 
should ‘receive similar treatment’ (26). (See also Stuurman 2004b and Stuurman forthcoming.) 
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interchange with other men and women’ (Ahmed 1989: 149); implicitly 
critiquing women’s subordination; creating a way of life as a woman that 
challenged the dominant gender patterns of her time; within the context 
of an emerging Sufi movement that offered self-techniques and models.
Rabia’s legendary life was, and still is, a source of inspiration to many 
Muslim women, particularly to Muslim feminists. Algerian/Moroccan-
Dutch singer Rajae el Mouhandiz recalls a f ilm on Rabia’s life that fascinated 
her as a child.7 Watching the f ilm over and over again turned her into a 
feminist. To her, Rabia was
the f irst feminist role model whom I could look up to. I could not relate to 
Snow White, Cinderella, Rapunzel or any other female fairytale f igures 
and to be honest as a child I felt sorry for them, because they all needed 
to be rescued by men and chased worldly dreams. My Rabia instead was 
a self made woman, who overcame so much and who tasted from various 
female roles, but chose to be close to God and loyal to her own journey 
to self. She inspired me to not chase Cinderella dreams, but to leave my 
own mark on the world via the arts.8
Especially Rabia’s transgressing of women’s second-class status in society 
is an inspiring example for today’s Muslim feminists (cf. Ahmed 1989; 
cf. Chapter 2). Ouguir (2013) also discusses Rabia’s life from this perspective, 
in addition to the lives of other notorious female Sufi mystics, like Fatima 
of Nishapur and Fatima of Cordoba, who are described in oral stories and 
hagiographies as spiritual leaders in their own right. Ouguir in her study 
especially focuses on several legendary female saints of Moroccan back-
ground, whose lives similarly transgress patriarchal patterns. Sufi saints for 
a long time played important social and political roles in Morocco.9 From 
7 Her mother many times showed her a videotape of this f ilm, that was produced in 1963 in 
Egypt and that is well known in the Arab world. For the f ilm see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=atXLFQCwYHk (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
8 Rajae adds: ‘I was raised by a single mother, who was orphaned at a young age and who was 
married at 15 and the second time at 17, and who overcame loss, abuse, neglect and prejudice, but 
who sacrif iced to give her children a better education in the Netherlands. She never remarried, 
but decided to stay close to God. I believe Rabia’s story relates to my mother’s pain and hopes 
and in the end also to mine’ (personal communication, 22 October 2014.)
9 Suf ism gradually moved away from the ascetic moralism of early practice towards an 
organization of charismatic personal domination. However, in Morocco ‘there is some continuity 
instead of a sharp distinction between Moroccan orthodox and popular Suf ism, given that in 
many instances the latter also involves an acceptance of the foundational texts, beliefs and 
practices of orthodox Islam’ (Ouguir 2013: 266).
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the hagiographies of al-Tadili (thirteenth century) and al-Kattani (twentieth 
century), female Sufi saints emerge on an equal footing with male saints.
Ouguir specif ically exposes the lives of Moroccan saints Azīza 
 al-Saksawiyya (fourteenth century) and Khadija al-Tamgdushtiya (nine-
teenth century). She gathered oral stories and hagiographic material, which 
portray both women as social and political leaders. Oral stories on the life 
of Aziza al-Saksawiyya, for instance, present her as a beautiful Sufi girl who 
rejected many marriage proposals and who performed miracles while she 
worked as a shepherd in the mountains. After studying in Marrakech and 
Algeria, she returned as a famous Sufi and became the political leader of her 
tribe. Hagiographer Ibn Qunfudh (fourteenth century) similarly describes 
Azīza al-Saksawiyya as the head of her tribe, and as a remarkably gifted 
woman that lectured to ‘the men and women, who were always around her’ 
(Ibn Qunfudh 1965: 86; translation: Ouguir 2013: 117).
Ouguir discusses the lives of many other Moroccan female Sufi saints, 
who developed their piety inside or outside their homes, performed 
miracles, and in some cases roamed the streets in ‘madness’. Female ven-
erators who visit the shrines of female saints – sometimes camping there 
for days – ask their particular woman saint for her blessing. But saints 
not only function for them as some kind of ‘psychiatrist,’ in the words of 
Fatima Mernissi (1977), who help them to deal with the hardships of their 
daily lives (cf. Ouguir 2013: 135). The saints are role models to their female 
venerators, and sometimes a source of inspiration to those seeking orthodox 
education and to become active religious agents (cf. 135). Ouguir found that 
several murshidats (Moroccan women preachers) integrate women saints 
as role models in their sermons on women’s rights, in addition to other role 
models such as the prophet’s wife Khadija Khuwaylid, who, being a wealthy 
merchant, spent her riches on the poor.
From her interviews with female leaders and politicians of the Islamist 
associations al-‛adl wa al-Iḥsān, al-‛adala wa al-Tanmiyya, and muntadā 
al-Zahrā, and with Islamist activists of other Moroccan organizations, 
Ouguir found that, although they reject the veneration of saints, they also 
integrate Moroccan female saints in their discourses, as empowering role 
models that may inspire Muslim women to engage in activism, education, 
and learning. Berber Islamists even ‘name their associations after the Berber 
women saints who belong to their Berber tribes and regions, such as Lalla 
Zaynab. Likewise, Arab Islamist activists choose names of Arab women 
saints who are buried in the urban and rural locations of Morocco, for 
their associations, schools, youth houses and other institutions, such as 
Khumaysa, Umm al-Banīn’ (216).
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From her interviews with Moroccan female Islamist leaders and activists, 
Ouguir concludes that they are feminists f ighting patriarchy just as secular 
feminists do. While many of them prefer to speak of men and women’s 
‘equity’ rather than equality – i.e. that men and women have equal value 
rather than being equal – this only relates to the private sphere, in which 
they, moreover, oppose any hierarchical relations between men and women. 
Zakia Salime (2005) similarly concludes in her study on Moroccan Islam-
ist women’s organizations that they seek political, social, and economic 
empowerment of women and equality with men.
Other studies show that Muslim women throughout time and space 
developed personal ethical life projects as poets, scholars, and spiritual or 
political leaders (cf. among others, Nadwī 2007). In reference to several of 
these exemplary women, and especially to Rabia al Adawiyya, Ahmed (1989) 
argues that there is no need for Muslim women to import concepts from the 
West, since ‘the beliefs on which feminism rests are an endemic part of Islamic 
civilization (just as they are an endemic part of Western civilization before 
the development of the political idiom of democracy)’ (Ahmed 1989: 144).
Islamic Feminisms
Muslim women scholars turn in particular to the Qur’an to articulate the 
contours of an endemic Muslim women’s movement. Mernissi, in The Veil 
and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam (1991), 
originally published in 1987, discussed that the Qur’an conveys a message 
of gender justice. Ahmed (1992), too, argues that the Quran’s ethical Spirit 
conveys that men and women are equal in the eyes of God. This explains 
‘why Muslim women frequently insist, often inexplicable to non-Muslims, 
that Islam is not sexist. They hear and read in its sacred text, justly and 
legitimately a different message from that heard by the makers and en-
forcers of orthodox, androcentric Islam’ (Ahmed 1992: 66).
Ahmed explores how the ethical-spiritual message of the Qur’an was 
neglected with the elaboration of androcentric laws that were encoded in 
the Abassid period, i.e. the dynasty of the caliphs (750-1250). This period 
was extremely patriarchal and sexist: women were literally seen and dealt 
with as sexual objects (88 ff.). Even then, Sufis and Quarmatians continued 
to privilege Islam’s ethical teachings. Had the ethical voice of the Qur’an 
been more widely acknowledged, ‘it would have signif icantly tempered 
the extreme androcentric bias of the law, and we might today have a far 
more humane and egalitarian law regarding women’ (88). Ahmed argues 
muSlIm womeN’S freeDom PrAc tIceS 103
for an endemic Muslim women’s movement that turns the ethical gender 
egalitarian voice of Islam against its hierarchical side – while political 
Islamism, once it gains power, does the opposite (cf. 242).
Ahmed discusses the history of feminism in the Arab world, particularly 
the different strands of Egyptian women’s movements. Quasim Amin’s work 
The Liberation of Women (2000), published in Cairo in 1899, is generally seen 
as the beginning of Arab feminism. Amin’s approach was Western liberal 
in orientation, including in its rejection of the veil, an issue that was also 
important to British colonial administrators. Ahmed relates how British 
consul general of Egypt, Lord Cromer, a self-proclaimed ‘feminist’, argued 
against Muslim women’s degradation through practices of veiling and 
segregation, while at home in England he presided over the Men’s League 
Opposing Women’s Suffrage (153). She notes that, at the time, European 
feminists criticized the actions of such men in their own societies, but 
acquiesced in ‘the discourse of colonial “feminism”’ that aimed to rescue 
women ‘from the religion and culture in which they had the misfortune to 
f ind themselves’ (244).
A Westward-looking women’s movement, led by Huda Shaarawi, emerged 
in Egypt in the f irst decades of the twentieth century. An alternative move-
ment, however, emerged at the same time – led by Malak Hifni Nassef – and 
pursued reforms for women ‘in a native idiom’ (160). Though this movement 
was generally not recognized as a voice of feminism, Sharaawi and Nassef 
advocated the same causes, among others the necessity of fundamental 
reforms in family laws and the right of women to access higher education 
and public spaces – Nassef’s movement formulating these reforms in terms 
internal to the indigenous culture (cf. 179 ff.). Ahmed concludes once more 
that Muslim women’s movements that want to enable women ‘to contribute 
to their societies in all domains’ (248) can rely on beliefs that are an endemic 
part of Islamic civilization.
Several studies of Muslim women scholars discuss the gender egalitarian 
message of the Qur’anic text in detail, among others Amina Wadud (1999), 
and Asma Barlas (2002). Wadud is an American scholar of Islam, who herself 
wears the hijab. She famously led a mixed-gender prayer service in New York 
City as a female imam in March 2005, which, at the time, triggered a lot 
of controversy and death threats on the internet. Her gesture was heavily 
disputed among Muslim women as well, with many of them arguing that 
it was counterproductive and that time was not ripe for it yet. Ahmed, 
however, commented that the time would never be ripe for women to 
enter the male domain and praised Wadud’s gesture. In May 2005, Wadud 
repeated her gesture during a two-day conference on ‘Islamic feminism’ in 
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Amsterdam. The meetings were attended by a mixed audience, men and 
women of Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds, with much press and 
security as it took place at the height of the controversy around Islam in the 
Netherlands, with anti-Islam populism at its peak.10 When Wadud opened 
the meeting with a prayer, the public was silent, aware that Wadud’s actions 
were changing an Islamic ritual ‘form’ into a gender egalitarian direction.
In her study Qur’an and Woman (1999), Wadud aims to show ‘the relevance 
of the Qur’an to the concerns of the modern woman’ (Wadud 1999: 95). 
Her hermeneutic-interpretative approach to the Qur’an is based on the 
presumption that its universality and wisdom can only be implemented 
through continued interpretation (cf. 94).11 The meaning of the text has to 
be disclosed in constant conversations, to keep its Spirit alive. The Qur’an 
being the word of Allah revealed to the Prophet is a revelation in context, 
adapted to the language of the time that gave words their meaning. This 
necessitates us to distill the general principles of the text and translate these 
for other contexts. A literal reading of the text ‘does not allow for many of 
today’s realities. […] Therefore, the Qur’an must eternally be reviewed with 
regard to human exchange and mutual responsibility between males and 
females’ (73).
Wadud starts her exploration of the text by discussing the Qur’anic story 
on the origin of humankind that states that women and men are created 
from a single nafs (soul). Unlike the Bible story, in which Eve is created 
from Adam’s rib, woman is not secondary to man, the pair is on an equal 
footing. The Qur’an literally says: ‘all things we have created by pairs’ (Q51: 
49) (Wadud 1999: 21).12 Since only Allah is unpaired and unique, it follows 
that men who consider themselves superior to woman are trying to be like 
Allah, which is deeply mistaken. Moreover, in the Qur’an, unlike the Bible, 
it is not only woman who is the cause of evil: both man and woman eat from 
the forbidden tree (Q20: 115-121) (cf. Wadud 1999: 25).
10 Due to the political murders of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and in 2004 of Dutch 
f ilm maker Theo van Gogh – both openly expressing their aversion of Islamic culture and religion 
– outspoken anti-Islam polarization increased and led to a series of confrontations, clashes and 
violent incidents between ‘autochthonous’ and ‘allochthonous’ parts of the population – the latter 
mainly of Moroccan and Turkish descent – such as the setting f ire to Islamic schools and mosques.
11 Wadud ‘s book was originally published in 1992 in Malaysia, and since then has been 
translated among others into Indonesian (1994) and Turkish (1997).
12 In line with Wadud (1999), I refer to Qur’anic quotations in general in the text in parentheses 
by a Q followed by numbers with a colon between them: the f irst number referring to the Chapter 
and the numbers after the colon referring to the verse(s) (cf. Wadud 1999: 11). Literal quotations 
from the Qur’an as well are taken from Wadud’s text (for the English translations of the Qur’an 
she used, see Wadud 1999: 11.)
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Wadud also explores the passages in the Qur’an that portray female char-
acters; namely, the mother of Moses, Mary, and Bilqis the Queen of Sheba. 
She concludes that in the text women are never declassif ied as sinners per 
se, nor are they explicitly restricted to a limited set of roles, subordinate 
to men, where there is no room for spiritual growth. The Qur’anic text 
explicitly calls for women to be on an equal footing with men in order to 
fulf il all religious duties. Verse 33:35 of the Qur’an places woman on an 
absolute par with man in relation to their spiritual potential:
For Muslim men and Muslim women, for believing men and believing 
women, for devout men and devout women (i.e. who have qunut), for 
true men and true women, for men and women who are patient and 
constant, for men and women who humble themselves, for men and 
women who give in charity, for men and women who fast, for men and 
women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage 
much in Allah’s praise – for them has Allah prepared forgiveness and 
great reward (Q33:35) (cf. Wadud 1999: 99).
The Qur’an moreover explicitly states that women, like men, are offered 
paradise and proximity to Allah: ‘whoever does right, whether male or 
female, and is a believer, (all) such will enter the Garden’ (Q40:39-40) 
(Wadud 1999: 48).
The verses that remain problematic for women, among others verse 4:34 
in the fourth Chapter of the Qur’an, al-Nisā‛ (The Women), which advises 
men when women disobey to ‘admonish them, banished them to beds apart, 
and scourge them,’ are to be seen as remnants of the socio-historic context 
in which the Qur’an was revealed (Q4:34) (cf. Wadud 1999: 100-101). They are 
specif ic for the situation in the Arab world in the seventh century, but they 
demonstrate the intention of gradual reform, since they put constraints on 
what were the habits of men (95). In the words of Nazirah Zein Ed-Din (1982): 
‘If all these customs had been entirely abolished by God, several problems 
would have ensued […], not many of His commandments would have been 
obeyed’ (Zein Ed-Din 1982: 224, quoted in Wadud 1999: 82). Similarly, the 
Qur’an posits severe restrictions on slavery. While its immediate total 
abolition was not completely instituted by the end revelation, enough clear 
indications of the Qur’an’s intentions are given in this regard (101). Slavery 
is no longer accepted in the Muslim world, and the unequal treatment 
of women should not be either, since it contradicts the essence of Islam 
(cf. 77). The ‘continued change which the Qur’an put into motion was not 
meant to stop when the revelation was completed’ (101). There has to be a 
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‘continual assessment of a current situation’ in the light of this principle of 
gradual reform (89).
Wadud concludes that while some limitations exist in the text, ‘such 
as when it specif ically addresses the social situation in Arabia at the time 
of revelation’ (95), the Qur’an’s key assumptions and overall worldview 
are egalitarian in character. Men and women are treated in the Qur’an as 
individuals that, depending on their own piety, can merit paradise. The 
differences between men and women should not be obliterated, but no 
f ixed gender roles can be distilled from these differences (cf. 102-103). Social 
justice requires for women to have ‘full access to economic, intellectual and 
political participation,’ and for men to ‘value and therefore participate fully 
in home and child care.’ Only then can ‘a more balanced and fair society’ 
come about (103).
Pakistani-American scholar Barlas, in her study ‘Believing Women’ in 
Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (2002), demon-
strates the egalitarian and anti-patriarchal nature of the Qur’an’s teach-
ings on the basis of the methodology that the Qur’an itself proposes for 
its reading.13 At several points, the Qur’an says that it must be interpreted 
holistically. The Qur’an warns us not to break its text into parts (Q15: 91-93). 
Each concept must be read in the context of others so as to arrive at the 
intentions of God. We have to treat the Qur’an as a unity and read it for 
its best meanings so as to reach its foundational message. The text also 
encourages a contextual reading, instructing us to discover its true meaning 
by reflecting and making the best use of reason. It is unavoidable that we 
read the text from our own ‘reading sensibilities shaped by existing ideas, 
debates, concerns, and anxieties.’ Indeed, if we are to re-contextualize the 
text for new generations of Muslims, ‘we must bring new insights to our 
reading. Interpreting the Qur’an in light of new insights is also legitimate 
inasmuch as Islam is not bound by space, time or context’ (Barlas 2002: 25).
From the methodological principles of the Qur’an itself, Barlas concludes 
that not all readings can be accepted. Verse 4:34, for instance, should be 
interpreted as a restriction instead of a licence for men to beat their wives, 
as is clear from examining the historical context of its teaching. At a time 
‘when men did not need permission to abuse women […] it could only have 
been a restriction in so far as the Qur’an made daraba the measure of last, 
not the f irst or even the second, resort’ (188). Read holistically and for its best 
meaning, the Qur’an points towards the ending of violence against women, 
13 Barlas (2002) has been translated into among others Bengali, Indonesian, Spanish, French, 
and Urdu.
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which is in line with ‘the Qur’an’s view of sexual equality and its teaching 
that marriages should be based in love, forgiveness and harmony’ (189).14
While the studies of Barlas and Wadud explicitly criticize patriarchy and 
women’s subordination to men, they avoid the term ‘feminism’, due to its 
Western connotations. Today, however, both Wadud and Barlas accept the 
term ‘Islamic feminism’ that was launched by scholars Mir-Hosseini and 
Margot Badran.15 Mir-Hosseini (2004) concluded that ‘by the late 1980s, there 
were clear signs of the emergence of a new consciousness, a new way of 
thinking, a gender discourse that is “feminist” in its aspiration and demands, 
yet is “Islamic” in its language and sources of legitimacy’ (Mir-Hosseini 
2004: 3). For instance, the Iranian journal Zanan, in the early 1990s, ‘made 
no apologies’ for using the term feminism (cf. Mir-Hosseini: 1999: 6). The 
term ‘Islamic feminism’ conveys that ‘there is a theoretical concord between 
the egalitarian spirit of Islam and the feminist quest for justice and a just 
world’ (Mir-Hosseini 2004: 4; cf. Mir-Hosseini et al. 2015).
Historian Margot Badran (2009) also launched the term ‘Islamic femi-
nism’ in reference to Arabic women’s movements, which from the 1990s 
onwards started to use the term feminism. The term ‘Islamic feminism’ is 
important since it eradicates binaries such as ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ and 
‘East’ and ‘West’, and conveys that feminism is a phenomenon endemic to 
Islamic civilization as well (cf. Badran 2009: 245).
Muslim women’s organizations that struggle for women’s rights, gender 
equality, and ‘gender justice’ in Islam, on the basis of an egalitarian re-
reading of the Qur’an, exist today in Morocco, Iran, Egypt, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia as well as in Western countries. About the beginning of the Ma-
laysian movement, ‘Sisters in Islam’, Zainah Anwar and Rose Ismail (2012) 
relate:
Women were telling us how they were suffering in silence: they had 
been taught that Islam demanded complete obedience to their hus-
bands, even in instances when the men in question deserved no such 
consideration. Over and over they were told in religious lectures and 
sermons; in private gatherings; over radio and television; at mosques, 
14 Other key studies concerning the gender egalitarian character of the Qur’anic text are Riffat 
Hassan (1987) and Azizah al-Hibri (2014).
15 Cf. Barlas (2016). Barlas and Wadud attended the conferences on ‘Islamic feminism’ that 
for several years took place in Barcelona, since 2005, with delegates from many countries. Cf. 
https://abdennurprado.wordpress.com/2005/10/27/presentation-on-islamic-feminism-f irst-
international-congress-on-islamic-feminism-barcelona-27th-october-2005/ (last accessed, 
21 September 2016). 
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and in the courts that all men were superior to all women; that the 
evidence of two women equaled that of one man; that the husband 
had the incontrovertible right to beat his wife or to take a second wife; 
and that the only place for a disobedient wife in the hereafter was hell 
(Anwar and Ismail 2012: 63).
Focusing on polygamy and the popular belief that men had the right to beat 
their wives, they started studying the Qur’anic text. In reference to the work 
of Wadud and the Qur’anic verse 4:34, they state:
Those supporting the rights of men to this violence sought justif ication in 
the Qur’anic verse on nushūz, commonly interpreted as “disobedience.” 
[…] [I]t was Amina’s pioneering work which enabled us to argue that 
wife-beating was not a God-given right in Islam. She pointed out to us the 
context of revelation. […] We also looked at the Hadith literature, which 
had no record of the Prophet Muhammad ever beating any of his wives 
or supporting any incident of domestic violence (66).
As for polygamy, it was a revelation to see that the second half of the verse 
on polygamy (Q4:3) in Arabic clarif ies that if one fears not being able to 
deal justly with women, ‘then marry only one’ (Anwar and Ismail 2012: 66).
The organization Musawāh (‘equality’ in Arabic), founded by Mir-
Hosseini and Anwar as the global branch of ‘Sisters in Islam’, calls itself 
the international ‘Islamic feminist’ movement for equality and justice in 
the Muslim family (Musawāh 2010). While the concept ‘Islamic feminism’ 
has become accepted in wider circles, it is contested by many others: by 
Muslims, because of the Western connotation of the term ‘feminism’ and by 
secularists who consider Islamic feminism a contradiction in terms. From 
both sides, Muslim feminists’ re-reading of the Qur’an is often debunked 
as a selective cherry-picking – overlooking the fact that any re-reading of 
old texts in modern contexts involves re-interpreting. Critics claim as well 
that it is not clear what Islamic feminism stands for and who is and who is 
not an Islamic feminist.
While Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (1998) defines an Islamic feminist as ‘a 
woman with extraordinary survival skills who constructs a self according to 
the company she keeps and the place she lives’ (Sciolino 1998), Isobel Cole-
man (2010), for instance, includes all kinds of projects to alleviate poverty, 
such as NGO development work, and other kinds of activisms that challenge 
overarching structural inequalities. Mir-Hosseini (2004) rightly warns that 
any clear-cut definition of Islamic feminism falls short, since the movement 
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is diverse and evolving (Mir-Hosseini 2004: 3). However, in what follows, 
I will present some of its contours from the perspectives outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter, articulating Islamic feminism in terms of Muslim 
women’s ethical freedom practices.
Muslim Women’s Feminist Freedom Practices
Islamic feminism’s contours can be characterized along the lines of the 
f ive core characteristics discussed in Chapter  2; namely: 1) personal 
ethical-spiritual life projects of believing Muslim women that share a 
concern for other Muslim women; 2) expressed in actions in the world; 
3) explicitly critiquing practices that deny Muslim women access to a 
personal ethical life project within their communities; 4) creating new 
ethical ways of life, and ‘forms’ in a certain relationship to womanness; 
5) (within) distinct, relatively autonomous, groups or movements, the 
fabric of which consists of (1).
Regarding the first characteristic, it is no coincidence that several Islamic 
feminist scholars explicitly give an account of their own ethical-spiritual 
life trajectory. Wadud, in Inside the Gender Jihad (2006), goes into her per-
sonal spiritual quest at length. Ahmed has gone extensively into her own 
life in A Border Passage (1999), as did Mernissi in her own autobiography 
(Mernissi 1994). Barlas (2008a) questions the concept of feminism in relation 
to her own ethical-spiritual trajectory.
Where it concerns the second and third characteristic, Islamic feminists 
organize and act in the world in an outspoken critique of those practices 
that prohibit Muslim women from developing a personal ethical life project 
within their communities. Some initial contours of the movement thus be-
come clear. While to Miriam Cooke (2001), Islamic feminists are those who 
‘navigate’ among and through ‘multiple identif ications’ with the common 
purpose of calling for justice and freedom (Cooke 2001: xxviii), she includes 
secular feminist Nawal El Saadawi as well as Zaynab Al-Ghazali – founder 
of the Egyptian Muslim Women’s Association. The latter marginalizes 
domesticity and embraces political activism for herself, while holding 
that all Muslim women should stick to the domestic sphere. Al-Ghazali’s 
aff irmation for women in that sense qualif ies her as an Islamist activist, 
rather than an Islamic feminist.
Women of the so-called Turkish Turban movement – a political movement 
of women students who, from 1983 onwards, started to wear the headscarf 
in universities despite it being forbidden by the Turkish state – examined 
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in the work of Nilüfer Göle (1996), similarly emerge as Islamist activists 
rather than Islamic feminists, since their protests did not question women’s 
subordination to men (Göle 1996: 136). Islamic feminists, however, do so. 
They criticize traditionalist Muslims’ claims that men were designed as 
mentally and physically superior to women, and that women were meant 
to perform care-taking tasks in the domestic sphere.
Merieme Yafout, a Moroccan scholar and activist who was aff iliated to 
the Faith and Justice Association (adle wa al-Ihssan) argues:
[T]he crucial thing is having choice. Some women choose to reconcile 
the two, to be housewives, to be good mothers and wives, but also to be 
part of society, to work as professionals, to be part of organizations that 
campaign for women’s rights, for human rights or on the political scene 
and so on. So they’re choosing to be present in the public and the private 
world. So our criterion is choice. Are women acting in a way they have 
chosen or in a way that has been imposed on them?
Yafout adds: ‘Islamic feminists try to reconcile the two, making their own 
choices so they may be happy in what they do, without forgetting the com-
munity, without the egotism that makes an individual only think of herself 
and forget the community’ (Yafout 2013). Islamic feminism’s normative 
perspective is the ideal of a personal ethical life project that balances 
individual and collective dimensions.
While criticizing oppressive practices such as polygamy and violence 
against women, Islamic feminists at the same time create new visions and 
models for self and society, in line with the fourth core characteristic. To 
Zeynep Jane Louise Kandur, affiliated to the Istanbul women’s branch of the 
Turkish Justice and Development Party, (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), 
women should be encouraged to work or engage in activities outside their 
homes. While the family is important, who takes on the tasks of care-giving 
is for people to decide themselves:
[P]eople always point to the mothers, they should be re-educated so as to 
be better parents. However, in my view, the fathers should be re-educated 
and retrained, today. The Prophet was a good father; he was shocked to 
hear a man saying that he never kissed his child. The Prophet also took 
care of his house himself. Men should learn to care and nurture, like him.16
16 Personal communication, 21 October 2014.
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Islamic feminists not only argue for women’s access to full social participa-
tion, but also for the sharing of household duties and the raising of children 
between men and women.
Men also support their causes. Muslim feminists often differentiate 
themselves from Western feminists by arguing that they prefer to struggle 
together with men for their ideals and not against them: cooperation between 
the sexes is not only their f inal goal, but their strategy as well and love in the 
family is upheld as a strong value. But from the premise that ‘(u)ltimately, 
only Allah can judge personal actions’ (Wadud 2006: 36), Wadud, as a Muslim 
feminist, also supports lesbian, transgender, and gay Muslims’ efforts to build 
support groups to help them reconcile their sexual orientation and gender 
identity with the Islamic faith (cf. Siraj al-Haqq Kugle 2010: vii).
Finally, relating to the f ifth core characteristic, Islamic feminist groups 
and networks together form a relatively independent movement. According 
to Mir-Hosseini (2010), the movement of Islamic feminism is the ‘unwanted 
child’ of political Islam, which actually ‘politicized the whole issue of gender 
and Muslim women’s rights.’ Political Islam, which propagated a return to pre-
modern interpretations of sharia, with generally restrictive laws concerning 
women, led to the emergence of Islamic feminism and ‘critiqu[e] [of] Islamists 
for conflating Islam and the shariah with undistilled patriarchy and for 
claiming that patriarchal rule was divinely mandated’ (Mir-Hosseini 2010).
Whereas to Mir-Hosseini Islamic feminism has its origins in political 
Islam, others argue that Islamic feminist movements are the unmediated 
effect of Western influences. According to Ong (2006), the Malaysian move-
ment ‘Sisters in Islam’ is the by-product of neoliberalism ‘as exception.’ In 
line with the authors of the ‘governmentality school’ (cf. Chapter 1), she 
argues that neoliberalism governs ‘through freedom,’ and ‘requires popula-
tions to be free, self-managing, and self-enterprising individuals’ in different 
spheres of everyday life, such as health, education, bureaucracy, and the 
economy (14). Ong shows how neoliberal governmental techniques have 
become translated and operationalized in non-Western contexts, especially 
in East and Southeast Asia, where they are ‘neoliberal exceptions – rather 
than the general characteristic of government (cf. Ong 2006: 3-4).17 The 
introduction in Malaysia of neoliberal techniques to manage (parts of) 
the population involves a subsidizing by the state of ‘moderate Islam’. Ong 
claims that Malaysian Muslim feminism similarly is subsidized by the 
17 Ong (2006) argues that overall a variety of overlapping sovereignties and labor regulations is 
at stake, contra the claim of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) ‘that economic globaliza-
tion has produced a uniform global labor regime’ (Ong 2006: 8).
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state to – ‘at a distance’ – regulate Muslim women’s entry into the market 
economy (35).
Like other governmentality authors discussed in Chapter  1, Ong – in 
reference to Foucault’s f inal work – takes ethical self-practices in neoliberal 
contexts as totally linked to state-governmental techniques. From this per-
spective, she concludes that the Malaysian ‘Sisters in Islam’ in many ways 
‘act as surrogates for the government, and its vision of a corporate Islamic 
culture that promotes self-discipline, capital accumulation, and loyalty to the 
state’ (36). But while Ong (2006) takes the ‘Sisters in Islam’ movement as the 
child of a neoliberal regime, it would be more accurate to call it the unwanted 
child of this regime, to paraphrase Mir-Hosseini. ‘Sisters in Islam’ is harshly 
criticized by (neo)liberal groups who attack the movement for defending 
conservative traditions. But it is criticized as well by Malaysia’s main Muslim 
organizations. Islamic feminism has crystallized into a relatively independent 
movement, in relation to both the traditional power centres of Islam and those 
of a globalizing neoliberalism.
Islamic feminists organize in networks and gather together in reading 
groups to study the Qur’an. In a debate with Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan 
in June 2008, Barlas defended the right of modern Muslim women to discuss 
and interpret Islam among themselves, while Ramadan insisted that only 
the Ulema are entitled to Qur’anic interpretation.
Ahmed  (1992) argues that Western culture is very inf luential on a 
global scale and that any attempt to reinstall a pure, original Islam fails 
since contexts have changed. However, as we have seen, she also points 
to endemic Islamic sources to contest injuries against women. Badran, 
Barlas, Mir-Hosseini, and Sadiqi, in a similar vein, consider Islamic and 
Muslim feminisms as building on local and religious sources, while 
engaging in interactive debates inside and outside the Islamic world.18 
Women’s organizations like ‘Sisters in Islam’ and Musawāh equally turn to 
the cultural heritage of the Islamic world itself as sources for an endemic 
Muslim women’s movement.
As a relatively independent movement, Islamic feminism is critically 
creative in character, since it cannot just rely on dominant interpretations 
but must confront the Qur’anic text itself. But this does not mean that 
it creates new beliefs and idea(l)s without foundations. Far from being 
relativist in character, Islamic feminists’ claims involve the disclosure of 
the true meaning of the Qur’anic text.
18 Sadiqi (2014) argues for an endemic Moroccan feminism that takes on board pre-Islamic 
Berber culture. 
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In this respect, Raja Rhouni (2010) and Aysha Hidayatullah (2014) warn 
against a new ‘foundationalism’ that wants to restore the true meaning of 
the Qur’an. Rhouni (2010) prefers the approach of Islam scholars Moham-
med Arkoun and Nasr Abu Zaid, who both aim to restore the historicity of 
foundational texts – without denying the sacred or transcendental dimen-
sion of the Qur’an – arguing that Islam’s tradition of  ỉjtihād (independent 
reasoning) should be revitalized. Islamic feminists should recognize that the 
text involves divine as well as human communication, as such containing 
‘at least two competing voices regarding women, one egalitarian (ethical) 
and the other hierarchical (practical)’ (Rhouni 2010: 35).
Similarly, Aysha Hidayatullah (2014) holds that ‘the Qur’an itself must be 
held responsible for its sexist and harmful readings’ (Hidayatullah 2014: 136). 
Both authors argue that Islamic feminists should not deny this, but seek 
to dismantle Islamic androcentric assumptions, and take their movement 
as ‘an open-ended project of construction, which intends to reactivate the 
dynamics of Islamic thought as critical thinking’ (Rhouni 2010: 16).
While Islamic feminists disagree about the status of the text, involving 
divine or a combination of divine and human communication, they do agree 
on reading the text for its divine message, which points to social justice 
and gender equality. When Rhouni argues that gender equality is not a 
norm already established by Qur’anic discourse, but a ‘horizon or trajectory 
pointed at by the Qur’an’ (Rhouni 2010: 16) this covers Wadud’s and Barlas’ 
approaches as well. Like Wadud, Barlas points to the context of Arab socie-
ties in the seventh century in her reading of verse 4:34, interpreting this 
verse as a restraining order against men who mistreated women generally. 
Both Barlas and Wadud emphasize the importance of a contextual reading. 
As Wadud contends,
[E]ach Islamic society must understand the principles intended by the 
particulars. These principles are eternal and can be applied in various 
social contexts. […] However, the movement from the principles to par-
ticulars can only be done by the members of whatever particular context 
a principle is to be applied. Therefore, interpretation of the Qur’an can 
never be f inal (Wadud 1999: 10).
Barlas (2002), while pointing to certain limits that are present in the text, 
also argues for the openness of the Qur’anic text toward future (other) 
interpretations.
Barlas (2016), in response to Hidayatullah (2014) and Rhouni (2010), argues 
for a disclosure of the meanings of the Qur’anic text in hermeneutical 
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ways. Every text has ‘an excess of meanings and no interpretation can 
exhaust them all’ and ‘every text has multiple contexts and can always be 
recontextualized.’ Scriptures ‘encompass a horizon of ethical possibilities 
and uncovering those that can be realized in our times could be our voca-
tion. This might well include deriving a theory of sexual equality from 
the Qur’an’s teachings’ (Barlas 2016: 114, 119). Rhouni and Hidayatullah 
do not take into account the hermeneutical point of view that bringing a 
new perspective to the process of interpretation involves a disclosure of 
the text’s true meaning. In other words, they do not take into account the 
hermeneutical claim that perspectivism and truth are interrelated, instead 
of being each other’s counterpoints. Islamic feminists claim to uncover the 
true meaning of the Qur’an from their perspectives as modern believing 
women. By re-interpreting the text themselves, they aim to reveal its key 
principles – without denying its contextual voice – and to demonstrate its 
relevance to the concerns of modern Muslim women and men.
Muslim Women in Western Europe
The movement of Islamic feminism is not well known in Western Europe – 
either among Muslims, or among other parts of the population that mostly 
assume that Islam is inherently hostile to women. Especially the media 
recycle stereotypical images of Muslim women as victims of an oppressive 
culture, and of Islam as an inherently violent religion (for instance, by show-
ing images of Muslim terrorists when speaking of Muslims in general).19 The 
‘issue’ of the oppressed Muslim woman has especially gained attention in 
recent years through the media-hyping of some high-profile former Muslim 
female writers and politicians who have emigrated to the West, and who 
argue that Western secularism is the only road to women’s emancipation. 
Notable examples include the French-Iranian writer Chahdortt Djavann, 
the Somali-born Dutch-American author Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and American-
Iranian author Azar Naf isi (cf. Mahmood 2008; Vintges 2005, 2012). The 
stereotypical ‘image’ of the oppressed Muslim woman also routinely turns 
up on the internet in Western Europe, where the bashing of Muslims goes 
to extreme lengths.20
19 On the recycling of stereotypical stories and images of Muslims and Islam on Dutch televi-
sion, see Andrea Meuzelaar (2014).
20 Cf. The Eurobarometer on Discrimination, 2015. Cf. http://www.equineteurope.org/
Discrimination-in-the-EU-in-2015 (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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The typical representation of Muslim women in the media as passive 
victims of an oppressive religion, stands out as one of the core concerns of 
Muslim women in the West. Sarah Bracke (2011) shows that Dutch Muslim 
women’s reactions to these stereotypes range from criticizing women’s 
emancipation to claiming the possibility of emancipation as pious women, 
to investing in a grassroots women’s movement that informs women on their 
rights in a literal reading of the Qur’an. Likewise, Narzanin Massoumi (2015), 
in her study on a British grassroots movement against the War on Terror, 
shows that Muslim women activists counter the dominant narrative of the 
oppressed Muslim woman by focusing on the rights of women in a literal 
reading of the Qur’an (Massoumi 2015: 16 ff.). Instead of feeling oppressed 
by Islam, they feel oppressed by Western culture.21
Some of Massoumi’s interviewees told her, ‘Islamically you can’t be a 
feminist, not if you really understand what it is behind Islam […] (b)ut you 
don’t need to be a feminist because Islam gives you everything you need 
as women. […] I think it’s a minority of people that describe themselves as 
Islamic feminists […] In a way they do make me really angry’ (17). Annoying 
to them is the hegemonic ‘feminist rhetoric […] (T)hat ideology in Britain. 
[…] You always have a feminist perspective and a feminist agenda’ (18). 
One participant concludes, ‘[t]he way that the media is presenting us now, 
maybe in the past it was more equal for us. But now, it’s becoming worse’ 
(Massoumi 2015: 19).
Regular Muslim women’s organizations in Western Europe today organ-
ize social meetings, self-help groups, readings, workshops, and debates, 
to support Muslim women in their various roles, in society, and in the 
Muslim community. Facing a climate of Islamophobia, Muslim women 
in Western Europe mostly keep their distance from any ‘feminism’ and 
primarily identify as Muslims.
Sociological research shows how European Muslims are affected by an 
increasingly hostile social climate, experiencing, among other things, a 
different treatment by the police and discriminatory practices in relation 
to housing, employment, and education.22 To date, Western European 
countries are far from being ‘decolonized’ (cf. Van Reybrouck 2014). In 
the Netherlands, interethnic contact has decreased over the last f ifteen 
years, especially between people from Moroccan or Turkish descent and 
21 Muslim women involved in Dutch migrant women’s organizations similarly respond in this 
way (cf. Roggeband 2010). 
22 For an analysis of the climate of Islamophobia in The Netherlands, cf. Ineke van der Valk (2012). 
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the so-called autochthonous population.23 Overall, the income position of 
non-Western migrants is a third lower than of Dutch natives. Unemploy-
ment of non-Western immigrants and their children is considerably higher 
than of ‘autochtonous’ Dutch, and this does not improve for the younger 
generation. Poverty is widespread, especially among the Moroccan commu-
nity.24 Detailed analysis shows that migrants with the same characteristics 
as natives have less chances of f inding (permanent) work, and this also 
counts for higher education graduates. Several recent studies show that ‘an 
applicant’s ethnic background plays a role in selection decisions’ (Statistics 
Netherlands 2013: 198, 184).25
The government counters these negative developments with an equal 
rights discourse and by equally applying neoliberal ‘activation’ techniques 
to all parts of the population (cf. Chapter 1). Willem Schinkel and Friso 
van Houdt (2010) assess that the Netherlands is currently one of the most 
23 Netherlands Institute for Social Research 2012a: 132. In 2013, the ‘Turkish group comprises 
almost 400.000 persons, the Moroccan group roughly 370.000’ (Statistics Netherlands 2013: 192) 
‘In 2009 the total Dutch population was 16,405,399 of which 13,189,983 (80%) were considered as 
autochthonous Dutch (note that anybody with one or two parents born abroad is not considered 
autochthonous). About 1 million inhabitants are of Muslim descent’ (Anja van Heelsum 2008: 8). 
Almost all people of Turkish and Moroccan origin living in The Netherlands ‘regard themselves 
as Muslim’ (Netherlands Institute for Social Research 2012b: 179) and religious self-identif ication 
is almost as high in the second generation as in the f irst generation (185). 
24 The difference in unemployment increased during the recent years of economic crisis, as a 
report of Statistics Netherlands (2013) shows. For migrant groups in the Netherlands unemploy-
ment, since 2008 has risen sharply, and in 2012 is more than three times as high as for the ‘native 
Dutch population’: 16 per cent of them are unemployed, compared with 5 per cent of native 
Dutch (183). Migrant youth unemployment – age 15-24 years – is high, approaching 30 percent, 
with Moroccans reaching 37 percent (183, 197). While almost half of young Dutch natives have 
flexible jobs instead of permanent ones, this is the case for two-thirds of migrant groups. In total, 
non-western migrants are six times more likely to be dependent on social assistance benef it 
than Dutch natives (i.e. 2 per cent), with 9 per cent of the Turkish group and 14 per cent of the 
Moroccan receiving social assistance benef it – many women and people aged over 45 years 
among them. One in f ive non-Western migrants, and one in four non-Western children live in a 
poor household; for the Dutch natives this concerns respectively 5 and 7 per cent (191). Fewer than 
half of Moroccan migrants aged between 15 and 65 are in paid work and ‘youth unemployment is 
very high, especially among those who have left senior secondary vocational education without 
a basic qualif ication. Moroccans are also the group where unemployment has risen fastest in 
the Netherlands in recent years. Many members of the Moroccan group receive social assistance 
benef it and poverty is widespread’ (193). However, there is also a growing group of women and 
men from Moroccan background who are doing well in terms of education and profession.
25 In the Netherlands in 2012, 46 per cent of non-Western women were in paid work, with 60 per 
cent of their male counterparts; for the ‘Dutch natives’ the f igures are 63% and 76% respectively 
(Statistics Netherlands 2013: 187). Migrant women’s participation in labour has increased during 
the last ten years.
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‘neoliberalized’ Western European countries and a forerunner in disman-
tling the welfare state and in the burial of multiculturalism (Schinkel and 
Van Houdt 2010: 697). The population is increasingly regulated as a set of 
‘entrepreneurial selves’, i.e. as persons who have to manage themselves 
and who are responsible for their own success or failure (cf. Chapter 1). 
‘Activation’ programs, such as courses to improve people’s job application 
skills and enhance their ‘employability’, and radical cuts in social benefits 
for those who do not actively seek work or develop skills, are equally applied. 
Unemployment has become an individual failure, while migrants of all 
generations have no equal chances at all due to their discrimination on 
the job market.26 Christian Joppke (2007) characterizes the new Dutch 
integration policies in terms of a ‘repressive liberalism’ that increasingly 
marks Western European states, and that coerces migrants ‘to release their 
self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an alternative to redistribution 
and public welfare […] seeking to make people both self-suff icient and 
autonomous by illiberal means’ (Joppke 2007: 16).27
The neoliberal approach of ‘responsibilizing’ people is extra disadvanta-
geous for migrant groups (cf. Van Baar 2012) as is also clear from its effects 
in the school system and in healthcare. The current Dutch school system 
can be characterized as a tricky combination of disciplining and neoliberal 
governance: a neoliberal ‘responsibilizing’ approach of children is paired 
with an intense monitoring and a negative categorizing of all those who 
fall behind.28 From a very early age, children are trained and supposed to 
behave as an ‘entrepreneurial self’, with skills such as coordination, self- and 
time-management, and cost-benefit calculation (see Chapter 1). Those who 
are (construed as) failing to do so are often boys, and more often boys from 
migrant backgrounds. It is quite common in the Netherlands to signal a 
‘boys problem’, due to a ‘feminization’ of education: it is said that the boys 
cannot identify with the almost all female staff in primary schools applying 
feminine values.
26 Schinkel and van Houdt (2010) distinguish between a ‘repressive’ and ‘facilitating’ neolib-
eral responsibilization, the f irst concerning the migrant population, the latter concerning the 
indigenous population. From the analyses presented in my earlier chapters on the constraining 
sides of neoliberal governmentality, I would rather speak in terms of different forms of coercive 
responsibilization of both groups (cf. Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 708).
27 Saskia Bonjour and Doutje Lettinga (2012) discuss important differences, however, between 
national models of migrant integration regarding Islamic headscarves and civic integration 
abroad policies.
28 A documentary that criticizes the Dutch school system in terms of feminization, in fact 
clearly shows the neo-liberal disciplining character of the school system; cf. ‘De echte jongens 
f ilm’, http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/1373349 (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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However, the real problem is not so much the school’s ‘feminization’, but 
rather its disciplining type of neoliberalization and boys rebelling more 
than girls against the system’s compulsory aspects. The school system works 
as a funnel with two exits, one for the normal, and one for those who are 
construed as ‘falling short’ and who, at a very young age, are relegated to 
several kinds of lower-level education. Due to the system’s individualizing, 
‘responsibilizing’ approach, especially migrant children with illiterate 
parents have no hope of equal chances. They lack the parental support 
in planning and helping with their homework, and they do not have their 
assignments written for them – as often happens with children from a 
white, middle-class background.
Moreover, schools are increasingly segregated in the cities, which also 
affects the chances of migrant children in negative ways. Former ‘compre-
hensive schools’, which offered many levels of secondary education, are 
today split between educational institutions that offer artisan schooling and 
vocational training and more academic establishments, including the top 
level ‘gymnasia’ schools. The director of the only remaining comprehensive 
school in Amsterdam is regularly forced to confront board members, parents 
and staff wanting to ‘uncouple’ the several academic streams in her school 
from the rest.29 Another secondary school in Amsterdam recently turned 
its lower education department into an ‘art class’ so as to be able to refuse 
lower-class migrant youth from enrolling. Most students of the – almost all 
white – University of Amsterdam have no contacts, let alone friendships, 
with people from Muslim background. ‘Non-white’ students generally have a 
hard time in this university. For example, one Surinamese student reported 
that university security guards follow him whenever he enters a university 
building.
Some Dutch-Moroccan and -Turkish youth are able to compensate for 
their discrimination in the school system at early age by embarking on the 
‘long route,’ moving step by step into higher education (Crul 2008).30 An 
18-year-old Dutch-Moroccan boy nicknamed ‘Dotty’, who pays his grand-
mother rent for living with her, works till 4 am in the vegetable market and 
then goes to adult education 9 am because he is determined to work his 
way up the school system.
29 Personal communication, July 2014.
30 ‘(T)hey started out in lower vocational education, moved on to middle vocational education, 
then to higher vocational education and some continue into University […] About half of the 
second generation Turkish youth in higher education took this long route’ (Crul 2008: 7).
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While an increasing number of Muslim migrants’ children – especially 
girls from Moroccan background31 – are entering higher education, a major-
ity are still allocated to lower-level schools. In particular, Dutch-Moroccan 
boys are rebelling against the disciplinary aspects of the school system 
– with its selective funnel character – to the point that they drop out and 
follow the neoliberal message32 of seeking their own success, but they do so 
via criminal activities: 60 per cent of them have been in contact with the 
police as a result of the street culture they have developed. These habits 
usually end around the age of 22, when they are supposed to start leading 
a ‘normal’ life and settle down (cf. Statistics Netherlands 2008).33 According 
to Frans Bovenkerk (2014), the criminality rates of Moroccan boys in the 
Netherlands are much higher than in other Western European countries, 
due to the boys’ lack of a positive father f igure; that is to say, many of their 
fathers have been receiving social welfare in the Netherlands since the 1980s 
due to the economic crisis. But their behaviour seems more linked to the 
general Dutch ‘boys problem’, i.e. to the prevailing neoliberal ‘grid’ of the 
Dutch education system and the general style of thought and imagination 
(cf. Chapter 1).
A similar program of neoliberal responsibilization has taken over the 
healthcare system. It is now common to categorize people using ‘health 
literacy’ criteria, meaning their ability to obtain, understand, and ap-
ply information about health issues. To economize the expenditures of 
healthcare, people are increasingly supposed to monitor their own health, 
consult websites, decide whether to take tests or not and judge when it is 
appropriate to visit a doctor. Healthcare workers are now trained to cope 
with the ‘health illiterate’ – about 30 per cent of the population – mostly 
people who grew up without schooling, many of whom are from immigrant 
groups of less developed countries.34 Doctors are supposed to reinforce 
prevention and self-management among these groups in order to make 
the healthcare system more eff icient and less expensive. With e-health on 
31 Muslim girls who pursue further studies are under less possible pressure from their family, 
for instance to marry young. Reaching economic independence as well widens their possibilities. 
32 With thanks to Fatima Ballah. 
33 Cf. Jan Dirk de Jong (2007) for a f ield study on the street culture of Moroccan youth groups 
in Dutch cities.
34 With thanks to Marga Vintges, medical doctor and senior researcher at Pharos (Dutch center 
of expertise on health disparities). In spite of all neoliberal cuts and reorganizations, many 
doctors still try to provide a humane type of care. In 2015, 70 per cent of the 9,000 family doctors 
successfully boycotted the health insurance companies that forced them to sign contracts 
against their will (among others on the type of drugs to prescribe and on which specialists or 
labs to send their patients to).
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the rise, and the development of health apps for tablets and smart phones, 
people will be increasingly encouraged to monitor their own blood pressure, 
blood sugar level, and so on, making the gap between the ‘health literate’ 
and the ‘health il-literate’ even wider.
The ‘health illiteracy’ of the people at stake is only one of their many 
‘shortcomings’ linked to their ‘low-educated’ status and resulting in their 
generally disadvantaged position in a society that increasingly organizes and 
promotes a specif ic type of personhood, i.e. the successful, self-regulating 
individual with marketable skills. Another example is the citizenship tests 
for new immigrants. To successfully prepare and pass the test, immigrants 
must undertake all kinds of complicated, expensive, and bureaucratic 
initiatives. Far from being neutral, this procedure already requires many 
skills, and ultimately excludes from citizenship ‘certain “weaker” groups in 
society, such as traumatized refugees, women in disadvantaged positions, 
the elderly, and people with no, or only a limited educational background, 
such as illiterates’ (cf. Van Oers 2013). Immigrants are supposed to not only 
have knowledge of ‘Dutch values’, but to identify with them as well: a recent 
government report on integration demands that immigrants ‘internalize’ 
Dutch values, such as an inner acceptance of homosexuality (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment 2013). This tendency can be analyzed in 
general terms as the culturalization of citizenship that is taking place all 
over Europe. Schinkel and van Houdt (2010) speak of a ‘neoliberal com-
munitarianism’ in this regard: a formal citizenship, with the right to be 
different in cultural and moral respects, is increasingly being replaced by 
a cultural citizenship comprising (neo)liberal values and models of person-
hood (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 704).
Especially the wearing of a headscarf raises a lot of hostility towards 
Muslim girls and women in Western Europe today. Not only the French are 
convinced that Muslim women should be rescued by law from the headscarf, 
which they see as a symbol of oppression, but across Western Europe there is 
much confusion about the ‘issue’, also among ‘feminists’.35 In what follows, 
I briefly discuss the ‘issue’ from the theoretical perspectives developed in 
earlier chapters of this study, exploring women’s various subject-positions 
(Cf. Chapters 1 and 2).
Mahmood  (2005), in reference to Foucault’s concept of ethical self-
formation, explains how for orthodox Muslim women, wearing a veil is a 
35 Scott (2007), John Bowen (2008), Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008), and Jansen (2013) give 
extensive overviews of the debate in France that led to its legal ban in public primary and 
secondary schools in 2004. 
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ritual to perform in the context of their self-cultivation. Foucault’s concept 
of ethical self-techniques captures the ‘repeated bodily acts,’ by which 
Muslim believers train their ‘memory, desire and intellect to behave ac-
cording to established standards of conduct’ (214). From this approach the 
meaning of the veil can be identif ied as a ‘ritual practice of performative 
behavior’ (23).
As one of Mahmood’s interviewees comments:
I used to think that even though shyness [al-ḥayā’] was required of us by 
God, if I acted shyly it would be hypocritical [nifāq] because I didn’t actu-
ally feel it inside of me. Then one day, in reading verse 25 of the Chapter 
[al-Qaşaş] [“The Story”] I realized that shyness [al-ḥayā’] was among the 
good deeds [huwwa min al-a’māl al-şaliḥa] and given my natural lack of 
shyness [al-ḥayā’], I had to make or create it f irst. I realized that making 
[şana‛] it in yourself is not hypocrisy, and that eventually your inside 
learns to have [al-ḥayā’] too (156).
Wearing the veil emerges as a ritual gesture and exercise: by wearing it, 
‘your inside learns to feel shy without the veil, and if you take it off, your 
entire being feels uncomfortable [mish rāḍī] about it’ (157).
While to orthodox Muslim women the veil is one of Islam’s basic rituals 
‘forms’, others point out that veiling is not explicitly prescribed anywhere in 
the Qur’an. Barlas (2008b) argues: ‘many Muslims think they are authentic 
Muslims if they are dressed in Saudi style. But the Quran at the universal 
level does not prescribe the dress code of a given society, but merely ad-
vocates general principles as sexual restraint and mutual respect’ (Barlas 
2008b). In the same vein, Ahmed (1992) points out that: ‘Verse 24: 31-32 just 
instructs women to guard their private parts and throw a scarf over their 
bosoms’ (Ahmed 1992: 55).
Muslim women wear all sorts of different clothes, and their headscarves 
vary as well, in shape and colour, thus comprising different ‘forms’, and as 
such different modes of thought (cf. Chapter 2; Moors 2013). When Joan 
Scott (2007) takes veiling as simply an expression of Muslim traditions 
(cf. Scott 2007: 181), she implies that the veil or headscarf is a f ixed symbol 
of meaning, and overlooks the variety of meanings that veiling involves, due 
to women’s different subject-positions in relation to this ‘form’, including 
their reworking it.
When the veil is imposed on women by law, as, for example, is the case 
in Iran – with women testing these laws by pushing their headscarves as 
far back as possible – and recently in the so-called Islamic state in the 
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territory of Iraq and Syria – where women are heavily intimidated and 
punished if they do not cover themselves – women’s agency obviously 
is extremely limited. Imposing the veil on women can happen as well 
in other collective settings. Jansen (2013) refers, in this regard, to French 
author Samira Belil, whose Dans l’enfer des tournantes (2003) is ‘a moving 
account of her escape from a ghetto where women, particularly those 
dressed in a Western style and non-veiled, were assaulted on a daily basis’ 
(Jansen 2013: 307). In such conditions of pressure and punishment, the 
meaning of the headscarf is overdetermined as compulsory decency and 
protection from / of male sexuality, i.e. as a practice of ‘Othering’ women 
as sexual beings (cf. Chapter 2).
Veiling in orthodox circles as discussed by Mahmood (2005), instead 
emerges as a self-technique or ritual practice in the context of Muslim 
women’s self-cultivation in a code-oriented moral system (cf. Chapter 1). In 
different contexts, the meaning of the veil has yet other meanings. To many 
Muslim women in Morocco, as Ennaji and Sadiqi (2006) contend, wearing 
the veil allows for ‘greater movement through public space, as veiled women 
have access to the public space while remaining symbolically in private 
space’ (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006: 92). In Western European contexts as well, 
Muslim women use the veil to increasingly transgress the public-private 
space dichotomy of Islamic traditions.
Buitelaar (2006) discusses the ‘life story’36 of a Dutch-Moroccan female 
politician who attained a high position in the Dutch administration. While 
her identity as a Muslim woman is important to her, wearing a headscarf 
allows her to combine and organize her experiences of intersectionality. 
Fashioning the headscarf in new ways enables her to demonstrate to 
Dutch as well as Moroccan audiences ‘that she participates in public 
spheres in the Netherlands without renouncing either her religion or 
femininity’ (Buitelaar 2006: 272).37 But wearing a headscarf also involves 
an outspoken political critique. Representing herself as a ‘Muslim girl 
with a headscarf, brains and a big mouth,’ is her answer to the dominant 
image in Dutch society of the oppressed Muslim woman. But it is her 
answer, too, to an orthodox Islamic discourse that expects Muslim women 
36 Buitelaar  (2006) especially applies the concept of the ‘dialogical self,’ of Hubert Her-
mans (2001), referring to the person’s use of a self-narrative to integrate its multiple I-positions, 
emotions and self-representations, that are given with the several groups and categories to 
which it belongs.
37 Other studies likewise show that Muslim women use the headscarf to reconcile multiple 
identities. E.g. Fadwa El-Guindi (1999), Willy Jansen (1998), Buitelaar (2014).
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and girls to be obedient, caring, and modest, and avoid the public sphere. 
She states:
[Y]ou can find me engaged in a debate with three men at 11 o’clock at night. 
Does that look like I’m being oppressed? Well no, actually it doesn’t. I am 
the living proof – not only I, but all those girls are the living proof – that 
all those ideas we used to have in the past about women and headscarves 
were just a lot of nonsense. […] What I do is challenge society. If you ask 
me, I am the ultimate challenge (265).
This woman’s life-story shows how wearing a headscarf as a ritual ‘form’ is 
reworked by Muslim women today, in the shape of a self-technique in the 
context of a freedom practice. While she later stepped out of the political 
arena, she certainly challenges and changes tradition by living her life as a 
pious woman, working outside the home. Many other Muslim women do so, 
by working, and sometimes by being single and not married. Muslim women 
in Western Europe challenge patriarchal traditions by simply leading their 
lives, a fact that is overlooked by many, including many ‘feminists’.
While Badinter often refers to Beauvoir as her ‘spiritual mother’, and 
claims that her views on the headscarf are totally ‘dans la lignée de Beauvoir’ 
(Long 2013; cf. Rodgers 1995), it can be questioned whether Beauvoir would 
agree, given her situational approach of ethics (cf. Vintges forthcoming).38 
In a concluding chapter, Beauvoir’s solidarity with Algerian freedom fighter 
Djamila Boupacha will be discussed as an example of a cross-cultural 
feminist coalitional politics. The f inal section of this chapter, meanwhile, 
discusses some cross-cultural feminist media strategies.
Cross-cultural Feminist Media Strategies: Some Examples
Muslim women and girls in the West are very present on the internet, as 
they are in North Africa and the Middle East. In Western Europe, they 
are active across a variety of different social media platforms. They visit 
websites on religious issues, but also, for instance, sites on beautiful-hijab-
muslim-fashion-trends. The Happy Muslim Videos, launched from the UK, 
Germany, the States, and Iran, with Muslim youth, boys and girls, dancing 
38 Badinter routinely positions herself as Beauvoir’s spiritual heir, among others during her 
lecturing tours across Western Europe. Long (2013), in addition to discussing Badinter’s ideas 
in this respect, gives an extensive account of Badinter’s active support of the headscarf ban.
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to Pharrell Williams’ record Happy, were a success, with almost two million 
hits for the original British version alone.39
In the Netherlands, in 2006, an Islamic Women’s Manifest (IW/M) was 
released to the press, by Dutch Muslim feminist organization Al Nisa, 
publicly denouncing the wrongful image of Muslim women and raising 
awareness about the equality of Muslim men and women according to 
Islam (cf. Pektas-Weber 2007).40
In 2010, Al Nisa successfully launched a ‘real Dutch’ campaign, spreading 
posters via the internet with a view to replacing negative stereotypes of 
Muslim women. While anti-Islam populist politician Geert Wilders had 
targeted headscarves as ‘head-rags’ and had proposed imposing an annual 
tax for wearing them, his threat ‘they are a raw deal for me’ was ironically 
countered by a poster of a Muslim woman eating a raw herring, a ubiquitous 
Dutch habit.41
Cross-cultural feminist media strategies are important for changing 
the dominant Western media frame of the oppressed Muslim woman. 
Mir-Hosseini and British f ilm maker Kim Longinotto together made 
two documentaries on women’s strategies for coping with patriarchy in 
Iran, Divorce Iranian Style (1997) and Runaway (2008), broadcast widely 
at festivals and on Western television.42 In the same vein, was Dutch f ilm 
maker Bregtje van der Haak’s documentary Satellite Queens (2008), about 
the talkshow on Saudi satellite channel MBC, Kalam Nawaem – ‘sweet’ or 
‘soft talk’ in English.
Featuring four hostesses from four different Middle Eastern countries, 
Kalam Nawaem purportedly reaches 45 million (male and female) view-
ers in 22 countries. Its four hostesses discuss lifestyle, cultural, and social 
issues, in a reinterpretation of Islamic heritage from a women’s empow-
erment perspective. The four talkshow hostesses have reached celebrity 
status and function as role models to many. Their self-presentation in the 
documentary, however, is one of being average, believing Muslim women 
39 For more versions: see https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=happy+muslims+
For the Dutch version: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iotR7apCYxo, The Iranian version 
was forbidden and the dancers were prosecuted (last accessed, 21 September 2016) . 
40 The action was inspired by the f irst International Congress on Islamic Feminism, in 
Barcelona, 27 October 2005.
41 The posters are downloadable so as to be spread in schools, off ices and workplaces. The 
campaign was reported on in international Muslim newsletters; it was spread as well in Muslim 
groups in Germany (with German versions of the posters) and in New York in the English version 
represented here. 
42 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBm8GqMNwXU and https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MbsVbyRGqL8 (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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who fully participate in society, and who are self-conscious, modern, and 
beautiful. The documentary zooms in on the personal ethical life projects 
of these women, conveying egalitarian effects. As a consequence of the 
documentary, the talkshow was broadcast weekly on an Amsterdam televi-
sion channel, the hostesses were regularly interviewed in Dutch newspapers 
and became celebrities in the Netherlands as well.43
Another example is the work of Spanish photographer and f ilmmaker 
Nuria Andreu, who gathered photographs from the photo albums of Muslim 
immigrant women in Belgium and the Netherlands to counter the lack of 
such images in archives and photographic institutes. In cooperation with 
the members of the intercultural research project ‘Women and Islam: New 
Perspectives’, she produced the documentary Moroccan Women Today: 
New Perspectives, which gives voice to a number of Moroccan women who 
develop new visions on their position in society (Andreu and Vintges 2013). 
More media strategies are necessary to change the dominant ‘picture’ of 
Muslim women in the West, considering the signif icant role the media play 
today, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
43 For a discussion of the role of media celebrities as ‘political personae,’ see Vintges (2016).
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Forged-Iron Cooperative, Morocco (2008)
Photographer: Nuria Andreu 
© Andreu, Núria. Forged Iron Cooperative. ARFEDEC (Association de Recherche pour le Development et 
la Cooperation). tetouan, maroc. 2008

4 The Battle of Myths
Patriarchal power patterns turn out to be more resilient than Beauvoir 
presumed. But what is the ‘bottleneck’ today that keeps processes of change 
from definitely heading in egalitarian directions? In terms of our metaphor 
of a multi-headed monster, we argued that its ‘immortal’ head, which must 
still be defeated, is the ‘presentational’ realm of rite, art, and myth that 
conveys ideas not in a grammatical scheme of expression, but in the shape 
of ‘forms’, i.e. holistic ‘pictures’ or patterns that currently seem to be most 
resilient to change. Struggles within each of these realms are necessary 
in order to replace these dominant ‘forms’ that, in their arrangements of 
elements, or picturing of a ‘relational order of things’ (Langer 1960: 59), 
articulate a power asymmetry between the sexes.
The previous chapter discussed the multiple voices of the gender egali-
tarian movement of Muslim women. Muslim women today are involved 
in freedom practices in the religious realm that involve ‘keys’ of rite and 
verbal language, thus re-articulating beliefs and idea(l)s that matter deeply 
to Muslim women and men. But what is the dominant face of the hydra’s 
‘presentational’ head in the West today? And do we f ind women’s freedom 
practices in this realm as well?
Discussing in particular popular culture, I will argue that media-hypes 
today fulf il the role of mythical tales, which, in the words of Langer (1960), 
are dream-narratives, made of dream-material, i.e. images and fantasies. 
According to her, ‘(t)he Gods have their twilight, the heroes are forgotten; 
but though mythology has been a passing phase in man’s mental history, 
the epic lives on, side by side with philosophy and science and all the higher 
forms of thought’ (165). But while to Langer, the heyday of mythology is over, 
as its epic has passed into ‘a new symbolic mode, the mode of art ’ (165), 
popular culture today suggests otherwise.
Art historian Camille Paglia, in her 700-page study Sexual Personae (1990) 
– ‘personae’ meaning characters in a play or public setting – argues that the 
Hollywood stars of the 1930s revived pagan myth. Western popular culture 
and especially Hollywood restored ‘the pagan pantheon of physically perfect, 
openly sexual gods and goddesses’ (Paglia 2013: 2). The creation of ‘glamour’ 
in early Hollywood had magical properties, since ‘ordinary men and women 
were turned into divinities by the vast machinery of the star system’ (3). 
In subsequent books, Paglia analyses other media ‘celebrities’ in similar 
terms, going into the ‘sexual personae’ of, among others, Elizabeth Taylor, 
Judy Garland, Princess Diana, Barbara Streisand, and Madonna – the latter 
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being her favourite (Paglia 1992, 1994). Since popular culture – expressed in 
the popular media, such as advertisements, magazines, popular television, 
mainstream f ilm, and internet – sidesteps politically correct feminists and 
other liberal censors, according to Paglia, it speaks the truth: popular media 
tell us what is, and not what should be.
Erving Goffman (1976), in a similar vein, assumes that popular culture 
tells us who we are. In his well-known study Gender Advertisements (1976), 
Goffman looks at the different representations of men and women in 
advertisements, pointing out that their apparent normality tells us some-
thing about ourselves: gender advertisements are to Goffman the most 
concentrated form of our contemporary ‘gender codes’.1 While Goffman 
uses advertisements for a diagnosis of the time, specif ically for a diagnosis 
of who men and women are, in a similar vein, I will use popular f ilms for 
a gender diagnosis of the present. I specif ically look at the f ive f ilms of 
The Twilight Saga, which caused a ‘hype’ among girls and women, for a 
diagnosis of today’s collective ‘dream-narratives’. Do current Hollywood-
hypes still only comprise men’s fantasies, and do girls and women in that 
sense ‘still dream through men’s dreams’ – in the words of Beauvoir? 
(Beauvoir 2010: 166).
Capitalizing on Paglia’s approach – and partly on Beauvoir’s, as we will 
see – I take current Hollywood-hypes as the new face of the mythical genre. 
From this perspective, the leading characters in the Twilight ‘hype’ can be 
discussed as mythical sexual personae, and the Twilight hype as one of the 
mythical tales of our time that through its ‘visual forms’ spread its ideas on 
a mass scale (cf. Chapter 2).
‘Presentational forms’ can be studied in a variety of ways, so Langer 
claims (cf. Langer 1960: Preface). While in her own view they are rooted 
in man’s natural activity of symbolic transformation and ultimately in 
man’s fantasy, to Lévi-Strauss myths are secular stories that are strongly 
structured in terms of the constitutive, essentially binary, structures of 
any society. As discussed, Beauvoir historicizes Lévi-Strauss’ approach, 
suggesting that new myths will emerge, expressing new, non-hierarchical 
relationships between the sexes. Her approach in this respect comes close 
to a Foucauldian one, which takes all discourses, including mythical nar-
ratives, as crystallizing and developing over time, and this also includes 
ethical practices of freedom – re-articulated by us in terms of distinct sets 
of critically creative ethical life projects. Comprising new concepts and 
1 ‘Gender codes’ to him are ingrained cultural signals that make us position people in the 
categories male / female.
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models for self and society, in various ‘keys’, freedom practices equally 
emerge at a certain time and cannot be forced or simply be made to 
happen.
Do we f ind any slow movements at the mythical level of collective 
dream-narratives that take place under the radar, so to speak? Have freedom 
practices emerged in this realm, are women and girls involved in processes 
of change?
In search for an answer to these questions, I will f irst examine the cur-
rent ‘post-feminist’ climate in the West and its new dominant model of 
womanhood, in the shape of a female sexual agent. Does she represent a new 
liberating moment, or is she the newest face of an old male projection, i.e. 
the newest version of the old myths of Woman? To answer to this question, I 
f irst explore the classic myths of Woman as analysed in the work of Beauvoir 
and Paglia. Next, I will focus on some mythical tales and sexual personae of 
our time, so as to answer the question whether the new female sexual agent 
of today is a recycling of old myths or a new liberating mythical f igure. As 
argued above, I specif ically examine the dream-narrative of the Twilight 
hype that moves masses of girls and women today. What story does it tell 
and which sexual personae does it present? Is Paglia right that the old myths 
of femininity will always pop up, or is Beauvoir right in her prediction that 
change will take place?
Super Woman Revisited
The concept of ‘post-feminism’ has a variety of meanings, ranging from a 
backlash to feminism, to an academic perspective of postmodern anti-foun-
dationalism, to the pastness of feminism as such (cf. Gill and Scharff 2011: 3), 
McRobbie (2004) articulates the concept in yet another sense; namely, in 
terms of a current entanglement of feminist and anti-feminist elements. 
Processes of liberalization today are intrinsically intertwined with neo-
conservative values. The popular Bridget Jones books and movies illustrate 
how feminism today is both taken into account while at the same time 
‘f iercely repudiated’ (McRobbie 2004: 255). A desperate 30-year-old, sexually 
liberated Bridget, secretly dreams of a traditional wedding that would rescue 
her from her demanding working life as a single woman. While Bridget is 
totally aware that this is not how young women today are supposed to think, 
she – and the audience with her – escapes this censorious politics and freely 
enjoys that which is disapproved of: ‘feminism is invoked in order that it is 
relegated to the past’ (262).
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To more fully understand what is going on, McRobbie argues that we need 
Foucault’s concept of neoliberal governmentality in the sense of a ‘day-to-
day’ organizing of people’s behaviour ‘at a distance’ (McRobbie 2011b: 180; 
cf. Chapter  1). Current neoliberal governmentality also involves a new 
gender logic or even a new ‘sexual contract’. Women and girls are provided 
with sexual freedoms and with all kinds of opportunities for achievement in 
education and employment. But, as part of the same package, ‘modes of pa-
triarchal retrenchment have been digging in, as these conditions of freedom 
are tied to conditions of social conservatism, consumerism and hostility 
to feminism in any of its old or newer forms’ (McRobbie 2011a: xi). The new 
sexual contract allows young women and girls to earn their own wages, 
provided that they prioritize consuming and spend their wages on fashion 
and beauty. It organizes their ‘consumer-citizenship’ (McRobbie 2008: 90), 
omitting ‘any encouragement to a more active form of political participa-
tion’ (McRobbie 2011b: 182).
French writers’ collective Tiqqun, in Raw Materials for a Theory of the 
Young-Girl (2010), discusses the Young-Girl in similar terms. She symbolizes 
the total and sovereign consumer that is ‘good for nothing but consuming; 
leisure or work, it makes no difference’ (Tiqqun 2010: 2). The Young-Girl is 
someone who ‘resembles her photo’ (7), she does not love but only ‘loves 
herself loving’ (20). The new social organization of consumption and seduc-
tion has freed women and youth, the slaves of the past, only to meet the 
demands of mass consumption: it has ‘freed them AS SLAVES’ (2).
Beauvoir, in line with her critique on the neoliberal ‘Organization Man’, 
criticized the model of personhood of ‘Super Woman’ ( femme totale), who 
aims to ‘be successful at all levels’ (Beauvoir 2011: 226; Chapter 1). In a similar 
vein, McRobbie (2015) introduces the notion of the perfect woman, i.e. the 
neoliberal woman or girl who is perfect in all realms of life. Facebook’s 
board member Sheryl Sandberg, in her book Lean In (2013), advises women 
on how to succeed in business while having a family life. Anne Marie 
Slaughter, in a famous newspaper article entitled ‘Why Women Still Can’t 
Have It All’ (2012), vice versa argues for women to reaff irm their commit-
ment to their family while pursuing a career. Catherine Rottenberg (2013) 
concludes that both Sandberg’s and Slaughter’s approaches are phrased in 
the same neoliberal feminist language: both address women in competitive 
individualist terms, and encourage them to pursue career success, but also 
a succesful family life.
In the words of McRobbie (2015), being a Super Woman – ‘having it all – 
demands ‘an inner-directed self-competitiveness’ next to ‘an outer-directed 
competition or antagonism towards other women’ (McRobbie 2015: 14). 
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The ‘perfect’ as a horizon of expectation involves an increase in levels of 
(self) competition, triggering economic growth, innovation, and a more 
entrepreneurial outlook, and pathologizing failure, since if one is not 
excellent one can only be, at best, mediocre. McRobbie signals a new 
‘competitive femininity’ with ‘older reprehensible features of traditional 
female culture being reactivated and having new life breathed into them’ 
(McRobbie 2015: 9, cf. 7, 15). The ‘neoliberal feminism’ of today, which wants 
women to lean in, has done away with social critique and solidarity.
While McRobbie (2008) speaks of a new ‘sexual contract’ on neoliberal 
terms, Oksala (2013) argues that neoliberal governmentality no longer needs 
any ‘sexual contract’ due to its increasing commodif ication and marketi-
zation of domestic and care-work. It no longer needs ‘feminine’ subjects 
who surrender their self-interest to the well-being of their husbands and 
children: ‘the self-interest of particular women can now be bought relatively 
easily with the subordination and exploitation of others’ (Oksala 2013: 42). 
Women today, like men, increasingly function as egoistical subjects of 
interest, making choices on the basis of rational economic calculation. 
They not only want a happy home, but ‘they too want money, power and 
success. They are atomic, autonomous subjects of interest, competing for 
the economic opportunities available’ (39).
Ladelle Mcwhorter (2013) likewise concludes, albeit from another angle, 
that the sexual contract has lost its meaning, and that many women today 
live ‘in a state of post-liberation’ (Mcwhorter 2013: 71). However, the appear-
ance of Super Woman as the perfect femme totale, shows that old heads 
of the patriarchal hydra are still alive and kicking, and are still vital to 
many women’s lives. Neoliberalism might not necessarily be patriarchal in 
character, but it converges with older features of ‘femininity’, to paraphrase 
McRobbie, culminating in a new dominant model of womanhood.
Beauvoir already outlined this new figure of Super Woman, but today she 
has yet another face. British feminists Rosalind Gill, Angela McRobbie, and 
Christina Scharff, in reference to Foucault’s concept of neoliberalism, have 
pointed to a new kind of sexualization of women and girls that is taking 
place in mainstream popular media – including social media.
Foucault’s earlier concepts of disciplining and normalization have been 
extensively used in gender studies. Bartky (1988) analysed how women’s bodies 
are disciplined into docility. They are trained to take less space than men’s bod-
ies; gesture, posture and movement and bodily comportment are restrained; 
dieting, smiling and make-up are a must and skin should be soft and smooth 
at all times. The bar of femininity is raised so high, and demands such radical 
technologies, that virtually every woman is destined to fail and consequently 
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is subjected to shame (Bartky 1988: 71). Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (1988), 
Jana Sawicki (1991), Lois McNay (1992) and Margaret A. McLaren (2002, 2004) 
similarly ‘gendered’ Foucault’s theories on the disciplining of the body.
Building on Foucault’s concept of neoliberalism, and on the work of 
authors of the ‘governmentality school’ (cf. Chapter 1), McRobbie (2004), 
Gill (2008), and Gill and Scharff (2011) analyse that what marks out the 
present, post-feminist, moment as distinctive is not only a dramatically 
increased intensity and extensiveness of the hostile surveillance of women’s 
bodies and psyche, ‘but even more fundamentally that notions of choice, 
agency and autonomy have become central to that regulatory project’ 
(Gill 2008: 443). Television make-over shows, women’s magazines, adver-
tising campaigns, and billboards organize women’s self-regulation ‘at a 
distance’, to act in accordance with the model of the new female sexual 
agent that they spread. Gill identif ies this model that emerged in the media 
over the last decade as the new face of neoliberal woman, a new f igure 
‘constructed to sell to women: a young, attractive, heterosexual woman 
who knowingly and deliberately plays with her sexual power and is always 
‘‘up for’’ sex […] an increasingly globalized f igure who appears in different 
transnational sites in magazines like Cosmopolitan’ (437).
Gill, in reference to Rose (1990), assesses the new female sexual agent that 
has emerged involves a neoliberal, postfeminist moment of ‘governing the soul 
(cf. 443). Rather than a remoulding of the body, we face a remaking of women’s 
subjectivity; women are no longer sexually objectified, they are sexually ‘sub-
jectified’ (cf. 440). It is not just that women should look nice, or even that they 
are entirely judged on their looks. But more fundamentally ‘a particular kind 
of beauty and sexiness has become a prerequisite for subjecthood itself ’ (440). 
Women’s autonomy, choice, and self-improvement today ‘sit side-by-side with 
surveillance, discipline and the vilif ication of those who make the “wrong” 
“choices” (e.g. become too fat, too thin or have the audacity or bad judgment 
to grow older)’ (442). Gill concludes that we deal with a remaking of female 
subjectivity, in terms of a ‘compulsory (sexual) agency’ (440).
In a similar vein, Bauer (2015), in a discussion of the current sexual hook-
up culture among American college students, speaks of women’s sexual 
‘self-objectif ication’. She notices how her female students choose to spend 
their weekend evenings ‘giving unreciprocated blow-jobs to drunken frat 
boys,’ enjoying the sense of power it gives them (Bauer 2015: 10). In reference 
to Beauvoir’s argument in The Second Sex that women often consented with 
their role as bodily Other (Beauvoir 2010: 10; cf. Chapter 2), Bauer argues that 
women should resist an ‘allure to self-objectif ication.’ Whereas Bauer points 
to the girls’ behaviour in terms of their choices, from Gill’s perspective their 
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behaviour emerges as a compulsory sexual agency, reflecting their ‘sexual 
subjectif ication’ in a post-feminist-neoliberal area.
Super Woman, who must be perfect and successful in all realms of life, 
today is supposed to be sexy as well. Girls and women, including women 
professionals like lawyers, CEOs and consultants, are advised to dress in 
sexy ways. A website with tips on ‘how to not dress boring to work’ advises 
‘all those sexy women who rule the world’ to do so ‘in bright lips, sky high 
heels and outf its that can go from 9 am to late dinner cocktails. The TIP is 
always in the posh fabulous heels.’2 If women and girls decide not to comply 
2 http://thefashiontag.com/2014/05/05/7-off ice-wear-ideas-how-to-not-dress-boring-to-work/ 
(last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Lady Foucault (2011)
Author: Joseph Guillermo
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with the new norm of sexiness, they run the risk of being neglected, or even 
f ired. As blogger ‘Abbeysbooks’– a pseudonym for feminist f ilm critic Janet 
Abbey – comments: ‘men today only see the signs that say hot: make-up; 
hair color bright of course; designer clothes; higher than high heels, so read 
hyper high stilettos; cleavage and well you get the idea I am sure. Scrub it all 
off and they think she is plain, not worth the attention’ (Abbeysbooks n.d.).
The dominant image of sexiness that girls and women identify with, 
surely affects their own hopes and fears. Annemarie van Oosten (2015) 
shows that girls’ posting of sexy self ies on social network sites influences 
their sexual behavior and sexual self-image. Jessica Ringrose (2011) equally 
shows how British fourteen-year-old girls’ ‘performing slut’ on social media 
affects their identity in a negative way, involved as they are in a narrative 
of ‘servicing the phallus’ and ‘non-reciprocal’ pleasure (Ringrose 2011: 112).
While according to Gill and Scharff (2011) girls and women have to be 
sexy on penalty of not being noted at all, according to Paglia (2012), they are 
taking control of their capacity to inflame men with sexual desire, using it 
in a power play. As she expresses it in an interview in Playboy: ‘(t)he more a 
woman takes off her clothes, the more power she has’ (Paglia 1995). Women 
today have f inally understood their role: a new ‘pro-sex, pro-art, pro-beauty 
feminism,’ triumphs over the politically correct, oppressive kind of feminism 
of the 1970s and 80s, as she had predicted all along (Paglia 2012).3
British sociologist Catherine Hakim (2011), in a similar vein, calls for 
women to use their ‘erotic capital’ in the bedroom and the boardroom. 
As Hakim argues, men’s greater sexual desire leaves them frustrated, and 
women can take advantage of this in public as well as private life, bargaining 
for ‘a better deal’ (Hakim 2011: 8). According to Hakim, ‘(p)atriarchy has tried 
hard to […] control women’s public dress and behaviour. As I see it, radical 
feminism has gone down a dead-end by adopting similar ideas that belittle 
women’s allure. […] Why not champion femininity rather than abolish it? 
Why does no one encourage women to exploit men whenever they can?’ (3). 
Similarly, Dutch feminist magazine OPZIJ recommended its readers to use 
their erotic capital in the workplace, in a positive appraisal of Hakim’s book 
Honey Money – in spite of its rather alarming title.
Whereas Hakim (2011) speaks in terms of women’s ‘erotic capital’, does 
she perhaps – unintentionally – transmit that we need a Marxist analysis 
of how capitalist principles of prof it and commodif ication have reached 
3 Paglia adds that now that ‘all careers have been opened to women,’ feminism is only needed 
‘in Third World countries where women can be treated like chattel.’ In what follows I only discuss 
her stances regarding women’s positions in the West.
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women’s bodies today? According to Power (2009), the capitalist labour 
market today demands that all people be an all-round self-seller, and 
especially impels women to include their bodies as part of the package 
and expose themselves.4 Is capitalist economy currently invading women’s 
bodies?
As discussed earlier, McRobbie (2011b: 180) argues that Marxism’s con-
ceptual tools are too blunt to grasp the ways in which subjectivities, and 
especially those of women today, are restructured. Instead, a Foucauldian 
concept of neoliberalism, in terms of a ‘conduct’ of people’s conduct ‘at a 
distance’, allows for a more specif ic analysis of how women and girls are 
activated to copy and embody the new female f igure outlined above.
Foucault characterized the neoliberal homo oeconomicus as ‘entrepre-
neur of himself,’ being for himself his own capital, i.e. a source to produce 
earnings (cf. Foucault 2008: 226). He pointed out how, today, we are sup-
posed to improve our human capital – our abilities, skills, health – which 
is made up of acquired elements, alongside hereditary ones. From this 
approach, and paraphrasing Hakim (2011), it can be argued that women 
today are stimulated and advised by all kinds of experts, to improve and 
invest in, their ‘erotic capital’, as part of their human capital and, further-
more, they are advised to make the most of it. Their erotic capital can be 
seen as made up of hereditary elements, such as good genes, as well as of 
acquired components. Women and girls today are activated to optimize 
the latter, by practicing self-techniques such as constant full-body exercise, 
cosmetic surgery, wearing porn-chic fashion, and enhancing their skills 
in the sexual realm. They are stimulated to, on the basis of their own cost 
benefit calculations, make the most of their erotic capital, to enhance their 
success in all domains of life. The new female f igure that emerges is the 
woman who is an entrepreneur of her own erotic capital.
At stake is not a literal marketization of womanhood, but one being 
shaped and governed to conform to the model of the market. Neoliberalism’s 
dissemination of market-shaped systems in the social f ield, and especially 
its generalization of the model of the entrepreneurial self to every form 
of behaviour, involve an optimizing management technique of govern-
ing the population. It has converged with older forms of femininity, and 
culminated in the emergence of a new form or myth of womanhood namely’, 
4 Power (2009) in this context refers to Alain Badiou’s explanation of the hatred in the West 
against the veil: according to him, the French law on the hijab is a purely capitalist law, since it 
‘orders femininity to be exposed. In other words, having the female body circulate according 
to the market paradigm is obligatory’ (Badiou 2004).
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of Super Woman, and Super Girl, who have to manage their erotic capital 
as part of their being perfect.
Laura Harvey and Gill (2011), in their discussion of the television show 
‘The Sex Inspectors’, argue that a new female ‘sexual entrepreneur’ has 
emerged that cannot easily be judged in binary terms as either a liberated 
or a compulsory sexual agent. Others in the same volume similarly point to 
the complexity of women’s and girls’ negotiating of, and navigating between, 
sexual regulation and agency, some of them framing the new female sexual 
agency in a ‘context of persistent coercion and inequality,’ others deploying 
‘a more upbeat language of freedom and choice’ (Gill and Scharff 2011: 9).
Does the new f igure of the female sexual agent who manages her erotic 
capital, as part of her being perfect, involve a new liberating moment, or is 
she the new face of old constraining myths of femininity? For an answer 
to this question, we will f irst investigate the dominant myths of Woman 
as they were analyzed by Beauvoir (2010) and Paglia (1990).
Myths of Woman
As discussed earlier, Beauvoir’s concept of Myths covers the ‘presentational’ 
realms in terms of Langer (1960); namely, ritual religion, art, and mythi-
cal tales. In what follows, I focus on Myths in the latter sense; that is to 
say – in Langer’s terms – on mythical stories that comprise mankind’s 
collective dreams and fantasies, dealing with themes of ‘human desire 
frustrated by non-human powers, hostile oppression, or contrary desires’ 
(Langer 160: 143; cf. Chapter 2). For her analysis of mankind’s mythical tales, 
Beauvoir refers in The Second Sex to Lévi-Strauss’ thesis that the incest 
taboo – i.e. the prohibition of marriage between close relatives – marks 
the transition from nature to culture. According to Lévi-Strauss, the incest 
taboo is constitutive of society since it involves ‘exogamy’, i.e. an exchange 
of women among men, which creates the kind of alliances that society 
consists of. Lévi-Strauss saw this basic asymmetry between the sexes as 
well ref lected in the myths of mankind, which he took as the voices of 
our ancestors. In his study on myths, he analyses how they are always 
structured along binary oppositions, manifesting among others the rule 
of exogamy, which involves that ‘between groups, women are exchanged 
like foodstuffs’ (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1971: 49).
In line with Lévi-Strauss, Beauvoir argues that the mythical tales of 
mankind comprise a hierarchical relationship between men and women. 
But for the roots of this asymmetry she refers to the mechanism of Othering: 
man establishing woman as the negative of himself is, in her view, a phase 
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to be overcome (cf. Chapter 2). She thus situates the myths of mankind in 
historical perspective; namely, as developed by patriarchal society ‘for the 
end of self-justif ication’ (Beauvoir 2010: 281). Beauvoir places Lévi-Strauss’ 
f indings in a broader, historicizing framework, arguing that patriarchal 
patterns will be surpassed in a new age. She states:
After studying the diverse forms of primitive society in depth, Lévi-
Strauss could conclude: “The passage from the state of Nature to the 
state of Culture is def ined by man’s ability to think biological relations 
as systems of oppositions; duality, alternation, opposition […] are not 
so much phenomena to explain as fundamental and immediate givens 
of social reality.” These phenomena could not be understood if human 
reality were solely a Mitsein based on solidarity and friendship. On the 
contrary, they become clear if, following Hegel, a fundamental hostility 
to any other consciousness is found in consciousness itself; the subject 
posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the essential and sets 
up the other as inessential, as the object (7).
While to Lévi-Strauss the status hierarchy between the sexes is constitutive 
for society, to Beauvoir it represents a historical, passing phase of mankind 
(cf. Rubin 1975 for another historicizing approach).
In her chapter, Beauvoir argues that the Myths of Woman seem to fluctu-
ate and to be contradictory. However, their unity can be discerned as soon as 
we realize that Woman embodies Nature for men. Man’s carnal contingence 
dooms him to death. Woman, who symbolizes nature and flesh, therefore 
inspires horror in man: ‘the horror of his own carnal contingence that he 
projects on her’ (171). But nature also involves giving life. Nature therefore 
‘inspires ambivalent feelings in man, as has been seen. He exploits it but it 
crushes him; he is born from and he dies in it; it is the source of his being 
and the kingdom he bends to his will’ (167).
Nature, to man, is life and death, ally and enemy, chaos and supreme 
reality (cf. 167). And he views woman as ‘akin to nature, she embodies it: 
animal, little vale of blood, rose in bloom, siren, curve of a hill, she gives 
humus, sap, tangible beauty and the world’s soul to man’ (270). Man longs 
for her, but fears her as well; he wants to subdue her, as an untamed animal. 
And as every desire, man’s longing for woman involves ‘consuming the 
desired object, entailing its destruction’ (178). Woman to man is ‘Delilah and 
Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora and Athena, woman is both Eve and 
the Virgin Mary. She is an idol, a servant, source of life, power of darkness; 
she is the elementary silence of truth, she is artif ice, gossip and lies; she is 
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the medicine woman and witch; she is man’s prey; she is his downfall, she 
is everything he is not and wants to have’ (166).
Man not only wants to possess woman, he also wants to be validated 
by her for his strength, his beauty, his courage. ‘She is one of the privileged 
prizes promised to heroes, adventurers and individualists. In ancient times, 
Perseus saved Andromeda, Orpheus went to rescue Eurydice from Hades 
and Troy fought to keep the beautiful Helen. Novels of chivalry recount 
barely any prowess other than delivering captive princesses’ (206). But 
conquering is more fascinating than rescuing. ‘(I)t is far better to tame 
Penthesilea than to marry a consenting Cinderella’: man’s true victory is 
‘that woman freely recognise him as her destiny’ (207). Apart from prey 
and prize, she is a sexual vamp as well. ‘She is the mermaid whose songs 
dashed the sailors against the rocks; she is Circe, who turned her lovers into 
animals, the water sprite that attracted the f isherman to the depths of the 
pools’ (188). The woman ‘who freely exercises her charms – adventuress, 
vamp, femme fatale – remains a disquieting type’ (213). The mythical tales 
of mankind, according to Beauvoir, express men’s – contrary – desires. But 
women, like men, do identify with them, experiencing themselves through 
men’s eyes: ‘woman knows and chooses herself not as she exists for herself 
but […] as men dream of her’ (159).
Beauvoir also discusses the insinuation of myths of femininity in the 
shape of f ilms (Beauvoir 2010: 281), and paintings (204). She especially dis-
cusses Hollywood f ilms, with women in the role of femme fatale or vamp 
adventuress ‘as the bad woman’ (213), or as enfant terribles to be ‘tamed by the 
healthy brutality of a lover or husband’ (374). Films like Citizen Kane and The 
Razor’s Edge show how men fantasize themselves as benefactor, liberator, or 
redeemer of women (cf. 207, 214). The female movie star typically is the ‘most 
recent incarnation of the hetaera,’ who flanked ‘by her husband or serious 
male friend – rigorously required by Hollywood – […] delivers Woman to the 
dreams of men who give her fortune and glory in exchange’ (625). Female 
Hollywood stars are ‘a passive object in the producer’s hands’ (591) whose 
bodies are no longer their own: ‘the producer decides on their hair colour, 
weight, f igure and type; teeth are pulled out to change the shape of a cheek. 
Diets, exercise, f ittings, and make up are daily chores’ (628).
Beauvoir not only includes f ilms in her discussion of the dominant myths 
of Woman, she also points to a shift in the myth of Woman in her discussion 
of a new female f ilm ‘character’ that was created by French rebel movie star 
Brigitte Bardot (Beauvoir 2015d). Beauvoir suggested in The Second Sex that 
new myths of eroticism will emerge (Beauvoir 2010: 283) that will display 
that ‘man is also flesh for woman; and woman is other than a carnal object’ 
the BAt tle of my thS 141
and that the f lesh for each person, in each situation ‘takes on singular 
significations’ (277). Similarly, in a 1950 article written for the American style 
magazine Flair, titled ‘It’s About Time Woman Puts a New Face on Love’, she 
argues that a new type of ‘equalitarian love’ will arise (Beauvoir 2015b: 78).
According to her, in Roger Vadim’s f ilm And God Created Woman (1955), 
a new character of woman as ‘erotic hoyden’ emerges, in a replacement of 
the myth of woman as the magical and mysterious vamp (Beauvoir 2015d: 
116). While the attraction the magical vamp exercised ‘was that of a passive 
thing’ and men went to their doom when she cast a spell, ‘Bardot does 
not cast spells; she is on the go.’ When she strips her clothes off ‘she is not 
unveiling a mystery. […] She walks, she dances, she moves about. Bardot’s 
eroticism is aggressive instead of magical.’ In the game of love ‘she is as 
much a hunter as she is a prey. The male is an object to her, just as she is to 
him’ (119). The character that Bardot created thus surpasses the traditional 
Myth of woman, asserting that between woman and man there is ‘mutual 
desire and pleasure’ (119).
However, Vadim’s movies remain abstract, Bardot never turns into a real 
human being. Vadim ‘de-situates sexuality’ (121): the world is absent in his 
f ilms, which puts the spectator in the position of a voyeur. Vadim’s f ilms lack 
any erotic emotion. It is a good thing that he portrays sexuality in an honest 
way; but he is to be blamed, Beauvoir argues, ‘for having gone so far as to 
dehumanize it.’ The ‘human factor’ has already lost its importance in many 
spheres. Man today ‘is regarded by politicians, brains-trusters, publicity 
agents, military men, and even educators, by the entire “organization world” 
as an object to be manipulated’ (120-121; cf. Chapter 1). Vadim, in a similar 
vein, strips sexuality of its humanity. ‘In real life, and usually in good novels 
and f ilms, individuals are not def ined only by their sexuality. Each has a 
history, and his or her eroticism is involved in a certain situation’ (121). 
Vadim instead reduces the world, things, and bodies to their immediate 
presence.
Whereas Beauvoir recognizes ‘the subversive feminist potential’ of Bar-
dot’s character, she concludes that it ultimately involves a new embodiment 
of the old myth of the ‘eternal feminine’ (Boulé and Tidd 2012: 8). Tidd (2004) 
aptly summarizes that, to Beauvoir, Bardot ‘challenges the consuming 
tyranny of the male gaze and ultimately loses’ (Tidd 2004: 46).
Paglia, in her study Sexual Personae  (1990), likewise deals with the 
mythical tales of mankind. She also discusses Hollywood f ilms and movie 
stars from the perspective of myths, as discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. Paglia was a great admirer of Beauvoir. She felt that the feminists 
who came after her were never capable of f illing Beauvoir’s shoes, or for that 
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matter hers (Showalter 2001: 304, 305, 308; Paglia 2013: 9). Paglia discusses 
the mythical narratives of mankind in a similar way to Beauvoir.5 She, too, 
argues that, in myths, man is to woman as Culture is to Nature, rephras-
ing this opposition in terms of a contradiction between Apollonian and 
Dionysian – pagan or ‘chthonian’ [of the earth – KV] forces, respectively. 
Like Beauvoir, Paglia concludes that women live and imagine themselves 
through the fantasies of men, and never created their own dreams.
But unlike Beauvoir, Paglia accepts all this as a given. According to her, 
‘(w)oman does not dream of transcendental or historical escape from natu-
ral cycle, since she is that cycle’ (Paglia 1990: 10). The dominant myths on 
women are based on reality since women, because of their biology, embody 
the principle of fertility and thus are inevitably identif ied with nature. In 
contrast, men embody the Apollonian principle that has to restrain nature: 
‘(m)en, bonding together, invented culture as a defense against female 
nature’ (9). According to Paglia, women are not only assimilated to nature 
in myths and art, they ARE the nature that man seeks to master.
Nature pops up in yet another meaning in Paglia’s work. Contra rosy 
feminist Rousseauist conceptions of nature, we must recognize that nature 
is ‘no picnic’ (5). We should adopt Sade’s views rather than Rousseau’s. 
Nature – and sex as nature in us humans – is all about aggression: Sade 
was right to consider sex a demonic force. Sex is ‘a far darker power than 
feminism has admitted’ (3). In an interview, Paglia clarif ies what this means 
for women; namely that men ‘do look at women as rapists,’ adding that, as 
a lesbian, she can totally identify with them (Paglia 1995). We are dealing 
here with the reality of nature; in other words, with nature’s laws, which 
are about violence and war, with women being men’s prey.
To Paglia, moreover, nature is not only violence, it is also death, mud, 
and rot. It is the Dionysian realm of ‘liquid nature, a miasmic swamp whose 
prototype is the still pond of the womb’ (12). Nature ‘is the dehumanizing 
brutality of biology and geology […] the squalor and rot we must block 
from consciousness to retain our Apollonian integrity as persons. Western 
science and aesthetics are attempts to revise this horror into imaginatively 
palatable form’ (6). Women suffer more from nature than men, since, as 
we have seen, they are nature, their body being a ‘chthonian machine, 
indifferent to the spirit who inhabits it. Organically, it has one mission, 
pregnancy’ (10). Nature is the enemy and woman is its necessary victim.
Admittedly, I have schematized Paglia’s arguments to an extent, whereas 
in her work all of the above is presented in one package. Identifying her 
5 Paglia (1990) only refers to Beauvoir’s essay on Marquis de Sade (Beauvoir 2012). 
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arguments more specif ically, however – 1) nature as female corporeality 
that men seek to master; 2) nature as violent relations of domination and 
submission, with women as men’s prey; 3) nature as a substance of mud and 
rot of which women suffer more than men – allows us to compare them 
with Beauvoir’s arguments in The Second Sex.
The violent dimension of sex, in line with Sade’s view, is a common 
theme in their work. Like Paglia, Beauvoir wrote about the Marquis de Sade 
(Beauvoir 2012), but her conclusion is totally different. Beauvoir praises Sade, 
for his courage in showing the violent dimension of sex; but she pities him 
for his total emotional isolation. There is sadism, but sexual love is possible 
as well, when both partners accept their human condition and transform 
into an incarnated consciousness: a ‘psycho-physiological unity.’ In a state 
of ‘emotional intoxication, existence is grasped in oneself and in the other 
as at once subjectivity and passivity. Through this ambiguous unity, the 
two partners merge: each is delivered from its self-presence and attains an 
immediate communication with the other’ (Beauvoir 2012: 59-60).
Sexual love thus involves ‘an apprehension of the other person as 
consciousness through the flesh’ (60), and is an erotic encounter between 
unique embodied consciousnesses. Paglia instead only conceives of sex as 
violent relations and considers all talk of love-sex as outdated ‘PC’ (politi-
cally correct) feminism. Sex, as Sade has revealed, is a dark side of mankind, 
‘a dangerous sport,’ and a combat in which especially women are in danger 
of being possessed and killed. Unlike PC-feminists, Paglia is not against date 
rape, pornography, and SM, since they are the reality of sex (cf. Paglia 1992).
There are similarities and differences with regard to Paglia’s claim about 
Nature’s substance as well. To Beauvoir, nature represents life, ‘a warm 
spring, […] rich in regenerating forces’ (Beauvoir 2010: 168). But, as in Paglia, 
it is also ‘the soft viscosity of carrion,’ and the ‘rotting of death’ (169). They 
both share the thesis that, generally, women suffer more from nature’s 
grip on them than men. Beauvoir, like Paglia, argues that woman ‘is more 
enslaved to the species than the male is, her animality is more manifest.’ But 
she immediately adds: ‘in her as in him, the given is taken on by existence; 
she also belongs to the human realm. Assimilating her with Nature is simply 
a prejudice’ (277). Society and culture can compensate women for their 
reproductive roles. Paglia comes remarkably close to Beauvoir’s outlook 
in this respect when she states: ‘nature’s burden falls more heavily on one 
sex. With luck, this will not limit woman’s achievement, that is, her action 
in male-created social space’ (Paglia 1990: 9). Here, Paglia seems to argue 
that women can achieve individual self-realization in work and life. But 
she immediately returns to nature’s laws, concluding that the more woman 
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strives for individual self-realization, ‘the f iercer will be her struggle with 
nature […] And the more nature will punish her: do not dare to be free! for 
your body does not belong to you’ (10).
Finally, Paglia’s claim that women’s bodies are represented as nature, 
which men want to master, is identical to Beauvoir’s argument that, in 
myths, women are nature to men, who aim to tame, conquer, and even 
destroy women as part of nature. However, unlike Beauvoir, Paglia prefers 
to speak of ‘reality based’ myths: the identif ication of women with nature 
is based on the reality of nature’s laws that ‘limit eroticism, that is, our im-
aginative lives in sexual space’ (9). Since woman is nature, our imaginations 
and dreams will never change. History has no chance. It is the character 
of women’s bodies, as the immanent principle of fertility that makes the 
dichotomy of Man as Culture and Woman as Nature inescapable.
By contrast, Beauvoir sees nature and culture as intertwined and she 
posits that nature is always culturally embedded and shaped. To her, hu-
man beings are a ‘becoming’, and woman is a subject on the move. While 
Paglia refers to nature’s laws, and cannot think in terms of any change at all, 
Beauvoir argues that women’s access to contraceptives, education, and jobs 
will allow them to escape confining stereotypes and practices. Like Paglia, 
she is aware of an always remaining dimension of power struggle between 
the sexes, but to her it can be overcome given permanent effort (cf. Chapter 1).
Paglia’s work can be classif ied as a ‘politically realist’ theory of gender: 
her work ‘genders’ the ‘political realism’ of authors like Quentin Skinner 
and others, who build on seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ 
concept of the state of nature as a state of war. In addition to Hobbes, Paglia 
refers to Sade and Nietzsche, conceiving of the relations between the sexes 
in terms of a state of nature, where women necessarily are men’s prey 
(cf. Paglia 1990: 2). According to her, the popular media – uncensored as 
they are – prove her theory; namely, that the sexes are eternally at war. In 
f ilm, popular music, and commercials, ‘all the daemonic myths and sexual 
stereotypes’ pop up again that movements like Christianity and feminism 
tried, in vain, to eradicate (26). Women should face reality and embrace 
their role. Feminism ‘has betrayed women, alienated men and women, 
replaced dialogue with political correctness’ in its attempt to ‘inhibit sex’ 
(cf. Paglia 1995). The stereotypical myths of woman as Nature will, however, 
pop up again the more we try to suppress them, since they are based on 
reality.
Returning to our discussion of the new figure of the female sexual agent as 
manager of her erotic capital, we can conclude from the above that to Paglia 
she recycles the traditional myth of woman as Nature, by finally accepting 
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it. We have seen that, unlike Paglia, Beauvoir suggested that new myths, 
especially on erotic love, will emerge, and she cites the character created by 
film star Bardot in this regard. Her image of female sexual agency was liberat-
ing, in that it broke with the myths of woman as passive, mysterious Flesh. But 
it fell short where it remained an abstract figure. For a model of female sexual 
agency to really break the mould of the old myth of Woman, it has to involve a 
situated woman of flesh and blood, rather than an abstract – male – projection.
Is the post-feminist-neoliberal female sexual agent, in the shape of 
manager of her erotic capital, a new liberating f igure from this perspective? 
While her agency breaks with the myth of Woman as Nature and passive 
Flesh, she remains an abstract projection. As discussed earlier, the popular 
media bombard women and girls with the stereotypes of female hotness 
and sexiness, stimulating them to embody these stereotypes, by choosing 
cosmetic treatments, including plastic surgery – even recommending the 
use of Botox to very young girls.
Linda Duits and Liesbet van Zoonen (2006) argue that girls should be 
taken seriously when they choose to wear porno-chic fashion.6 Girls’ agen-
cies should be taken into account, where it concerns the way they dress. 
What are girls saying with their garments?
Does a belly shirt mean fashion, sexual availability, pride in one’s body, 
that it is incredibly hot outside, or sheer habit? Is girls’ clothing a consist-
ent language, or does its meaning change across space and time? For 
academic research, the consequences of such an approach are uncom-
plicated: in the tradition of feminist analysis, research should be aimed 
at giving girls a voice (Duits and Van Zoonen 2006: 115).
Gill (2007), however, argues that the authors’ call to respect girls’ ‘autono-
mous’ choices for porno-chic fashion, such as belly shirts and G-strings, re-
mains trapped in a neoliberal discourse. It ignores the fact that girls’ choices 
are taking place in conditions that are not of their own making; namely, 
in a context in which a particular kind of sexualized self-presentation ‘has 
become a normative requirement for many young women in the West […] 
‘Porn star’ is no longer just a slogan on a T-shirt – it is a vital component of 
many young women’s CVs, at a moment in which pole dancing classes are 
the biggest ‘f itness’ craze sweeping the UK and young women’s magazines 
instruct on ‘how to make love like a porn star’ (Gill 2007: 72-73).
6 Girls’ choices for wearing a headscarf are discussed by them in similar ways. Cf. Chapter 3 
for further discussion of girls’ choices regarding veiling.
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Gill’s response puts the focus on girls’ compulsory sexual agency in cur-
rent post-feminist, neoliberal societies (cf. 74), but her approach implies 
a concept of postfeminist-neoliberalism as an all-encompassing System. 
While Gill rightly argues that an approach in terms of women’s and girl’s 
own choices is not enough, and that social conditions should be taken into 
account, Duits and Van Zoonen (2006) rightly imply that societies are more 
open and dynamic, and that one model does not f it all.
As discussed in previous chapters, rather than an overall System, neo-
liberalism comprises a set of dominant power patterns and techniques, 
alongside others, among which freedom practices, i.e. distinct sets of 
critically creative ethical life projects. While Foucault’s mid-work posi-
tioned people as docile bodies, his later work conceptualizes how people 
can develop into free agents within the context of relatively independent 
cultural collectives, or into minimally free subjects in the context of moral 
systems, or a neoliberal frame that allows them some room to manoeuvre.
From this perspective, in what follows, I investigate whether other figures 
of female sexual agency have emerged within the realm of the popular 
media. Do we f ind women’s freedom practices in this domain? Like Paglia, 
Beauvoir referred to f ilms as the vehicles of mythical tales, our dream-
narratives in the sense of Langer (1960). In what follows, I look in particular 
at today’s dream machine, Hollywood, and to other media’s celebrities or 
sexual personae. As Laura Mulvey famously analysed, in traditional Hol-
lywood f ilms, girls and women either have to die or marry, an observation 
that resonates with Beauvoir’s analysis that women in myths are typically 
tamed or destroyed (cf. Mulvey 1999). Do current Hollywood hypes suggest 
that the stereotypical myth of woman as Nature is immortal, as Paglia would 
have it? Or is Beauvoir right in suggesting that new myths on love will emerge 
and has a new female sexual agent emerged who truly breaks the mould?
The Twilight Hype7
As a social philosopher mostly interested in dominant social patterns 
and dreams, I focus on popular f ilms rather than avant-garde ones, and 
especially on Hollywood-hypes. In what follows, I focus specif ically on 
the f ive f ilms of The Twilight Saga, in search of an answer to the question 
7 Here, and in following sections, I insert authentic comments from the internet without 
always referring to name and place, since the sites they are drawn from are often obscure or 
no longer existent. I follow the spelling of the comments as I found them.
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of whether new myths on love and new female f igures have emerged. The 
f ilms, based on four novels by American author Stephenie Meyer – trans-
lated into 37 languages – caused a hype over the last decade, especially in 
‘the mediascape’ of the internet.8 Not being a media scholar, or a trained 
feminist media critic, I focus on the Twilight ‘hype’ mainly for a diagnosis 
of the present, and especially of present collective dream-narratives.
The Twilight fan base, which at its peak in 2011 reached an estimated 26 
million, mainly consists of girls, but also includes women of all ages. The 
hype around the f ilms and the actors is often compared to Beatlemania, 
with screaming girls all over the world camping out days before the arrival 
of their stars. The Twilight fan base reaches across continents, ranging from 
the US to Brazil and Argentina, Kuwait, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, 
Korea, Chile, and from Eastern to Western Europe, spreading over about 
f ifty countries. The fans use social media such as Twitter, Instagram, and 
Facebook, and internet sites. Discussions take place 24/7 among fans from 
several continents, who exchange, in addition to Twilight-related gossip and 
‘fan f iction’,9 weather reports, news events, and the time of day or night in 
their respective countries.
Several academic studies have looked for an answer to the question of why 
so many girls and women worldwide are so obsessively involved – with titles 
such as Bringing Light to Twilight (2011), Twilight and Philosophy (2009), Bitten 
by Twilight (2010) and Seduced by Twilight (2011). As blogger Abbeysbooks 
aptly notes, the author of The Twilight Saga, Stephenie Meyer is in no way a 
great literary writer: ‘she is an awful writer, it was by coincidence’ – meaning 
that Meyer accidently hit on something big (Abbeysbooks n.d.).10 But what 
exactly did Meyer accidently create?
The four original novels, Twilight, New Moon, Eclipse, and Breaking Dawn 
are all about life and death, as illuminated by the title of a recently added 
publication, Life and Death: Twilight Re-imagined (2015), written on the 
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the series. In this last novel, Meyer 
has swapped the gender of all the main characters, in order to refute the 
dominant interpretation of the saga as a clichéd story of a ‘damsel in dis-
tress’. A quick look at the storyline of the four novels makes clear where 
this interpretation comes from.
8 The term ‘mediascape’ was launched by Arjun Appadurai (1990) to describe a new global 
cultural economy that transgresses the boundaries of nation states.
9 The Fifty Shades of Grey book series by Erika Leonard James as well started as Twilight fan 
f iction, on the internet. 
10 Her personal blog ‘The Twilight Saga: Irruption into Simulation’ (Abbeysbooks n.d.) com-
prises astute analyses of The Twilight Saga’s sexual personae. 
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Teenage girl Bella has moved to a new village to live with her father, and 
falls in love with a remarkably beautiful and gifted seventeen-year-old boy 
at her new high school. Having discovered that he is a vampire, she decides 
that ‘it does not matter’ and cannot live without him. Edward, the vampire 
boy, is, in fact, a 100+ year-old man, who excels in beauty and knowledge and, 
moreover, reads minds. He lusts for the girl’s blood, which to him is like ‘his 
personal brand of heroin,’ but he remains faithful to the ‘vegetarian’ lifestyle 
that he and his family have adopted, feeding only on the blood of animals.
Worshipping the girl as his unique destiny and craving for her blood, 
he constantly fears he will kill her. While she struggles with her all ‘too 
human hormones,’ he puts the brake on their erotic encounters, for fear of 
killing her during lovemaking. The girl moreover is accident prone, falls, 
and hurts herself and ‘attracts danger’ mainly in the shape of attacks by 
non-vegetarian vampires. Edward and his family have to repeatedly protect 
and rescue her with the help of a pack of werewolves consisting of native 
American boys, one of them, named Jacob Black, being equally ardently in 
love with the girl. After her marriage to Edward, and the delivery within a 
few weeks of a half-man-half-vampire child, which kills her, her husband 
turns her, just in time, from a human into an immortal vampire. While 
vampires cannot procreate, Bella in the end has it all: baby, husband, and 
eternal happiness. Or does she?
From the above, it is clear that many elements of traditional mythical 
narratives are present, such as nature, death, desire, and semi-gods.11 Unlike 
more standard romance novels, The Twilight Saga thus entails themes that 
mythical dream-narratives are made of. According to Julia Pearlman (2010), 
The Twilight Saga is ‘a revision of American mythology’ (Pearlman 2010: 4): 
the narrative reconstructs conservative gender, class, and race relationships, 
and instructs the reader on ‘how to be American’ (14). Pearlman astutely 
analyses the racist subtext of the series, such as the fact that the girl Bella 
prefers the love of the white – superior – vampire man Edward, above 
the equally passionate love for her of Jacob, whose surname ‘Black’ is no 
coincidence.
But which model of love is preferred here, what do the millions of female 
fans of The Twilight Saga dream of? Is it the love of an overall superior f igure, 
11 Anthropologist William Bascom (1965) clarif ies that mythical narratives, other than fairy 
tales, ‘account for the origin of the world, of mankind, of death, or for characteristics of birds, 
animals, geographical features, and the phenomena of nature. They may recount the activities 
of the deities, their love affairs, their family relationships, their friendships and enmities, their 
victories and defeats’ (Bascom 1965: 4). In contrast to the genre of myth fairy tales and folk tales 
are stories that present existential dilemmas for us to identify with (cf. Bettelheim 1976).
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i.e. the love of the father, as Freud would have it? Is it the worshipping by 
werewolf and vampire of the girl Bella, out of a childish narcissism? Is it 
marriage, pregnancy, motherhood? Is Paglia right, and do the girls dream 
in terms of the eternal ‘natural laws’ that, according to her, lie at the basis of 
every myth? Is The Twilight Saga merely a new copy of stereotypical myths?
Paglia’s laws of nature totally apply to the storyline: women are men’s 
prey in violent sexuality and suffer more than men from nature as death. 
According to Paglia, ‘In the day we are social creatures, but at night we 
descend to the dream world where nature reigns, where there is no law 
but sex, cruelty and metamorphosis’ (Paglia 1990: 4). The picture of sex as a 
demonic force totally applies to the Twilight story. The Twilight story featur-
ing werewolves and vampires, symbolizes the nightly, animal world of sex 
and violence. Sex is even literally dangerous in the story since lovemaking 
would involve killing the girl. Paglia’s picturing of nature as death and mud 
is also present insofar as pregnancy is a struggle for survival, the unborn 
vampire child destroying her as a human.
While in the typical Hollywood f ilms woman has to be mastered by 
being tamed through marriage or killed – in terms of Mulvey (1999) – the 
Twilight story is not about the girl having to marry or die: she must do both.
Feminists have complained about the patriarchal storyline, arguing that 
Meyer, who at the time she wrote the books was a stay-at-home mum from 
a Mormon background, not surprisingly focused on early marriage and 
pregnancy as a girl’s ultimate desire and destiny. Pearlman (2010) argues 
that the storyline involves an outspoken conservative backlash against 
feminism. Diane Negra (2009) specif ies how numerous f ilm scripts since 
the end of the 1990s entail four messages that together involve a feminist 
backlash. Firstly, they propound family values and the social fantasy of the 
hometown. It is safe and rewarding for a woman to go ‘back home’, away 
from the big city, and back to a task as care-taker. Secondly, time is frozen. 
There is no ageing. Thirdly, work is in line with women’s essential feminin-
ity; female professional achievements are an expression of an unbalanced 
life. And fourthly, ‘self-care’ consists of a hyper-aestheticization of everyday 
life, a luxurious lifestyle consisting of an excessively celebrated elective 
domesticity and a self-stylization through cosmetic surgery, dieting, and 
exercising.
The storyline of The Twilight Saga f its Negra’s four criteria perfectly. 
Heroine Bella has gone to the countryside, only to ultimately become part 
of an extended vampire family as a mother and wife. She will not age: as a 
vampire she will stay eternally young and super attractive. All the vampire 
women in the series are involved in domestic virtues, not aspiring to any 
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professional training, but spending their time as spouses, with hobbies like 
fashion and house styling. The luxurious lifestyle of the vampire family is 
all about super cars, super houses, and super clothing, and Bella is given 
diamonds, phones as well as cars from her beloved vampire.
While, from this perspective, the Twilight story can be qualif ied as 
a conservative backlash against feminism, some feminist scholars have 
argued in contrast that its female f irst-person narrative allows girls and 
women to positively identify as sexual agents. The girl Bella pursues her own 
sexual desires and, in the end, has it all. Bonnie Mann (2009) concludes that 
since it is the male character that puts the brake on the erotic encounters, 
the story provides girls with a thus far missing narrative of ‘male account-
ability’ and ‘female pleasure without penalty’ (Mann 2009: 140). From The 
Twilight Saga’s female f irst perspective, we experience the sexual world of 
a seventeen-year old girl, who can act out her desire since the male f igure, 
for once, is the one who is accurate and sensitive. This allows girls and 
women the space to experience their own sexual feelings, instead of having 
to defend themselves constantly against male sexuality.
In this sense, the story can be seen as opening ‘pockets of agency’, to 
borrow a term from Maryn Wilkinson (2014; cf. Wilkinson 2014: 1). But, as 
Mann adds herself, there is a price to pay, since Bella dies in childbirth. 
Moreover, the storyline clearly conveys that it is the male f igure that 
decides, in line with stereotypical patriarchal patterns. First marriage, 
then sex, and only then a vampire transformation. This is the right order 
as Bella herself ultimately admits. Early marriage is indeed the message, 
and early pregnancy is the happy outcome of it all. Women’s sexual agency 
in the Twilight world appears to be totally in line with the static Myth of 
Woman described by Beauvoir and Paglia. Bella’s agency remains f irmly 
conf ined within the limits of patriarchal moral rules and, as such, can be 
qualif ied as a minimally free, limited agency. But, then, do the millions of 
girls and women who respond so emotionally to the Twilight world today, 
still live out their fantasies through men’s dreams, to paraphrase Beauvoir?
A New Face of Love
By adding a f ifth gender-swapped novel to the Twilight series, Meyer aims 
to prove that the Twilight story surpasses gender stereotypes and deals with 
‘the magic and obsession and frenzy of f irst love’ (Meyer 2015: Foreword). 
But Meyer does not fully understand what she wrote, blogger Abbeysbooks 
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argues (cf. Abbeysbooks 2013).12 According to her, The Twilight Saga in fact 
is a f inal retelling, in a modern variation, of the myth of Tristan and Isolde, 
which is about Courtly Love. The lady is courted and no consummation of 
love is allowed in the ritual:
Love was pure so to speak. This is Edward. […] Twilight is perfectly 
named. It is the end of the Tristan and Isolde legend which ruled Western 
Civilization concerning all the rituals of love and marriage for 800 fucking 
years until the pill. As Nietzsche has said, “Only what is over can be fully 
understood.” And that is what she has given us. The full understanding 
of Courtly Love in all its splendor, passion, death, courtship, engagement, 
marriage, and ritualistic behavior.
While the pill in the 1960s put an end to the entire ritual, we are ‘still strug-
gling to put a new one in place and haven’t succeeded yet. We are the FIRST 
culture in the history of the world that does not have a ritual for mating, 
betrothal, marriage.’ Twilight is a re-introduction of the ‘passion-myth’ 
that goes back to the medieval Tristan and Isolde legend, about love that 
can only be satisf ied by death.13 It comprises ‘many inversions,’ but it is 
‘a MYTH, not a story about healthy relationships in reality. It’s a MYTH!’ 
While The Twilight Saga is heavily criticized by many, she argues: ‘All these 
addictive, healthy, destructive, etc. [labels] DON’T apply to the Symbolic 
Order where mythology is. Myth doesn’t tell you how it should be, it tells 
you what is’ (Abbeysbooks 2013).
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir describes the model of courtly love, born in 
the twelfth century in the Mediterranean south of France, as only a certain 
‘improvement in woman’s lot’ (Beauvoir 2010: 111). Courtly poets did exalt 
love and ‘many codes of courtly love appear, [that encourage] young men 
to devote themselves to the service of ladies’ (118). In this ‘gallant tradition, 
woman is no longer an animal creature but rather an ethereal being, a 
breath, a radiance’ (203). Yet, Beauvoir adds, woman remains the essential 
Other of man. ‘While courtly love might ease woman’s lot, it does not modify 
it substantially’ (112). The role of woman is still passive, being the one who 
is conquered, loved, and worshipped. She remains an outsider to men’s 
activities, and ‘does not take part in their jousts and combats: her entire 
12 The following quotes are taken from Abbeysbooks (2013). 
13 Abbeysbooks (n.d.) refers in this respect to Denis de Rougemont’s Love in the Western 
World (1956), which describes the passion-myth as rooted in the medieval Tristan and Isolde 
legend, resonating in twentieth century romance stories, popular music and f ilms.
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situation predestines her to play this role of onlooker. The chevalier jousts 
in tournaments for his lady’ (206).
This highly gendered model of courtly love is The Twilight Saga’s original 
scheme, which explains why Meyer’s gender-swapped f ifth novel – not 
‘backed’ as it is by the original myth of courtly love – does not ‘work’, to say 
the least. In the original storyline of the books, several tournaments with 
bloodthirsty creatures (werewolves, non-vegetarian vampires) have to be 
fought by the chivalrous lover, with the girl as onlooker and privileged prize. 
The courtesy of the lover who worships the unique lady-girl is without limits. 
Courtly love obviously differs from Sade’s model of sex as violence and rape, 
which, according to Paglia, is the truth of sex. From this perspective, the 
Twilight hype among women and girls emerges as a desire for the old type 
of romantic love, and as an alternative to the sex dates and the compulsory 
sexual agency neoliberal society inflicts on them.
The Twilight story is about the uniqueness of the beloved, and about 
impossible and all the more passionate love – as is also suggested by the 
story’s literary references to the classics Wuthering Heights, Romeo and 
Julia and Pride and Prejudice. As Abbeysbooks notes, Twilight’s focus on the 
uniqueness of the beloved has ‘a huge reverberating circuit of an impact. 
Girls who did not want to “put out” by the 3rd date (you have to or he 
moves on and you are dateless) who wanted to wait for love/intimacy were 
given the courage to decide not to be meat in the market place. That’s not 
insignif icant. Twilight gave them that courage’ (Abbeysbooks 2013).
But in addition to girls’ and women’s – implicit – critique of a compulsory 
sexual agency, might there be another explanation for the Twilight hype? 
To understand it more fully, the f ive Twilight f ilms must be considered. The 
director and scriptwriter of the f irst f ilm were women, as, of course, are 
the author of the original books and main actress Kristen Stewart. Have 
these women perhaps created a new – more egalitarian – face of love, in a 
way Beauvoir was hinting at?
While Meyer suggested ‘hotness’ in her books, the Bella character 
in most of the f ilms is the opposite of a (post-feminist-neoliberal) sexy 
agent. She looks nerdy in green and brown coloured sweaters and pants. 
Especially in the f irst f ilm, by director Catherine Hardwicke, the camera 
identif ies with the Bella character: she is the one who looks, instead of 
being looked-at herself (cf. Edwards 2009). This female gaze clearly departs 
from the dominant Hollywood f ilm that privileges the male gaze. Mulvey’s 
famous article ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (Mulvey 1999), 
originally published in 1973, argued that cinema by its nature, steeped as 
it is in the act of seeing, satisf ies a primordial wish for ‘scopophilia’, i.e. 
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the pleasurable looking at an object for sexual stimulation. But it also has 
a narcissistic dimension in that we identify ourselves with the image on 
screen. The f ilm screen functions as a mirror in which we see ourselves 
and, as such, touches the primary level of self-identif ication of the very 
young child in front of the mirror, as described by Jacques Lacan. Both 
narcissistic identif ication and scopophilia explain why people invest their 
libido in movie stars.14
Cinema involves, in fact, a triple act of seeing, in that characters look at 
each other, the camera looks at them, and the audience looks through the 
camera’s eye (cf. Edwards 2009: 28). Traditionally, in Hollywood f ilms, the 
woman is the visual object of desire, since the triple act of seeing is male, 
i.e. the male character looks at the female character, the camera identifying 
with his perspective, and the audience with the camera. But in Twilight, the 
typical visual object of desire is Edward, ‘thus the implicit male authority of 
the gaze in fetishizing an image as sexual stimulant is claimed by Bella, and 
by extension her empathizing audience’ (29). While the ‘triple gaze’ shifts 
in other scenes to the female character, the power shifts back and forth 
between male and female characters, ‘between pursuer and pursued,’ (30) 
and ‘the obsessive pleasure in looking is shared between the characters, the 
camera and the audience’ (32). The pockets of female agency in the storyline 
thus are enhanced in the Twilight f ilm, allowing for an interpretation of 
the story in the direction of an egalitarian model of love.
Yet other, ‘extra-textual’ factors are relevant for an interpretation of 
the f ilms in this direction, especially the ‘sexual persona’ of main actress 
Kristen Stewart. Raised by a feminist mother, she calls herself a feminist as 
well and, on the whole, is not the pleasing female star that Hollywood is used 
to. She swears in public, and flips off the constantly harassing paparazzi. 
She does not smile constantly and swaps high heels for Converse on and 
off the red carpet. The fact that she does not make the most of her erotic 
capital, i.e. she refuses to always provide visual pleasure to men, generates a 
lot of hostility towards her. As Stewart comments, ‘(i)f a woman isn’t happy 
and un-opinionated and long-haired and pretty, then she’s weird and ugly. 
I just don’t get it.’15
14 The mechanisms of people’s libido investment in movie stars have been further analysed 
in psychoanalytical f ilm studies. From a Foucauldian perspective, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
can be re-articulated as comprising a useful toolset for analysing major patterns, suspending 
its all-encompassing claims (cf. Foucault 2003: 6; cf. the Introduction). Contra the Lacanian 
approach, Hall (1973) famously emphasized the active role of the audience in interpreting ‘texts’. 
15 Quotes are taken from the off icial webpage of the actress, imdb.com/name/nm0829576/bio 
(last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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As a method actor, Stewart blends her personal experiences with the role 
of Bella, creating a ‘visual form’ that allows for a reading of Bella as a female 
sexual agent – all the more since, in interviews, Stewart emphasizes the 
free sexual agency of the character. Yet another important, ‘extra-textual’ 
factor is the alleged off-screen affair of the two main actors. Whether it was 
a real relationship or a PR-orchestrated one is of no importance, since we 
are dealing with their public ‘personae’ and perceived relationship. Both 
actress Kristen Stewart and actor Robert Pattinson – referred to by fans as 
‘Robsten’ – presented themselves as artists who are passionate about their 
jobs. They supported each other’s careers and never confirmed an off-screen 
relationship. However, the perceived affair also contributed to a feminist 
subtext in the f ilms. From this blending of the love couple in the movies 
with the supposed real life couple, who allegedly shared love and work on 
equal footing, in combination with the female f irst-person narrative and 
camera perspective, ‘a new face of love’ appeared. The new myth of love that 
emerged, by accident, due to the several factors mentioned, is that women’s 
self-realization in work can go together with romantic love.16 Actress Stewart, 
who is passionately identif ied with by girls all over the world, is – according 
to her off icial webpage – totally involved in her work. She states, ‘as an actor 
your life is so wrapped up in your job. It’s not normal. People’s jobs don’t affect 
their whole lives. Mine is why I love my life.’ She is not only into acting, but 
also aspires to become a f ilm director. And yet, this feminist actress seemed 
to be loved by the ‘sexiest man of the planet’, British actor Pattinson.
It was especially this Robsten Saga that made people invest their libido 
in the f ilms. As one of the directors said, they saw real love unfolding on 
screen. And as one blogger commented: ‘[they] became friends and fell in 
love and somehow the whole damn world fell right along with them.’
The Battle of Myths
The fact that people invested their libido in the couple not only explains 
the obsessive love of the fans, but also the intense hatred of anti-fans – 
who call themselves ‘Nonstens’ – who were over-invested in the couple 
16 Beauvoir’s own ethical life project involved a personal attempt to put up a new face on love: 
her life long relationship with her friend Jean Paul Sartre, in the shape of a ‘contract’ involving 
‘necessary’ love next to other ‘contingent’ ones, has been an inspiring model to others. But this 
new face on love had its negative sides, especially for women who were often the sad ones left 
behind by adulterous men. Beauvoir’s relationship to Sartre is often discussed in these terms, 
but in fact it was more complex (cf. Vintges 1996).
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themselves.17 Others routinely debunked the f ilms as girl stuff, loathing 
Twilight and especially Stewart in overtly sexist ways. Most of the hatred 
against the actress came, however, from the female fans of male actor Pat-
tinson. Right from the beginning of the media frenzy, Stewart was targeted 
by traditional female fans of the actor, who wished for their heartthrob 
Pattinson a woman with domestic values, like themselves. They expressed 
their anger that Stewart refused to take second place and kept pursuing 
her own career.
A fear of identity loss seems to play a major role in their extreme disgust 
and hatred towards the persona Stewart. Neither sexiness, nor domestic 
virtues proved to be decisive for a woman or girl to be loved by the most 
wanted man on earth. The old Myth of Woman was trumped by an egalitar-
ian model of love that involved equal self-realization in projects in the world, 
rather than women’s ‘being-for-men’ (Beauvoir 2010: 159).
The hatred against Stewart reached a new peak in July 2012, when a 
so-called ‘cheating scandal’ hit the internet. Fifty photos were published of 
‘best paid Hollywood actress of the year 2011,’ a twenty-two-year old Kristen 
Stewart, ‘caught’ by paparazzi in a ‘make-out’ session with a forty-one-year-
old married father of two children – the director of a f ilm in which Stewart 
played a major role, which was supposed to be followed up by a sequel. 
The pictures, published online by the gossip site US Weekly, show the two 
hugging (described in the press as ‘steamy lovemaking’) in the middle of 
the road, plus somewhere inside a car.
Stewart, at that time, was allegedly in a three-year relationship with 
Pattinson. During the years of f ilming the Twilight series, both young ac-
tors – Stewart was 17 when f ilming began, Pattinson was 21 – were hunted 
by the media to the point that they had to hide out and sometimes adopt 
military-style strategy to escape paparazzi and harassing fans. With the 
upcoming premiere of the f inal Twilight f ilm, many wondered how the two 
actors would survive increasing hysteria, which seemed to heighten to a 
point where their lives were in danger and they could even be killed by a 
crazy fan or anti-fan, as Stewart herself formulated it.
‘Nowadays it’s harder because everyone is on Facebook and everyone knows 
where you are all the time, and everyone’s Twittering. I’m going to die 
because somebody is going to say where I am and somebody is going to kill 
me. Someone’s going to twitter my location and it’s going to be, like, BOOM!’
17 For an analysis of the phenomenon of the anti-fan see among others http://journal.trans-
formativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/247/253 (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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With the ‘cheating pictures’ published a few months before the f inal pre-
miere, the heat around the two actors reached a new peak. While the fans 
initially claimed that the photos were fabricated, what really f inished them 
were the alleged public apologies of Stewart and the director two days later, 
Stewart’s saying:
I’m deeply sorry for the hurt and embarrassment I’ve caused to those 
close to me and everyone this has affected. This momentary indiscretion 
has jeopardized the most important thing in my life, the person I love 
and respect the most, Rob. I love him, I love him, I’m so sorry’ (People, 
25 July 2012).
Stewart’s supposed apology for ‘momentary indiscretion’ made the infidel-
ity into a real deal. All the more astonishing to many fans was her so-called 
statement, since the actors had always refused to talk to the press about 
their private lives, and certainly never turned to a tabloid like People before.
For about two weeks, people reacted in shock. Twilight fans worldwide 
were heartbroken, and shared their grief.18 Lizzy on 7 August posted:
‘i am very very very sorry for them. i cant keep my feelings. i love them. 
i love. and i am very sorry and tired.’
Fan sites closed down, with declarations such as
‘Thank you and Goodbye. These past days have been very diff icult but I 
believe I’m coping just f ine. What to say, how to say it? This is not going 
to be easy’ (fan site Robstenation, 3 August).
Many other fans reacted in excessive ways in the media. Girls who had 
totally identif ied with Stewart cried and even spoke of suicide.
‘Robsessed’ fans – infatuated with the male actor, obviously sided with 
him, and reacted furiously against Stewart. For example, Twiharder117 posted:
‘how dare she cheat on him!!!!!!!!! i will never forgive her. she just 
lost like a millon fans!!! she is dead to me now.’
18 The quotes that follow are from the internet sites Hollywood Life and Gossip Cop, the fan 
sites Robstendreams and Robsessedpattinson, and Robstenation, and from the website of the 
journals Daily Mail and Huffington Post. I copy the spelling used.
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Funnyface 1064 posts:
bottomline kristen is a liar!!!!! cheater!!!!!!!! homewrecker!!!!!!!!!!!’
Stewart’s fans were devastated. B_dog01 on August 7, comments:
‘What she did was wrong, but people are being way to mean about it. Kristen 
was like a role model to me, she still is I just see her in a different way.’
Pati2002 posts:
‘Kristen if at all u read this, just know that some of us are still with u in 
each and every bad situation u r in, love you kristen.’
For many days the gossip press repeated itself, recycling stories of an ugly 
break up between Stewart and Pattinson, involving f ighting about their 
dogs, plants, and homes. Explanations included that she had become bored 
with the relationship, or that she wanted to move beyond the Twilight 
personage of the cute teenager Bella, who she symbolized for so many years. 
Others suspected the director of serious sexual harassment.
A few voices, especially ‘Twilighter’ who claimed to be a lawyer, and sites 
like ‘Justiceforkristen’, and later ‘MyHappyRKWorld’ stuck to their suspi-
cions about the so-called scandal, analysing the pictures as photoshopped 
and even staged. After one week the tabloids moved on and only ‘f illers’ 
were published, such as advice by therapists or gossip publicists as well as 
wild speculations concerning Stewart, with headlines such as ‘Inside her 
Betrayal’ and ‘How Many Other Men?’
On national television, comedian Will Ferrell called Stewart a ‘trampire’ 
(The Conan show, 4 August).19 T-shirts with the text immediately hit the 
market, with other text options as well such as: ‘FUCK Kristen Stewart’, ‘I 
wanna take a dump on Kristen Stewart’, and ‘Robert Pattinson deserves bet-
ter’. Stewart was supposedly dropped from the planned sequel by Universal 
studios for being ‘damaged goods’, and because ‘[n]o one wants to cast the 
emotionally unstable slut that America hates.’
Donald Trump, who at that time was considering running for the presi-
dency, warned Pattinson in a tweet not to take back Kristen Stewart. Trump 
writes: ‘She cheated on him like a dog & will do it again – just watch. He 
can do much better!’
19 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QuwgoIFgQpY (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
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‘Cuckolded’ Pattinson, when appearing on the Daily Show on American 
television was advised by host Jon Stewart to ‘kick her to the curb,’ to which 
he added:
‘when you are young and break-up, it feels like the world is ending but 
this is the f irst time I have actually seen the world react that way. It’s 
insanity!’ (Daily Show, 14 August).
Meanwhile, many fan-girls, via social media, fan sites, and YouTube, had 
started to defend their heroine, posting videos and self ies under labels like 
‘Stay Strong Kristen’, Robsten is Unbroken’, and ‘We Believe in Kristen’.20 
They launched a campaign to ‘Hide The Lies’, sampling visual proof of their 
hiding of the tabloid US Weekly in shops all over the world behind the dog 
food and other places, a type of global action unique thus far.21 Many girls 
clearly were not willing to let go of Stewart as their role model.
Other internet commenters started to get seriously worried about the 
public lynching of Stewart – characterized by some as a witch hunt or 
a stoning to death – that necessitated a permanent safeguarding of the 
actress, by off icial and informal bodyguards, the latter comprising a group 
of lesbian women friends.22 As one blogger commented:
‘They will probably harm her physically or attempt to […] I hope no one 
actually kills her. With the hate and judgment that’s going around. I 
wouldn’t be surprised.’
And another:
‘This is insane. The psycho James Holmes who massacred people in 
Aurora isn’t even getting 1% of the hate directed at Kristen.’
And yet another:
‘Rob is not just an ordinary guy […] He is the sexiest man in the world, 
he is a fenomen, he is the most loved one on the planet – what kind of 
20 See for instance https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5UMy6YzfpE (last accessed, 21 Sep-
tember 2016).
21 Their site operationhideusweekly.tumblr is no longer operative. For an impression see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=njtB-YMzJA8 (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
22 See for instance https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqGi4DiHhho (last accessed, 21 Sep-
tember 2016).
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reaction cheating on him might cause? Robsten was the most beautiful 
couple of the decade, now Kristen is the most hated slut of the decade.’
People also noticed the unfairness of the incredible amount of public hate 
for Stewart compared to the milder critiques about the movie director. 
Especially men were taking up the task of defending Stewart against the 
hatred. US feminists at the time were not taking notice of the attacks on 
the actress, since it was ‘too far out from the real world.’23
When, after a few months, pictures showed the two actors together again 
and when they engaged in a common press tour for the last Twilight f ilm, 
the hype about whether or not they were a couple reignited. As blogger 
‘Christopher Dark’ commented: ‘this kind of response is unprecedented. 
Perhaps ancient monarchs of old engendered this kind of response. Royalty 
is one thing. They were the movers and guiders of life then. But so much 
love for two actors is inexplicable to me and yet here I am among the second 
group. Bewildered but hopeful.’
Many other fans, however, were disappointed about the renewed ‘rela-
tionship’. Nicola comments:
‘Rob is such a dissappointment still being with the cheater. […] Then 
obviously he is as fake and as much of a fame ho and has as much love for 
drama as the skank […]. And for all his millions he will be using a used 
Vagina and the whole world knows about it.’
Deepika writes:
‘he is a pussy whipped lap dog, doormat wussiness is def initely not an 
attaractive trait in a man. he is such a joke of a man.’
But while the actor is merely debunked as a pussy, the actress is openly threat-
ened and harassed as being ‘a cheater, a liar, a cretin, a loser.’ Today, people 
are still not willing to let go: the cheating issue is brought up time and again.
Beauvoir, in her chapter on Myths, concludes that man’s failings
are often lightly dismissed; even if he disobeys community laws, the 
man continues to belong to it, he is merely an enfant terrible, not a pro-
found threat to the collective order. If, on the other hand, the woman 
deviates from society, she returns to Nature and the devil, she triggers 
23 Personal communication, 10 February 2013.
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uncontrollable and evil forces within the group. Fear has always been 
mixed with the blame for licentious behaviour. If the husband cannot 
keep his wife virtuous, he shares her fault; his misfortune is, in society’s 
eyes, a dishonour. […] And the community will take it upon itself to 
punish the guilty woman in his place: because she offended the group 
as a whole and not only her husband (Beauvoir 2010: 213).
Stewart apparently has ‘offended’ society. According to some, the ‘cheating 
affair’ allowed her to get out of the character of the decent Twilight girl. 
However, the affair evoked the projection on her persona of the other side 
of the dominant Myths of Woman, i.e. being death and the devil. From the 
above, we can analyse the clashes on the internet, spilling over into the 
regular media, as a battle between two competing myths of love, which 
like many internet wars has ugly faces. The old Myths of Woman are taking 
revenge on the new egalitarian face of love, i.e. the Robsten Saga that a sub-
stantial part of the fan base had identified with. The new myth of egalitarian 
erotic love that had ‘happened’ as a result of the above-mentioned factors 
– and maybe myths overall ‘happen’ in such ways – is not so much about 
female sexual pleasure without penalty (cf. Mann 2009: 140), but rather 
about female ambition without sexual penalty. This new dream-narrative 
for girls, with hindsight, has to be unmasked as the egotistic project of 
Stewart, being ‘a hateful, vile little backstabber.’
Today, the Twilight fans that ‘read’ The Twilight c.q. Robsten Saga as a new 
dream-narrative of egalitarian romantic love, have moved on to the HBO 
series Outlander – the female counterpart to the archaic masculine series 
Game of Thrones – with the female f irst-person narrative of a female sexual 
agent in the role of a time-travelling medical doctor. Kristen Stewart, in the 
meantime, continues working and successfully survives the violence of the 
old Myths of Woman that still try to crush her. She challenges and replaces 
the dominant Myths of Woman at the heart of Hollywood’s dream ma-
chine, with a feminist freedom practice shared with others. And certainly, 
overcoming millennia old Myths – to paraphrase Paglia – is ‘no picnic’, 
Hollywood being not only still predominantly white but male as well.24
24 The nomination of an all-white group of actors for the Oscar 2016 is an indication for what 
today is called ‘the unbearable whiteness of Hollywood.’ For an overview of the male character 
of this f ilm industry, by the New York Film Academy, among others on the typical ways women 
are portrayed in most f ilms (including absurd and ridiculous straw feminist characters), and the 
lack of female directors, see http://www.nyfa.edu/f ilm-school-blog/gender-inequality-in-f ilm 
(last accessed, 21 September 2016). In the wake of the Twilight hype, a contest for female directors 
was organized by ‘Women in Film,’ with among others actresses Stewart and Kate Winslet as 
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A similarly ‘dangerous’ domain of myth production is the male domi-
nated gaming industry, with its stereotypically sexist video games, in which 
female characters are either absent or represented in passive, often hyper-
sexualized ways. Anita Sarkeesian, Brianna Wu, and Zoe Quinn, among 
others, are engaged in feminist freedom practices in this domain. Fighting 
the sexism of games and installing new egalitarian ‘visual forms’, they have 
been heavily harassed and even received death threats. An anonymous 
hate campaign, ‘Gamergate’, organized against them via online fora such 
as Reddit, became ugly to the point where all three women had to go into 
hiding. As a result of her experiences, Wu considers the internet an increas-
ingly unsafe place, where women and girls who speak out against sexism 
are routinely and seriously intimidated. Recent protests against the typical 
sexist representations of female characters in comic books and magazines 
have also caused much controversy.
Female singers, performers, and dancers who are hyped as ‘sexual per-
sonae’ in the media trigger a lot of hatred, and controversy too. Feminist 
women today read Miley Cyrus’s hyper-sexy performances – in combination 
with her postings on Instagram – as a freedom practice that critically creates 
a new sexual persona, subverting the traditional gender binary. Equally, 
male performers such as Stromae function as inspiring gender fluid new 
sexual personae. Kristen Stewart, who in recent years defies any labels – by 
refusing to ‘tell all’ and preferring to live in ‘the grey zone’ – likewise is a 
role model to many.
Singer and dancer FKA Twigs, born Tahliah Debrett Barnett has also been 
heavily criticized, in sexist and racist terms, for her porno-chic performance 
style. FKA-Twigs refuses however to conform to standard norms of hetero-
sexual beauty, often wearing a nose ring and dressing up in unexpected 
ways. She produces and controls her own video clips and performances, 
takes the lead in her group of dancers, and speaks in a voice that is out-
spokenly anti-racist and implicitly feminist. Her style is overdetermined 
as a freedom practice conform our f ive core characteristics – expressing 
new ‘forms’ that break the moulds of submissive femininity through the 
performance of dance and music, within a circle of friends, in a shared 
artistic practice, comprising various ‘keys’.25
members of the judging panel, for directing f ive spin-off f ilms focusing on different characters 
from the story, to be released via social media. 
25 Feminist ‘total’ disapprovals of cosmetic surgery as well should be reconsidered from this 
perspective. Other than Kathy Davis (1995; 2003), Heyes (2007) outlines cosmetic surgery and 
dieting as disciplining and normalizing techniques per se, and recommends for women to turn 
to yoga and other practices that counter ‘the mental anguish and dis-ease caused by corporeal 
162 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
normalization’ (Heyes 2007: 121), so as to move us into freedom without ever dieting again 
(cf. 129). But cosmetic surgery as well can be a self-technique in the context of an ethical life 
project, involving a freedom practice, as was dieting in ancient Greece according to Foucault 
(cf. Foucault 1986a). ‘Beauty’ as such can be overdetermined as a self-technique in the context 
of a freedom practice, as is illustrated by Muslim women who use beauty in the context of their 
ethical life projects challenging patriarchy (cf. Chapter 3). 
FKA Twigs live in Paradiso, Amsterdam (2015)
Photographer: Bobo Boom
retrieved from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/fotnmc/16549707049/
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From the examples discussed above, we can conclude that new ‘f igures’ 
of female sexual agency are emerging that comprise women’s singular 
personalities, created in critically creative, slow, and arduous work within 
the mythical realm of the popular media, in a grim f ight with its dominant 
‘visual forms’. While the dominant f igure of the female sexual agent spread 
by the popular media comprises stereotypical behaviour and characteristics 
of female sexiness, as analysed by Gill and others, a new female sexual agent 
has appeared that breaks the mould of the old Myths of Woman: a female 
‘sexual persona’ who walks, dances, and moves, to paraphrase Beauvoir, 
and that is involved in work and in concrete activities in the world.
In that sense, post-feminist-neoliberal models of woman- and girlhood 
are to be conceived of as dominant models of personhood, rather than 
exclusive ones. New kinds of female sexual agency that emerge today in the 
context of collective freedom practices in the mythical domain of popular 
culture, prove Duits and Van Zoonen (2006) right in arguing for an open and 
critical eye for the various relationships of women and girls to porno-chic 
fashion. A bottom up approach of ‘studying upwards’ is necessary. Many 
girls and women, however, are unaware of the ways the popular media 
manipulate their own choices to be sexy ‘at a distance’. Many lack the 
vocabulary or tools to distinguish more liberating ‘forms’ of female sexual 
agency from schematic sexist ones. The truly new f igures of female sexual 
agency that are emerging today in freedom practices within the mythical 
domain, may, and already do, inspire and encourage them to resist the 
sexist ‘visual forms’ and expert advice of the popular media that we are 
bombarded with on a daily basis.26
26 Cf. for an example: http://stylecaster.com/how-to-be-sexy/ (last accessed, 21 September 2016).

5 Feminism in a New Key
We live in a ‘period of transition,’ Beauvoir concluded in 1949. Abstract rights 
are ‘far from wholly granted to women,’ and, moreover, they ‘have never 
been suff icient to guarantee woman a concrete hold on the world: ‘there 
is not yet real equality today between the two sexes’ (Beauvoir 2010: 155).
Today, we are still living this period of transition. Important break-
throughs have been reached by and for women in law, politics, and econom-
ics, in the West and elsewhere. Slow but steady movements are taking place 
under the radar in gender egalitarian directions in the Islamic world – where 
women, on the basis of a strict domestic-public dichotomy, are treated 
as essentially domestic beings (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2006); and similarly, in 
other places in the world, where women increasingly accede the public 
sphere and f ight, often together with men, to improve their position in the 
‘private’ sphere. But everywhere the powers that be are still predominantly 
male. A millennia old status hierarchy between men and women persists 
everywhere and the patriarchal patterns described by Beauvoir are appar-
ently more resilient than she, and many with her, suspected. Langer (1960) 
stated that the human mind is ‘a slippery customer; if one door is closed to 
it, it f inds, or even breaks, another entrance to the world. If one symbolism 
is inadequate, it seizes another’ (Langer 1960: 69-70). In a similar vein, 
we concluded that patriarchy is making new entrances and, like a hydra, 
grows new heads when others are cut off. Beauvoir’s study The Second Sex 
comprises a still indispensable toolset for analysing the multiple dimensions 
of these patterns today, in their old and new shapes across continents.
While some men in the West complain that women have gained the 
upper hand and that they are the ones that are being crushed, it is neolib-
eralism that invalidates them, as was signalled by Beauvoir for the US. If 
‘the American male is crushed,’ she wrote, it is by the Organization, and 
not by the female – since the American woman still ‘remains a depend-
ent and relative being’ (Beauvoir 1999: 133). Beauvoir explicitly criticized 
‘Organization Society’ and its models of Organization Man and Super 
Woman, which Foucault conceptualized in terms of an American type of 
‘neoliberal governmentality’ and a neoliberal model of the ‘entrepreneurial 
self’. Her critique of these models of self and society is more relevant than 
ever, since they are spreading across the globe – universalizing competition 
and ‘market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institu-
tions’ (Lemke 2001: 197) – under the banners of freedom, ‘feminism’ and 
democracy, equally crushing men and women.
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Contra these individualist, competitive models, Beauvoir’s original 
feminism favours a model of an ethical self that, out of concern for fellow 
human beings, develops a personal ethical life project within a collective 
setting, rather than being its counterpoint – a perspective that we, with the 
help of the f inal Foucault’s concepts, coined in terms of a concept of ethical 
‘freedom practices’. The concept balances personal and communitarian 
dimensions as two sides of the same coin: a personal ethical life project is 
developed within a collective setting, the fabric of which is the personal 
ethical life projects of its members. The concept of freedom practices thus 
refers to distinct sets of critically creative ethical life projects. Surpassing 
notions of autonomy, the concept captures women’s struggles all over the 
world for women’s access to a personal ethical life project within their 
respective communities. The concept also allows for a critical reformulation 
of feminism in terms of a freedom practice itself; more precisely, in terms 
of an assemblage of identif iable, distinct sets of critically creative ethical 
life projects.
While the ancient myth of the Lernean hydra holds that the monster’s 
‘immortal head’ had to be finally slayed, in The Second Sex Beauvoir suggests 
that the ‘Myths’ of Woman as Nature comprise patriarchy’s most resilient 
head today. Her concept of ‘Myths’ covers the three so-called presentational 
realms in terms of Langer (1960); namely, rite, art, and mythical secular 
tales. Their dominant ‘forms’ today still ‘picture’ the old status hierarchy 
between the sexes, rather than conveying that ‘the real relation is one of 
reciprocity’ (Beauvoir 2010: 275). Changing the dominant ‘forms’ in these 
domains is necessary, as happens today by women engaged in critically 
creative freedom practices in these realms.
Muslim women are moving the domain of rite, pushing limits in the 
Islamic world as well as in their communities elsewhere (cf. Chapter 3); 
Islamic feminists re-articulate and re-contextualize Islamic idea(l)s in 
critically creative freedom practices, im- or explicitly critiquing the old 
status hierarchy between the sexes, developing new ritual ‘forms’ and new 
visions for their societies.
Mythical tales, or collective ‘dream narratives’, in the shape of popular 
media hypes turn out to be patriarchy’s most resilient head in the West 
today. Hollywood hypes especially fulf il the role of mythical tales, and still 
recycle the old Myths of Woman as Nature. Movie stars, and other media 
hyped performers, revive the ancient ‘pagan pantheon of physically perfect, 
openly sexual gods and goddesses’ (Paglia 2013: 2). As ‘sexual personae’ they 
still embody the stereotypical Myths of femininity. The dominant visual 
‘forms’ of the popular media are often identif ied as ‘merely’ superf icial 
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(or ‘super-structural’), but they are the bearers of ideas that ‘insinuate’ 
themselves ‘in each consciousness’ (cf. Beauvoir 2010: 281). As long as they 
still convey a ‘picture’ of Womanhood and of sexual love based on the Myths 
of Woman as Nature, the penalty on female ambition continues – since 
male partners are supposed to be women’s superiors. As long as girls and 
women still dream through men’s dreams, that is, many will hesitate to 
leave their ‘comfort zone’.
But other women and girls today do engage in critically creative freedom 
practices in this realm, in f ierce battles moving the dominant mythical 
‘forms’ of the game industry the f ilm industry, and the showbiz industry 
with its ‘sexual personae’ of media hyped performers. They are changing the 
dominant ‘forms’ of Woman as man’s Other, shifting these in the direction 
of reciprocal relationships between men and women, or even of gender 
f luidity. Many other studies show how women all over the world in the 
domain of art move the dominant gender-images, as for instance the punk 
rock protest group Pussy Riot does in Russia today, in an equally grim f ight 
(cf. Braidotti and Dolphijn 2015).
Rite, art, and mythical tales comprising ‘modes of thought’ in their own 
right, are the producers of ‘new conceptual forms’ that, Langer argues, a 
‘Philosophy in a New Key’ should build on (Langer 1960: Preface, 71, 238). 
A ‘feminism in a new key’, in a similar vein, builds on women’s freedom 
practices that critically create ‘new conceptual forms’ in the realm of rite, 
art, and myth. It recognizes that argumentative discourses are not suf-
f icient, let alone decisive today, and that crucial battles take place in these 
‘presentational’ realms.
Whereas to Paglia the stereotypical Myths of Woman as Nature are truly 
immortal, they turn out to lose their monopoly today. The hydra is on its 
way to the sky, turning into a constellation (cf. the cover), in a new dawn 
for the second sex. While the dominant ‘forms’ of mythical tales, art, and 
rite, insinuate the Myths of Woman in essentially material, social ways, 
they themselves prove to change under the influence of societal changes.
A feminism in a new key not only recognizes more ‘keys’ than verbal 
argumentative language alone. It also recognizes that the plurality of faces 
and heads of the hydra demand for a plurality of strategies. It also recognizes 
the new heads of the hydra that pop up today, in the shape of a ‘compulsory 
sexual agency’ for women and girls in the Western world, a masculinist 
political revival in different parts of the world, the new opportunities of-
fered by the internet for sexual abuse, and the rise of transnational networks 
of traff icking in women and children. New international ‘jihadist’ move-
ments operating ‘in the name of Allah’, comprising a mixture of modern 
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technology and extreme machismo, also prove that patriarchy is a hydra 
in fact. While they according to Charlotte Wiedemann (2014), represent a 
‘last gasp of archaic masculinity,’ they actually illustrate – as do the other 
phenomena mentioned – that patriarchy as a hydra grows new heads. Even 
when the monster will be projected in the sky, scattered fragments will 
always fall back to the earth, trying to rear new ugly heads. Out of a will 
to power in Nietzschean sense – or a striving for self-certainty in Hegelian 
terms – people will always try to dominate others and sexual violence and 
oppression is but one of its many manifestations. Women’s explicitly critical 
freedom practices, in plural ‘keys’, will always be necessary, by those who 
are able or willing to engage in them. Others will simply live their lives as 
a freedom practice in an implicit critique of any gender domination.
Finally, an existential ethical perspective as such, as present in Beauvoir’s 
work as well as in Foucault’s f inal work, elucidates the new alliances that 
emerge today between groups of people throughout cultures. They share an 
orientation to an existential type of ethics, namely an ethics that is devel-
oped and lived by persons within their own communities – in an implicit 
or explicit critique of an abstract morality that is forced upon people. As 
such, they are open to a more general perspective. In the words of Beauvoir, 
‘the assertion’ of ‘particular solidarities’ need not ‘contradict the will for 
universal solidarity,’ since as a ‘f inite undertaking’ they are also ‘open to 
the totality of men’ (Beauvoir 1948: 144). As she phrases it: ‘(i)t is f itting that 
the black f ight for the black,1 the Jew for the Jew, the proletarian for the 
proletarian, and the Spaniard in Spain.’ However, ‘each one must carry on 
his struggle in connection with that of the other and by integrating it into 
the general pattern’ (cf. Beauvoir 1948: 89).
Ethical ‘freedom practices’ in particular, as distinct sets of critically crea-
tive ethical life projects that invent new ethical ways of life, and new models 
for self and society, are bound to each other by sharing an existential ethical 
perspective. The various sets of women’s freedom practices, in a plurality of 
‘keys’ and contexts, likewise connect out of their sharing this perspective, 
and their goal of women’s access to a personal ethical life project within 
their communities. A feminism in a new key in world perspective, comprises 
all kinds of culturally plural support between women’s various freedom 
practices, as is, for instance, illustrated by the cross-cultural feminist media 
strategies that emerged over the past years (cf. Chapter 3). An example related 
to politics in the stricter sense is the coalition that developed over the past 
years in Morocco between secular and Islamic feminists in a campaign for 
1 My translation. The French reads ‘le noir,’ other than the English translation ‘negro’.
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the reform of the family law (cf. Ennaji, Sadiqi, and Vintges 2016). Sadiqi (2006) 
concludes that this ‘unique combination of activism by secular and religious 
women’ greatly contributed to the coming about of the new family law in 
2004, which involves real progress for women in Morocco.2
Moroccan scholar Yafout comments:
It’s true that the view from the outside is that the two feminisms in 
Morocco still see each other as enemies. But when you use the word 
enemy, politics comes into play: in Morocco it’s politics that does not want 
the various strands of Moroccan life to unite. There is always a politics 
that wants to divide and rule and that contributes to confrontations. But 
seen from another, more positive point of view, the two feminism learn 
a lot from each other (Yafout 2013; cf. Yafout 2015).
The coalitions between religious and secular feminists in Morocco, involve 
new perspectives not only for future developments in Morocco but also in 
a wider sense.
An earlier example of such a coalitional politics is Beauvoir’s defence 
of Muslim women during the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962). 
Beauvoir sided with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), which 
directed the war for Algeria’s independence against French colonialism – a 
struggle that, to her, was comparable to the struggle of the resistance move-
ment against Nazism during the Second World War. In her autobiography, 
Beauvoir expresses her outrage and shame about the French army’s systemic 
use of torture against the population in Algeria, and about the daily hostil-
ity towards the population of 200,000 Algerian Muslims living in France 
(Beauvoir 1968b: passim). As Julien Murphy (1995) comments, ‘Beauvoir 
understood her situation in light of anti-Muslim racism. By the time her 
thoughts were drawn to the Algerian war, she had visited America, felt 
her whiteness in Harlem, and seen American apartheid, which she spoke 
out against in America Day by Day. She was appalled by the widespread 
chauvinism and the depth of racism in France’ (Murphy 1995: 289). She 
urgently wished to do something and focused on the position of women in 
the Algerian war, especially on the disparate treatment of female prisoners 
who were routinely raped by paratroopers and soldiers (cf. 270-271).
2 Sadiqi (2006) summarizes that the law ‘mandates full equality between men and women as 
“head of household,” full authority for state courts in matters of divorce, creation of special family 
courts, and the possibility of maternal custody in the event of divorce.’ For further discussion 
of the substantial reforms that took place, see: Souad Eddouada (2008).
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Beauvoir acted on behalf of, among others, Jacqueline Guerroudj-Netter, 
her former student in Rouen, who was sentenced to death for her involve-
ment in the Algerian independence struggle.3 Invited by lawyer Gisèle 
Halimi, she contributed to the defence of Algerian Muslim woman Djamila 
Boupacha, who was an active member of the FLN. Boupacha was accused 
of having planted a bomb at the center of Algiers, an action that she after 
several weeks of imprisonment and torture confessed, but afterwards 
denied. Beauvoir, in defence of Boupacha, wrote a polemic article in Le 
Monde in June 1960, formed a political action committee, and contributed 
to a book compiled by Halimi on behalf of Boupacha’s case.
Beauvoir never met Boupacha in person, but, as Murphy states, together 
with Halimi, they formed a successful alliance, all three being ‘middle-class 
and French educated, but of different religious backgrounds, Christian, Jew-
ish, and Muslim respectively’ (274). They educated the men of France about 
the significance of rape and succeeded in postponing Boupacha’s trial, until 
she was released from prison in 1962 under the Evian treaty. Presiding over 
the Djamila Boupacha committee, Beauvoir in a ‘transnational feminist ges-
ture,’ demanded attention to the ‘gendered violence’ by the French military 
against women, i.e. the use of rape as a weapon of war (Khanna 2008: 90, 81).4
When Boupacha was released from prison and was taken against her 
will to Algeria by the FLN, Halimi asked Beauvoir to again speak up for 
Boupacha. Beauvoir refused, however, arguing that as a French intellectual 
she had no right to intervene in the movement’s decisions. In her memoirs, 
Halimi expresses her disappointment about Beauvoir, who, according to 
her, acted as an ‘entomologist’ rather than a sister-in-arms.
Kruks (2012), however, argues that Beauvoir was always keenly aware of 
her privileged situation as a white, middle-class person, and struggled with 
the dilemma of how to act on behalf of oppressed others without reaff irm-
ing her own privilege, or being self ish and hypocritical. She did not try ‘to 
immerse herself in the lived experience of Algerians,’ but, aware of her privi-
leged status, she ‘learned to deploy it as a basis for effective, public, political 
intervention’ (Kruks 2012: 111).5 Instead of refraining from action, she decided 
3 Her daughter Djamila Amrane – who was also sentenced to death for her FLN-activism – 
published a study on the role of women in the Algerian war (Amrane 1991).
4 Cf. the Telef ilm Pour Djamila, by Caroline Huppert (2014). 
5 Mary Caputi (2006), in a discussion of Halimi’s critique on Beauvoir, argues that Beauvoir’s 
actions demonstrated sensitivity to oppression, as well as a conviction that she had to intervene 
on behalf of those struggling against injustice (Caputi 2006: 121). Beauvoir primarily wished for 
a recognition of Boupacha’s suffering. She did not meet Boupacha since ‘what was needed was 
not more knowledge of her situation but a response to it’ (123).
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to take responsibility for her own ‘identity’ (103; cf. Harding 1991: 290), by 
making Boupacha visible as a concrete person to the French public: her 
interventions in Boupacha’s cause were directed to her own countrymen.6
To Lugones and Spelman (1983), a non-imperialist feminism requires 
friendship, instead of ready-made theories to frame women’s lives. Only 
from within friendship can a mutual understanding and dialogue take place 
that does not reduce women to an abstract category, but rather can lead 
to ‘joint theory-making’ (Lugones and Spelman 1983: 581). The same often 
applies to joint practices, as is clear from the examples of cross-cultural 
feminist media strategies discussed in the previous chapter. From my own 
cooperation and discussions with orthodox believing women from different 
backgrounds, mutual understanding and sympathy for each other can 
overcome boundaries of national and ethnic descent in ways that rational 
discourse cannot. However, support is possible as well on other grounds, 
as is illustrated by Beauvoir’s actions.
During the Khomeini revolution in Iran, Beauvoir, in March 1979, deliv-
ered a speech at a press conference in Paris, on the eve of a trip to Iran by 
an international women’s delegation, in response to calls for help from a 
large number of Iranian women to international feminists. In her speech, 
Beauvoir summarized that the f irst task of the women’s delegation was 
to acquire information concerning the struggle of Iranian women, com-
municating that information, and supporting their struggle. She concluded: 
‘I repeat that this matter is essentially an effort of gathering information, 
an information gathering mission in order to put ourselves in contact with 
Iranian women, in order to know their demands and the ways in which 
they plan to struggle’ (Beauvoir 2015e: 269). She emphasized the need to 
support Iranian women from their point of view, instead of imposing a 
Western feminist perspective.
While feminism in world perspective consists of a set of distinct freedom 
practices, to Beauvoir they share the task of ‘the transformation of society 
along with the transformation of women’s place in it’ (Schwarzer 1984: 116). 
According to her, ‘the successes of some few privileged women neither 
compensate for nor excuse the systematic degrading of the collective level’ 
(Beauvoir 2010: 154). For women’s social and political status to really change, 
according to her, we need societies that accept responsibility for the raising 
of children and that provide conditions like free childcare, parental leave, 
6 Beauvoir was disappointed about the situation of women in Algeria, after the independence. 
She states: ‘Fanon thought they would become emancipated after the Algerian war. On the 
contrary, they have been crushed’ (Moorehead 1974: 32; quoted in Murphy 1995: 203).
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equal chances, and equal pay (cf. 776-777). At several points in The Second 
Sex, Beauvoir hints at the necessity for societies to move in a socialist di-
rection in order to provide these conditions.7 But she immediately adds 
that this has to be a new kind of socialism (cf. 68). State-socialist regimes 
have never done what they promised: modifying women’s economic situ-
ation is not enough. Instead, for a real transformation ‘(e)verything would 
change – ideologies, myths, relationships between spouses and within each 
person, between parents and children and between everyone and society’ 
(Beauvoir 2015c: 94).
Today, many women still get f ired as soon as they get pregnant – meaning 
that their temporary contracts of employment ‘unfortunately cannot be 
renewed’. Women moreover do most of the unpaid domestic and care work. 
Social security and social organization of care work are important causes 
for feminism; not because all women are care-takers per se, but because 
they are most at risk of being reduced to their caring role as soon as they 
have children. Today, arguments for a society that accepts its responsibility 
for care work are more important than ever, in view of the excessive and 
competitive working conditions of the pitiless rat-race that is the world 
market, and in view of the current neoliberal dismantling of the welfare 
state in the West.
To push and elaborate Beauvoir’s argument in The Second Sex in this 
respect, I turn to Foucault’s concept of a new kind of social security. Fou-
cault criticized socialism for offering no alternative to the statist kind of 
governmentality that controls and manages the whole social body. While 
Daniel Zamora and Michael Behrent (2016) argue that he turned to neolib-
eralism as an alternative for stif ling governmental regimes, Foucault, in 
fact, conceived of neoliberalism in similar terms – namely, as a coercive 
governmental regime that, in indirect ways, manipulates people with 
behavioural techniques into acting as a competitive entrepreneurial self 
in all domains of life (cf. Chapter 2).
Dean (2014) more adequately captures Foucault’s trajectory, arguing that 
Foucault looked ‘into the liberal and neoliberal political repertoire to f ind 
ways of renovating social democratic or socialist politics and escaping its 
perceived fatal statism’ (Dean 2014: 437).8
7 She later specif ied that a socialist development is a necessary but not suff icient condition 
for the achievement of gender equality, and emphasized the importance of an independent 
women’s movement (cf. Schwarzer 1984). 
8 As is also clear from Foucault’s desire to write a book on the art of government and socialist 
politics (cf. 437; cf. Foucault 2008: 100 n. 53). 
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Foucault, in a 1983 interview on the social security system in France 
(Foucault 1988), talks about the problems of the current social security 
system as having the ‘perverse effects’ of an ‘increasing rigidity of certain 
mechanisms’ and a ‘growth of dependence’ arising from people’s integration 
in the social security system itself (Foucault 1988: 160, 162). As an alternative, 
he hints at a synthesis of people’s ‘lifestyles’ and the functioning of social 
security, so as to attain the aim of ‘optimal social security combined with 
maximum independence’ (165). But this involves us undertaking a ‘process 
of decentralization’ and ‘transform[ing] the f ield of social institutions into 
a vast experimental f ield […] to get the desired change’ (165; cf. Dean 2014: 
437). Synthesizing social security schemes with people’s (sets of) personal 
ethical ways of life, or ‘freedom practices’, is the perspective that Beauvoir 
also hints at when she argues for a new kind of ‘democratic socialism where 
classes would be abolished but not individuals’ (Beauvoir 2010: 69).
Today, a plurality of, often trans-local, grassroots movements, as social 
laboratories are creating alternatives to dominant neoliberal models of self 
and society. Countless cooperatives and community-based organizations 
are to be found across continents ‘that cover every aspect of modern life’, 
from food sovereignty i.e. local food production and consumption, fair trade, 
and global water justice to ‘health care, housing, caring for the environment, 
north-south trade relationships, non-violent dispute resolution, helping 
immigrants and refugees, education’ (Tully 2009: 25). For these ‘cooperative 
citizens,’ the ethical norm is ‘being the change,’ and to them ‘means and ends 
are one and the same’ (25). Cooperative citizens, do not wait for governments 
or for a world revolution, but bring new alternatives into being here and 
now, ‘step by ethical step’, linking words and deeds, in line with Foucault’s 
preferred concept of critique and political action (cf. 24; cf. Chapter 2).
Feminists partake in many of these movements, but also have their own 
relatively independent freedom practices that develop practical ethical 
alternatives for self and society.9 Feminists, from their own perspectives, 
contribute to astute analyses of current global power configurations (for an 
9 While globalized, state and market ‘feminisms’ activate and skill women to become an 
entrepreneurial self, integrated into neoliberal capitalism, they may attribute to the destroying 
of indigenous life forms and economies. Feminism in a new key as a set of culturally plural 
freedom practices may contribute to the development of alternative, solidarity economies, based 
on cooperation, equality and sustainability. Within neoliberal market systems once established, 
openings can be found as well, in that, as Foucault suggested, the ‘growth of capabilities’ of people 
can be disentangled from dominant power regimes, authoritarian systems and disciplinary 
structures (cf. Foucault 1997e: 317; 1997c: 260), and ‘exceed the framing of the original activity’ 
(cf. Heyes 2007: 67). 
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excellent example see Cornwall et al. 2008), and to achieving new societal 
and economic alternatives that synthesize collective and personal ethical 
dimensions. A feminism in a new key draws from women’s multiple freedom 
practices, but also from feminisms of the past, re-interpreting them as 
critically creative freedom practices that comprise new ethical models 
for selves and societies, and for the world – without taking on board their 
essentialist claims.10 From this perspective, women’s transnational peace 
movements from the past can be an inspiration for our times.
10 Ahmed (1992) concludes that mainstream Western, ‘still-colonial,’ feminism should be 
turned into ‘a feminism that is vigilantly self-critical and aware of its historical and political 
situatedness’ (Ahmed 1992: 247). Only then can feminism, rather than serving Western interests, 
contribute to a common human enterprise, by developing some criteria – out of its passionate 
commitment to the realization of societies that ‘enable women to pursue without impediment 
the full development of their capacities and to contribute to their societies in all domains’ (248).
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Nadwī, Muḥammad Akram. 2007. Al-Muḥaddithāt: The Women Scholars in Islam. Oxford: 
Interface Publications.
Negra, Diane. 2009. What a Girl Wants? Fantasizing the Reclamation of Self in Postfeminism. 
London: Routledge.
Netherlands Institute for Social Research. 2012a. Closer Together? The Hague: The Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research.
—. 2012b. Muslims in the Netherlands. The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2007. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Okin, Susan. 1999. ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ In: J. Cohen, M. Howard, and M. Nuss-
baum (eds) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton: Princeton University Press. 7-24.
Oksala, Johanna. 2013. ‘Feminism and Neoliberal Governmentality.’ Foucault Studies, 16, 32-53.
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, 
London: Duke University Press.
186 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Oosterling, Henk. 2015. ‘Mesopolitical Interests: Rotterdam Skillcity as Rhizomatic, Ecosophical, 
Reflective Event.’ In: R. Braidotti and R. Dolphijn (eds) This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, 
Life. Leiden: Brill, 269-298.
Ortner, Sherry. 1974. ‘Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?’ In: M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere 
(eds) Woman, Culture, and Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 68-87.
Ouguir, Aziza. 2013. Female Religious Agents in Morocco: Old Practices and New Perspectives. 
PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam.
Oyewumi, Oyeronke. 1997. African Women and Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood. 
Trenton: Africa World.
Pagès, Iréne. 1975. ‘Beauvoir’s “Les Belles Images”: Desubstantif ication’ of Reality Through a 
Narrative.’ Forum for Modern Language Studies, 11:2, 133-141.
Paglia, Camille. 1990. Sexual Personae. New Haven: Yale University Press.
—. 1992. Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays. New York: Vintage.
—. 1994. Vamps & Tramps: New Essays. New York: Vintage.
—. 1995. ‘Interview with Camille Paglia.’ Playboy. May. http://maxxwolf.tripod.com/paglia_in-
terview.html (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
—. 2012. ‘Critic Camille Paglia Thinks “Revenge of the Sith” Is Our Generation’s Greatest Work of 
Art.’ In: Vice. 28 November. http://www.vice.com/read/camille-paglia-believes-that-revenge-
of-the-sith-is-our-generations-greatest-work-of-art (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
—. 2013. ‘Rebel with a Cause.’ In: ParisLike. February. http://www.parislike.com/EN/
happenings/39-Paglia.html (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pearlman, Julia. 2010. ‘Happily (For)ever After: Constructing Conservative Youth Ideology in 
the Twilight Series.’ BA Thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University, Middletown, 
Connecticut.
Pektas-Weber, Ceylan. 2007. ‘Dutch Muslim Women and Fundamentalism: Experiences, Results 
and Strategies.’ In: I. Dubel and K. Vintges (eds) Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism. 
Amsterdam: SWP Publishers, 12-24.
Pilardi, Jo-Ann. 1993. ‘The Changing Critical Fortunes of “The Second Sex.”’ History and Theory: 
Studies in the Philosophy of History, 32:1, 51-73.
Power, Nina. 2009. One Dimensional Woman. Winchester, Washington: Zero Books.
Prado, C.G. 2000. Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy. Boulder: Westview Press.
Prilleltensky, Isaac and Lev Gonick. 1996. ‘Polities Change, Oppression Remains: On the Psychol-
ogy and Politics of Oppression.’ Political Psychology, 17:1, 127-148.
Ramabai, Pandita. 1888. The High-caste Hindu Woman. Philadelphia: Press of the J.B. Rodgers.
Ramadan, Tariq. 2012. Islam and the Arab Awakening. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reynolds, Katherine and John Turner. 2010. ‘The Story of Social Identity.’ In: T. Postmes and N. 
Branscombe (eds) Rediscovering Social Identity: Key Readings. New York: Psychology Press, 13-32.
Rhouni, Raja. 2010. Secular and Islamic Feminist Critiques in the Work of Fatima Mernissi. Leiden: Brill.
Ringrose, Jessica. 2011. ‘Are You Sexy, Flirty, Or A Slut? Exploring “Sexualization” and How Teen 
Girls Perform/Negotiate Digital Sexual Identity on Social Networking Sites.’ In: R. Gill and 
C. Scharff (eds) New Femininities: Postfeminism, Neoliberalism and Subjectivity. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 99-116.
Rodgers, Catherine. 1995. ‘Elisabeth Badinter and “The Second Sex”: An Interview.’ Signs, 21:1, 147-162.
Roggeband, Conny. 2010. ‘The Victim-Agent Dilemma: How Migrant Women’s Organizations in 
the Netherlands deal with a Contradictory Policy Frame.’ Signs, 35:4, 943-967.
BIBlIoGrAPhy 187
Rose, Nikolas. 1990. Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London: Routledge.
Rose, Nikolas, Pat O’Malley and Mariana Valverde. 2006. ‘Governmentality.’ Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, 2, 83-104.
Rössler, Beate. 2002. ‘Problems with Autonomy.’ Hypatia, 17:4, 143-162.
—. 2013. ‘Kantian Autonomy and its Social Preconditions: On Axel Honneth’s Das Recht der 
Freiheit.’ Krisis: Tijdschrift voor Actuele Filosofie, 1, 14-18.
Rottenberg, Catherine. 2013. ‘The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism.’ Cultural Studies, 28:3, 418-437.
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. ‘The Traff ic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex.’ In: R. Rayna 
(ed.) Toward an Anthropology of Women. London, New York: Monthly Review Press, 157-210.
Sadiqi, Fatima. 2006. ‘Morocco’s Veiled Feminists.’ Project Syndicate. 25 May. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/morocco-s-veiled-feminists (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
—. 2012. Femmes et Médias dans la Région Méditerranéenne. Fez: Imprimerie Imagerie Pub Neon.
—. 2013. Interview. In: N. Andreu and K. Vintges. Women and Islam: New Perspectives. Documentary.
—. 2014. Moroccan Feminist Discourses. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
—. 2016. ‘Centrality of Women’s Movements in the Post-Revolution Dynamics in North Africa.’ 
In: F. Sadiqi (ed.) Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1-11.
Saharso, Sawitri. 2000. ‘Female Autonomy and Cultural Imperative: Two Hearts Beating 
Together.’ In: W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 224-242.
Salime, Zakia. 2005. Between Islam and Feminism: New Political Transformations and Movements 
in Morocco. PhD Thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Salzman, Philip Carl. 1999. ‘Is Inequality Universal?’ Current Anthropology, 40:1, 31-61.
Sanday, Peggy Reeves and Ruth Goodenough (eds). 1990. Beyond The Second Sex: New Directions 
in the Anthropology of Gender. Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press.
Sanday, Peggy Reeves. 1990. ‘Introduction.’ In: P. Sanday and R. Goodenough (eds) Beyond 
The Second Sex: New Directions in the Anthropology of Gender. Philadelphia: Philadelphia 
University Press, 1-21.
Sandberg, Sheryl. 2013. Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead. New York: Albert Knopf.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1995. Anti-Semite and Jew. New York: Schocken.
—. 2001 [1943]. Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. New York: 
Citadel Press.
Sawicki, Jana. 1991. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body. New York: Routledge.
Schimmel, Annemarie. 1975. Mystical Dimensions of Islam. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press.
Schinkel, Willem and Friso van Houdt. 2010. ‘The Double Helix of Cultural Assimilationism 
and Neo-liberalism: Citizenship in Contemporary Governmentality.’ The British Journal of 
Sociology, 61:4, 696-715.
Schlegel, Alice. 1977. ‘Male and Female in Hopi Thought and Action.’ In: A. Schlegel (ed.) Sexual 
Stratification. New York: Columbia University Press, 245-269.
Schwartzman, Lisa. 2006. Challenging Liberalism: Feminism as Political Critique. University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Schwarzer, Alice. 1984. After “The Second Sex”: Conversations with Simone de Beauvoir. New 
York: Pantheon Books.
Sciolino, Elaine. 1998. ‘Lifting the Veil.’ The New York Times. 22 March. http://www.nytimes.com/
books/98/03/22/reviews/980322.22scolint.html (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Scott, Joan. 2007. The Politics of the Veil. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
188 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Showalter, Elaine. 2001. Inventing Herself: Claiming a Feminist Intellectual Heritage. London: Picador.
Simons, Margaret. 1999. Beauvoir and the Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Exis-
tentialism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlef ield.
—. 2002. ‘Beauvoir and the Problem of Racism.’ In: J. Ward and T. Lott (eds) Philosophers on 
Race: Critical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 260-284.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2012. ‘Why Women Still Can’t Have It All.’ The Atlantic. July/August.
Slocum, Sally. 1975. ‘Woman the Gatherer: Male Bias in Anthropology.’ In: R. Rayna (ed.) Toward 
an Anthropology of Women. London, New York: Monthly Review Press, 36-50.
Smith, Margareth. 1984 [1928]. Rabi’a the Mystic and her Fellow-Saints in Islam. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Spelman, Elizabeth. 1988. Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. London: 
Beacon Press.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ In: C. Nelson and L. Grossberg 
(eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 271-313.
Statistics Netherlands. 2008. Annual Report on Integration. The Hague, the Netherlands: CBS.
—. 2013. Annual Report on Integration. The Hague, the Netherlands: CBS.
Stevens, Christa. 2012. ‘Werewere Liking.’ In: C. Ceton, A. Halsema, I. van der Burg, K. Vintges, and 
V. Vasterling (eds) Vrouwelijke filosofen: een historisch overzicht. Amsterdam: Atlas, 486-492.
Stuurman, Siep. 2004a. ‘How to Write a History of Equality?’ Leidschrift. 19:3, 40-62.
—. 2004b ‘The Voice of Thersites: Reflections on the Origins of the Idea of Equality.’ Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 65:2, 171-189.
—. Forthcoming. The Invention of Humanity: Equality and Cultural Difference in World History. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Tatsuo, Inoue. 1999. ‘Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism.’ In: J. Bauer and D. Bell (eds) The 
East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
—. 1994. ‘The Politics of Recognition.’ In: A. Gutmann (ed.). Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 25-73.
Taylor, Dianna. 2004. ‘Foucault’s Ethos: (Guide)post for Change.’ In: D. Taylor and K. Vintges (eds) 
Feminism and the Final Foucault. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 258-274.
Taylor, Dianna and Karen Vintges (eds). 2004. Feminism and the Final Foucault. Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press.
Thompson, Kevin. 2003. ‘Forms of Resistance: Foucault on Tactical Reversal and Self-Formation.’ 
Continental Philosophy Review, 36:2, 113-138.
Tidd, Ursula. 2004. Simone de Beauvoir. Routledge Critical Thinkers. New York, London: Routledge.
Tiqqun. 2010. Raw Materials for a Theory of the Young-Girl. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Tully, James. 2009. ‘The Crisis of Global Citizenship.’ Radical Politics Today. July http://research.
ncl.ac.uk/spaceofdemocracy/word%20docs%20linked%20to/Uploaded%202009/Tully/
The_Crisis_of_Global_Citizenship_James_Tully.pdf (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Van Baar, Huub. 2011. The European Roma: Minority Representation, Memory, and the Limits of 
Transnational Governmentality. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
Van Beek, Mariëtte. 2002, ‘Images of Lâlla cAwîsh, a Holy Woman from Marrakech.’ In: M. Marín 
and R. Deguilhem (eds) Writing the Feminine. Women in Arab Sources. London: Tauris, 199-219.
Van Heelsum, Anja. 2008. ‘Case Study on Diversity in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.’ Dublin: 
Eurofound.
BIBlIoGrAPhy 189
Van Leeuwen, Bart and Karen Vintges. 2010. ‘“A Dream Dreamed by Reason… Hollow like All 
Dreams”: French Existentialism and its Critique of Abstract Liberalism.’ Hypatia, 25:3, 653-674.
Van Oers, Ricky. 2013. Deserving Citizenship: Citizenship Tests in Germany, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. Leiden: Brill.
Van Oosten, Annemarie. 2015. Putting Things in Perspective. Young People’s Susceptibility to the 
Effects of Sexual Media Content. PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam.
Van Reybrouck, David. 2014. Congo: The Epic History of a People. Amsterdam: Harper Collins.
Van der Haak, Bregtje. 2008. Satellite Queens. Documentary.
Van der Valk, Ineke 2012. Islamophobia in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications – 
Amsterdam University Press.
Vargas Llosa, Mario. 1996. ‘Simone de Beauvoir: Les Belles Images.’ In: M. Vargas Llosa, Making 
Waves. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 55-58.
Vasterling, Veronica. 2013. [Pseudo]Scientific Gender Claims, Embedded Embodied Cognition & 
Feminist Phenomenology. Paper presented at The Future Directions in Feminist Phenomenol-
ogy Conference, 24 May, Ontario.
Veyne, Paul. 1993. ‘The Final Foucault and his Ethics.’ Critical Inquiry, 20:1, 1-9.
Vintges, Karen. 1996. Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de Beauvoir. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press [or. 1992. Filosofie als Passie: het denken van Simone de Beauvoir. 
Amsterdam: Prometheus.]
—. 1998. ‘Beauvoir’s Philosophy as the Hidden Paradigm of Contemporary Feminism.’ In: T. 
Akkerman and S. Stuurman (eds) Feminist Thought in European History: From the Middle 
Ages to the Present. London, New York: Routledge, 203-217.
—. 2001. ‘“Must We Burn Foucault?” Ethics as Art of Living: Simone de Beauvoir and Michel 
Foucault.’ Continental Philosophy Review, 34: 2, 165-181.
—. 2004a. ‘Endorsing Practices of Freedom. Feminism in a Global Perspective.’ In: D. Taylor and 
K. Vintges (eds) Feminism and The Final Foucault. Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 275-299.
—. 2004b. ‘Beauvoir’s Autobiography: “Auto-f iction” or Selftechnique?’ In: Y. Raynova and S. 
Moser (eds) Simone de Beauvoir: 50 Jahre nach dem ‘Anderen Geschlecht’. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang GmbH, 203-211.
—. 2005. ‘Some Hypes and Some Hope: Women and Islam in the Western Media.’ Concilium: 
Islam and Enlightenment, 5, 41-48.
—. 2007. ‘The Life of Rabia al Adawiyya: Reflections on Feminism and Fundamentalism.’ In: 
I. Dubel and K. Vintges (eds) Women, Feminism and Fundamentalism. Amsterdam: SWP 
Publishers, 53-60.
—. 2011. ‘Freedom and Spirituality.’ In: D. Taylor (ed.) Michel Foucault: Key Concepts. Durham: 
Acumen Press, 99-110.
—. 2012. ‘Muslim Women in the Western Media: Foucault, Agency, Governmentality and Ethics.’ 
European Journal of Women Studies, 19: 3, 283-298.
—. 2013. ‘Erotic Capital?’ Krisis: Tijdschrift voor Actuele Filosofie, 1, 131-134.
—. 2016. ‘Women and Islam in the Western Media.’ In: M. Ennaji (ed.) New Horizons of Muslim 
Diaspora in North America and Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 153-162.
—. Forthcoming. ‘Misunderstanding in Paris.’ In: N. Bauer and L. Hengehold (eds) The Blackwell 
Companion to Simone de Beauvoir. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers.
Wadud, Amina. 1999. Qurʼan and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
—. 2006. Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam. Oxford: Oneworld.
190 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Walters, William. 2012. Governmentality: Critical Encounters. London: Routledge.
Weber, Max. 1968 [1921]. Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press.
Westlund, Andrea. 2009. ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy.’ Hypatia, 24:4, 26-49.
White, Stephen. 2000. Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Whyte, William. 1956. The Organization Man. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Wiedemann, Charlotte. 2014. The Last Gasp of Archaic Masculinity? 26  September, 
https://en.qantara.de/content/contrasting-images-of-islam-the-last-gasp-of-archaic- 
masculinity (last accessed, 21 September 2016).
Wilkinson, Maryn. 2014. ‘The Makeover and the Malleable Body in 1980s American Teen Film.’ 
International Journal of Cultural Studies, 18:3, 385-391.
Yafout, Merieme. 2013. Interview. In: N. Andreu and K. Vintges. Women and Islam: New Perspec-
tives. Documentary.
—. 2015. ‘Islamist Women and the Arab Spring: Discourse, Projects, and Conceptions.’ Compara-
tive Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 35:3, 588-604.
Young, Brigitte. 2000. ‘Disciplinary Neoliberalism in the European Union and Gender Politics.’ 
New Political Economy, 5:1, 77-98.
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young, Robert. 2006. ‘Sartre: The African Philosopher.’ In: Jean-Paul Sartre. Colonialism and 
Neocolonialism. London, New York: Routledge, ix-xxviii.
Zabrodska, Katerina, Sheridan Linnell, Cath Laws, and Bronwyn Davies. 2011. ‘Bullying as 
Intra-Active Process in Neoliberal Universities.’ Qualitative Inquiry, 17:8, 709-719.
Zamora, D. and M. Behrent (eds) 2016. Foucault and Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Zein Ed-Din, Nazirah. 1982. ‘Removing the Veil and Veiling.’ Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 5:2, 221-226.
Zerelli, Linda. 2005. Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 Index
Abbeysbooks 136, 147, 150-152
Abstract humanism 27, 49
Abstract morality 24, 28, 168
Abu-Lughod, Lila 59, 63
Academic philosophy 50, 69-70
Activation techniques 37, 116
Adawiyya, Rabia al 98, 102
Advertisements 85, 130
Aesthetics of existence 40, 48
African scholars 77
Agency 31, 36, 40, 46-47, 59, 63-64, 78, 95, 122, 
134-135, 138, 145-146, 150, 152-154, 163, 167
Ahmed, Leila 78, 97, 99-100, 102-103, 109, 112, 
121, 174
Akersloot-Berg, Betzy 10, 78-79
Alcibiades 88
Algeria 85, 100-101, 123, 169-171
Al-Ghazali, Zaynab 97, 109
Al-Hibri, Azizah 107
Al Nisa -Dutch Muslim women’s organization 
124-125
Altman, Meryl 26







Androcentric 71, 76, 102, 113
Antigone 82
Anthropological, anthropologist 62, 76, 80, 148
Anti-fan 154-155




Arab world 17, 100, 103, 105
Arendt, Hannah 89
Argumentative discourses 167
Art 16, 20, 28-29, 42, 44-46, 48-49, 68-70, 86-89, 
92, 94, 118, 129, 136, 138, 142, 166-167, 172
Art of living, art of life 29, 44-46, 48, 68, 88-89
Ascesis, ascetic exercises 40-41, 43, 49, 53, 66, 
94, 97, 100
Ascribed identities 89
Atomistic conception of the self 61, 133
Authenticity 17
Autonomy 16-17, 27, 36, 43, 59-61, 63, 66-67, 71, 
82, 96, 134, 166
Autonomous individuals 35
Baar, Huub van 9, 18, 37, 117
Badinter, Elisabeth 96, 123
Badiou, Alain 137
Badran, Margot 107, 112
Bakare-Yusuf, Bibi 77-78
Ballah, Fatima 9, 119
Bardot, Brigitte 140-141, 145
Barlas, Asma 9, 103, 106-107, 109, 112-114, 121
Bartky, Sandra 78, 133-134
Bascom, William 148
Bauer, Nancy 9, 73, 76, 91, 134
Beauty 49, 132, 134, 136, 139-140, 148, 161-162
Beauvoir, Simone de 11-12, 15-19, 21-29, 47-51, 
56-57, 67-68, 71-78, 80-83, 85-87, 91, 123, 









Bingen, Hildegard von 92
Biological, biology 30, 72, 74, 81, 86, 99, 139, 142
Biopolitics 32-33
Bios 45
Bloem, Jeannette 10, 53
Borren, Marieke 89
Boupacha, Djamila 123, 170-171
Bracke, Sarah 64, 115
Braidotti, Rosi 88, 167
Brink, Marieke van den 12
Brown, Wendy 46
Buddhism 77
Buitelaar, Marjo 9, 16, 122
Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization 22-23, 111, 120
Butler, Judith 63, 82, 90
Capitalism 35, 173
Caputi, Mary 170
Care of the self 39-44, 47, 52, 65, 88
Career 21, 23-24, 132, 136, 154-155
Caring for others 41, 47




Celebrities 126, 129, 146
Ceton, Carolien 52
Chakravarti, Uma 33, 94
Chicago School of Economics 33
Chinese culture 67





192 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Class 61, 77, 90, 118, 148, 170
class struggle 77
Code-oriented moralities 39, 66
Coercion 36, 38, 47, 88-89, 138
Colonialism 13, 56, 77, 169
Communitarian, communitarianism 38, 50, 166
Community, communities 41-42, 44, 49-51, 
53-54, 65, 68, 92-94, 110, 115, 159, 160, 173
Competitive femininity 133
Complementarity 80
Compulsory sexual agency 135, 146, 152, 167







Conversion (ethical) 25-27, 75
Core characteristics of freedom practices 90
Cooper, Anna Julia 56
Cooperative citizenship 173
Cosmetic surgery 44, 137, 149, 161-162
Courtly love 151-152
Crenshaw, Kimberlé 90
Critical 9, 13, 15-18, 29, 41-42, 44-49, 51-52, 57-61, 
67-68, 70-71, 78, 87, 89-92, 94-95, 112-113, 121, 
130, 146, 161, 163, 166-168, 170, 174
Cross-cultural strategies 16, 123, 125, 168, 171
Cross-cultural concept 16, 67, 70, 76, 90




Davidson, Arnold 41, 43, 51
Davis, Kathy 161
Decolonizing feminism 13
Dean, Mitchell 35, 172-173
Deleuze, Gilles 88
Descartes 50, 54
Dieting 43-44, 133, 149, 161-162
Disciplining techniques 30-31, 33, 161
Docile body 31, 46
Domination 41, 45, 47-49, 51, 90, 100, 143, 168
Dream-narratives 166
Duits, Linda 145-46, 163
Eddouada, Souad 9, 169
Education 11, 14, 23, 31, 34, 56, 70, 75, 100-101, 103, 
111, 115-120, 132, 144, 173
Egalitarian effects 99, 126
Egypt 95, 100, 103, 107
Egyptian piety movement 63-64
Empire 28, 59
Endemic feminism 102-103, 107, 112
Engaged freedom 25, 72
Enlightenment, Western 45
Ennaji, Moha 9, 16, 122, 165, 169
Entrepreneurial self 34, 51, 117, 137, 165, 172-173
Equality 12, 14, 56, 60, 80-83, 97, 99, 102, 107-108, 
113-114, 125, 165, 169, 172
equality effects 99
Equity 102
Erotic capital 136-138, 144-145, 153
Ethical self 16, 21, 26, 29, 50-52, 67-68, 70-71, 
90, 166
Ethical self-creation 41, 49, 51, 54, 67
Ethical self-formation, ethical techniques of 





Ethos 40-42, 45, 47-48, 92
Euripides 45
European thought 17
Existentialist, existentialism 24, 49-50, 56, 72, 
82, 148, 168
Existential ethical perspective 49-50, 72, 168
Exogamy 138
Expert knowledge 34-35
Fairy tales 69, 148
Family Law 103, 169
Fan f iction 147
Fanon, Frantz 77, 171
Female gaze 152
Female sexual agent 131, 134, 138, 144-146, 154, 
160, 163
Feminism, colonial 174
Feminism, contested concept 13
Feminism in a new key 17, 92, 167-168, 173-174
Feminism, second wave 61, 87
Feminism, transnational 170
Feminist freedom practices 89-92, 109, 160-161
Ferguson, Kathy 56
Film industry 160, 167
FKA Twigs 161-162
FLN 169-170
Forms of life 28, 89
Foucault, Michel 10, 15-19, 29-52, 57, 63, 65-67, 




Freedom practices 90, 123, 129, 131, 146, 160-163, 
166-168, 171, 173-174
Freud, Sigmund 81-82, 149
Friedman, Milton 33
Friendship 24, 26-27, 53, 75-76, 89, 118, 139, 148
Galster, Ingrid 81
Gaming industry 167
Game of Thrones 160
Gay movement 44, 46, 89
Gender 12-14, 16, 52, 54, 56, 60-61, 64, 77, 80-81, 
83-84, 90-92, 94-98, 100, 102-104, 106-107, 
INDex 193
109, 111, 113, 129-130, 132-134, 144, 147-148, 150, 




Gill, Rosalind 17, 35, 85, 131, 133-134, 136, 138, 
145-146, 163
Gines, Kathryn 56, 74, 77
Goffman, Erving 130
Gogh, Vincent van 78
Goldman, Emma 56-57
Göle, Nilüfer 110
Gordon, Colin 39, 77
Governmentality 31-32, 35-38, 112, 117, 132-133, 
165, 172
Governmentality studies, governmentality 
school 22, 35-36, 39, 46, 111, 134
Governmentalization of the state 32
Grand theory 18-19, 77
Grassroots movements 62-63, 115, 173
Greek ethics 17, 42, 44, 52
Group membership 42, 88
Gros, Frédéric 38-39, 41-42, 44
Growth of capabilities 43, 173
Guerroudj-Netter, Jacqueline 170
Haak, Bregtje van der 125







Havis, Devonya 50, 68-69
Hayek, Friedrich von 33
Headscarf 96, 109, 120-123, 145
Health care system 117, 119
Hegel 26-28, 48-50, 71-73, 76-78, 139, 168
Heidegger, Martin 50, 91
Hermeneutics 39, 42, 104, 113-114
Hetaera 53, 140
Heyes, Cressida 43-44, 88, 161-162, 173
Hierarchy between the sexes 86, 98, 139, 165-166
Hinduism 93
Historical materialism 72
Hollywood 129-130, 140, 146, 153, 155-156, 160
Hollywood f ilms 17, 140-141, 146, 149, 152-153
Hollywood hypes 130, 146, 166





Houdt, Friso van 116-117, 120
Human capital 34, 137
Human sciences 30
Husserl, Edmund 50, 72
Hidayatullah, Aysha 113-114
Hobbes, Thomas 61, 144
Hybrid assemblages, hybrid entanglement 37
Hydra 13, 16-17, 86, 91, 129, 133, 165-168
Hypatia 53
Hypomnemata 41, 44, 57
Identity 39, 68, 77, 88-90, 93-94, 111, 122, 136, 
155, 171





Interdependent, interdependence 26, 67, 72
Intersectional, intersectionality 19, 56, 90, 122
Iran, Iranian Revolution 65-66, 107, 114, 121, 123, 
125, 171
Islam 9-10, 13, 16, 62-64, 66-67, 78, 92, 95-98, 
100-115, 117, 121-122, 125-126, 165-166, 168
Islamic feminism 103, 107-112, 114, 125
International Congress on 125
Islamic history 78, 92, 96-97
Islamic State 95, 121
Islamic Women’s Manifesto 125
Islamism 103
Islamophobia 115
Jansen, Willy 81, 122
Jansen, Yolande 96, 100
Jasmine revolution 95
Jew 77, 168, 170
Jihadist movements 85, 167
Kahlo, Frida 78
Kalam Nawaem 125
Kant, Kantian 27-28, 45, 60-62, 67, 71, 96




Kruks, Sonia 51, 73, 88, 170
Labour 13-14, 34-35, 73, 76, 83, 85, 116, 137
Lacan, Jacques 153
Laicism 96
Langer, Monika 25, 28
Langer, Susanne 16, 69-70, 86-87, 90, 96-97, 
129-130, 138, 146, 165-167
Lemke, Thomas 34-35, 47, 165
Leontion 53
Lévi-Strauss, Claude 80, 130, 138-139
Liberalism, liberal theory 32-33, 59, 62, 88, 96, 
117
liberalism as governmental regime 32-33
Liberation 11, 29, 44-45, 51, 87, 103, 133, 169
Life-story 123
Liking, Werewere 50, 94
Lived experiences 74
Long, Imogen 123
194 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Love 26-27, 75-76, 82, 98-99, 107, 111, 132, 141, 143, 
145-157, 159-160, 167
Lugones, Maria 90, 171
Lundgren-Gothlin, Eva 71, 73, 76
Mahmood, Saba 59, 62-64, 114, 120, 122
Male dominance 11
Male gaze 141, 152
Management of the population 32
Management techniques, micro-management 
32, 35, 43, 46
Mann, Bonnie 150
Map making 19-20
Market shaped systems of action 34, 165
Martial arts 70
Marxist, Marxism 18, 35, 49-50, 71, 76-77, 82-83, 
88, 136-137
Massoumi, Narzanin 115
Master-slave theory 72-75, 77
Materialist feminism 91
Maxims 24, 27-28, 32, 60, 173
McLaren, Margaret 68, 71, 134
McRobbie, Angela 17, 35, 131-134, 137
McWhorter, Ladelle 71, 133
Mediascape 147
Media strategies 16, 123, 125-126, 168, 171
Mernissi, Fatima 101-102, 109
Method 11, 17, 33, 62
Microphysics of power 31-32
Migrant groups 116-117
Minimal freedom 36, 44, 46, 78
Minorities 88
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba 9, 107-109, 111-112, 125
Miller, Peter 22, 35-36, 47
Monistic approach 81-82
Moral agency 40, 63-64, 78
Moral codes, moral rules 39-40, 48, 50, 97, 150
Moral system 40, 122
Moralism 51, 100
Moroccan feminisms 16, 112
Moroccan female Suf i saints 101
Morocco 13, 95, 100-101, 107, 122, 127, 168-169
Multifactorialism 49, 54




Music 9, 68, 70, 85, 92, 94, 144, 151, 161
Muslim women, Muslim girls 13, 16, 19, 63-64, 
94-97, 99-103, 105-107, 109, 111-115, 117, 119-127, 
162, 166, 169, 175, 177, 186, 189
Muslim women scholars 16, 102-103
Mysticism 76, 97
Mystics 92, 98, 100
Mythical tales 69, 86-87, 129-131, 138, 140-141, 
146, 148, 166-167
Mythology 13, 69, 129, 148, 151
Myths 17, 69-70, 74, 72, 86-87, 94, 129-131, 133, 
135, 137-147, 149-151, 153-155, 157-163, 166-167, 
172
Myth of Woman 86-87, 140-141, 144-146, 150, 155
Nader, Laura 19
Narcissism 41, 149
Nassef, Mala Hifni 103
Nationalism 56, 88, 175
Nature 25-26, 53, 69, 72-74, 80, 86-87, 90, 
138-139, 142-146, 148-149, 152, 159, 166-167
Negra, Diane 149
Neo-Kantianism 96
Neoliberalism as exception 111
Neoliberal governmentality, neoliberalism as 
political regime 32-35, 37, 111, 117, 132-133, 165
Neoliberal economy 83
Neoliberal ‘feminism’ 133
Neoliberal models of self and society 35, 44, 
51, 173
Neoliberal woman 132, 134
Neuroscience 81
Nietzsche, Friedrich 50, 78, 144, 151
Nomadic life 89
Normalization 30-31, 40, 44, 88, 133, 162
Nussbaum, Martha 60, 62
Oedipus complex 81-82
Okin, Susan Moller 60, 96
Oksala, Johanna 83, 133
Ong, Aihwa 37, 111-112
Ontological freedom 71
Oppression 69, 77-78, 82, 94-95, 120, 138, 168, 170
Organization Man, the man of success 21-23, 29, 
33, 51, 132, 165
Organization Woman, the woman of success 
23-24
Ordo-liberalism, German 33
Othering 73-74, 77-78, 80, 122, 138
Other 25, 29, 73-76, 80, 139, 143, 168
absolute Other 74, 77, 86-87





Paglia, Camille 17, 129-131, 136, 138, 141-146, 
149-150, 152, 160, 166-167
Panopticon 31
Parrhesiastic, parrhesia 45-46, 48, 90
Pascal, Blaise 25
Pateman, Carol 84
Patchwork conception of society 37
Patriarchal power patterns 78, 85, 129
Patriarchy 12-13, 16-19, 74, 82, 86, 91, 96, 102, 107, 





Perfect, the 132-133, 138
Personality tests 23
Philosophy as a way of life 41, 50, 52, 64




Plural feminism 15-16, 168, 171, 173
Political action 170, 173
Political Islam 103, 111
Polygamy 108, 110
Polytemporality 18
Popular culture 129-130, 163
Popular media 85, 130, 133, 144-146, 163, 166
Porete, Marguerite 93
Porno-chic fashion 145, 161, 163
Pornography 85, 143
Postcolonial, postcolonialism 13, 17, 37, 50, 62, 
78, 88, 96
Postfeminist 131, 134-135, 145-146, 152, 163
Postmodern, postmodernism 49, 88, 131
Poststructuralism 49
Power, entanglement with knowledge 18-19
Power, dynamic relations 18, 41
Power asymmetries between the sexes 11
Power, Nina 15, 137
Practices of freedom, Foucault’s concept of 38, 
41, 44-47, 52, 64-67, 71, 89, 130
Pregnancy 81, 142, 149-150
Presentational forms 16, 87, 130
Proletarian, Proletariat 29, 74, 168
Prostitution 12, 85
Psychoanalysis 18, 30, 72, 81, 86, 153
Public lynching 158
Qur’an’s gender egalitarian message 102-108
Race 56, 90, 148
Racism 56, 77, 169
Ramabai, Pandita 93-94
Ramadan, Tariq 95, 112
Rape 85, 170
Recognition 25, 27, 69, 72-73, 75-76, 78, 88, 270
Reconciliation 27, 49, 73, 75
Relational autonomy 61
Relationship of the self to the self 39
Relatively independent status of ancient ethics 
40, 43, 48
Religion 16, 20, 65, 67-69, 86, 93, 95-97, 103-104, 
114-115, 122, 138
Religious groups, religious communities 42, 52, 
54, 66, 89, 92
Renaissance 52, 66
Resistance 31, 46, 56, 64, 95, 169
Responsibilization 117, 119
Rhouni, Raja 13, 113-114, 186
Rite 129
ritual exercises 64, 97, 121-122
Rose, Nikolas 35-36, 47, 134
Rousseau, Jean Jacques 142
Rubin, Gayle 139
Sade, Marquis de 142-144
Sadism 143
Sadiqi, Fatima 17, 95, 112, 122, 165, 169
Sandberg, Sheryl 132
Sarkeesian, Anita 161
Sartre, Jean-Paul 24-26, 71, 73, 77, 154
Satellite Queens 125
Scott, Joan 120-121
Scharff, Christina 131, 133-134, 136, 138
Schinkel, Willem 116-117, 120
School system 117-119
Schurman, Anna Maria van 9, 53-55
Secular, secularism 59, 64, 96, 114, 130, 166, 
168-169
Security 21-23, 32-33, 37, 47, 104, 118, 172-173
Second Sex, The 11-12, 15-17, 21, 28, 48, 57, 71-73, 
76-78, 80-82, 86-87, 91, 134, 138, 140, 143, 151, 
165-167, 172
chapter on Myth 17, 86, 159
Self-care 47, 149
Self-certainty 73, 77, 168
Self-hatred 78
Self in action 88-89
Self-practices 40, 43, 48, 66, 112
Self-techniques 35-36, 38, 40-44, 47-49, 51-52, 
54, 56, 63-64, 67, 70-71, 100, 121, 137, 173
Sex industry 85
Sex workers 85
Sexual contract 84, 132-133
Sexual love 82, 143, 167
Sexual personae 17, 129-131, 141, 146-147, 161, 
166-167
Sexual violence 11, 84, 168
Sexuality 81-82, 89, 120, 122, 141, 149, 150
Shaarawi, Huda 103
Shakman Hurd, Elisabeth 120
Sharia 111
Simons, Margaret 68, 73
Sisters in Islam 107-108, 111-112
Skinner, Quentin 144
Slavery 12, 75, 105
Slaves 28, 42, 52-53, 85, 132
Smith, Margareth 98
Social identity 77
Socio-political movements 44, 46, 51
Social security 172-173
Socialist, socialism 23, 83, 172-173
Solipsism 41
Soul 35-36, 53, 65, 88, 104, 134, 139
Sovereignty 37, 173
Spelman, Elisabeth 90, 171
Spirituality 20, 64-67, 70, 90
Spiritual exercises 41, 65
Spivak, Gayatri 19
State and market feminisms 14-15, 173
196 A New DAwN for the SecoND Sex 
Statism 172
Status hierarchy between the sexes 139, 166
Stevens, Christa 94
Stewart, Kristen 152-161
Strategy 44, 80, 88, 111, 155
Stromae 161
Studying upwards 18-19, 80-81, 85, 91, 163
Stuurman, Siep 99
Subjugated knowledges 19, 68
Success 11, 21-24, 34, 51, 53, 117, 119-120, 125, 
132-133, 135, 137, 160, 170-171
Suf ism 67, 97-100
Super Woman 21, 24
Taoism 92
Taylor, Charles 61, 78
Taylor, Dianna 15, 41, 71
Telos 40, 63-64, 97-98
Therapeutae 42, 65
Thompson, Kevin 36, 41, 44-46, 173
Tiqqun 132
Total theory 81, 91
all-encompassing theory 37, 77
Traff icking in women and children 12, 85, 167
Transition 26, 57, 138, 165
Transcendence 27-28, 71-72, 76
Tristan and Isolde legend 151
Turban movement 109
Twilight fan base 147, 156, 160
Twilight Saga 130, 146-152
Twilight hype 130-131, 146, 152, 160
Universal Woman 90-91
Vargas Llosa, Mario 22
Valverde, Mariana 35





Violence against women 84, 106, 108, 110
Visual forms 69, 130, 161, 163
Wadud, Amina 103-109, 111, 113
Walters, William 18-19, 32, 37-38
War on Terror 115
Waterbed 13, 86
Weber, Max 22-23
Welfare state 47, 117, 172
Wilkinson, Maryn 150
Willing ourselves free 47, 51




Wright, Richard 29, 68, 77
Wu, Brianna 161
Yafout, Merieme 110, 169
Zamora, Daniel 172
Zerelli, Linda 89
Zoonen, Liesbeth van 145-146, 163
